W. D., 8th New York State Militia, On the Battle and Retreat

28 02 2023

Correspondence of the Times.

8th Regiment,
Arlington Heights, Va., July 25th.

Receiving orders on Saturday, July 20th, to prepare for marching on the following morning, we filled our haversacks with biscuit and pork, for three days rations, and got everything in readiness to move forward at two o’clock A. M. As the day wore away, I noticed that other Regiments in our vicinity, were making the same preparations, and rumor was busy, as to where our next halting place would be, it was expected that we should have a brush with the enemy, but we did not expect it to turn out as it did. As night came on, our boys threw themselves on the ground to get a little rest, before the march began; it was rather a cold windy night, and laying on the ground in Virginia, (where dews are heavy, is not very pleasant.) I endeavored to sleep, but being so cold, I arose, and building a fire, some dozen of us laid around till one o’clock, when we commenced to get things ready, to fall in. Rolling our blankets, filling our canteens with water, with our muskets bright, ammunition all right, we formed company and fell into line. It is a singular sight to see Regiment after Regiment fall into its alloted place, not a drum was heard, nothing could be seen but the Camp Fires of the different camps. And the forests of flashing muskets of out men. Taking the road through the village of Centreville, and passing several Regiments in reserve, the advance column, came to a small wooden bridge, a short distance from which the Rebels were supposed to have erected a Battery. The plan of the attack seems to have been to have attacked them on two points at the same time. The advanced column consisting of about 9,000 men, under General Tyler, was to take the mountain road and attack the enemy in front, while Col. Hunter’s division of 13,000 men were to take a circuit through the woods to the right, and attack them in rear. In the flanking division was the 8th and 27th, also the 14th and 71st of New York, 2d Regiment of Regulars, and battery of artillery. Halting for a short time, to give the first division time to advance to the top of the hull, which we could see from the Bridge, we for the first time, heard the report of artillery, which was the 32 pounder our advance column had with them, trying its range on a force of the Rebels, which they could see at a distance. Our division now crossed the bridge, and leaving the central column, struck to the right, through the woods. After marching four or five miles we came to an open field, and expected the enemy would open fire, but there were none to be seen, every thing was as quiet on that Saturday night as if there were not a Rebel within mile around, but they were drawing us on (as in ou retreat over the same ground, they opened fire from concealed batteries.) Crossing the open space, we again took to the woods, and after a fatiguing march of some eight miles, again came to the open country, it was now between 9 and 10 o’clock, and we were beginning to get tired out, and wanted some refreshments, as out last meal was 6 o’clock the day before, the sun now began to tell upon us, and at every hold our boys would run to the trees, or any shady place to shelter from its scorching rays. Constant reports of artillery could now be heard, and as we came to an eminence we could see the smoke rise from the batteries of the opposing forces, while still farther to our left could be seen clouds of dust, as of large bodies of men moving along the road, we were anticipating it was ‘Patterson’s Division,’ instead of which, it turned out to be Johnson’s. We were now halted down in a meadow and laid our muskets down, expecting we had out-flanked the enemy, and they would retreat that way, when we should be able to capture them, (pleasant delusion, but of short duration) we had just commenced to open our haversacks to get a bite, when the order was given to fall in, and off we started on the double quick, for the battle field, through a creek, up to our knees in mud an water, and down the Road we ran, As the sound of artillery now became louder, and more frequent, we passed on still faster, throwing our blankets and haversacks by the road side, and grasping our muskets tighter, we still pressed on. A United States officer now rode by and made the remark not to be too hasty, as we should have enough before night. – We now came upon the scene of action, a large open space, surrounded by woods, in which were concealed the enemies infantry, while in front were their batteries, charging over the field, we came upon the Rebels in a clump of woods, After leaving some of our men, we drove them out and back into their entrenchments; meanwhile the Rebels had got the range of us with their guns, and poured in heavy charges of grape and canister, killing and wounding our boys in a frightful manner. We now fell back, and took a position on the hill, facing the Rebel earthworks, a brisk fire of musketry was now kept up on both sides, fortunately the aim of the enemy was bad, most of their balls, going over our heads. The enemy still kept up a sharp fire, and seemed to have double the number of guns in play we had, but their fire was not so effectual as ours, we could see our shot and shell fall into their batteries, and towards the afternoon an explosion took place, which blew some of them into the air. Our Brigade was now ordered again to endeavor to capture the battery on our left. With others, we marched over the brow of the hill, and charged up towards the Rebels, when they opened with heavy discharges of musketry, which we returned with interest. Several of my comrades now fell; on we went till within short range of the Rebel guns, when they opened a terrific fire upon us, the round shot and shell ploughed through our ranks. Our Brigade was now badly cut up. The dead and wounded were lying around in all directions, dreadfully mutilated. It was a disheartening prospect before us, 40 miles to our camp in Arlington, with no refreshments, nothing but dirty water to drink, and not enough of that, with a sanguine and merciless foe upon us. As we retreated I found the Regiments all mixed up, and every man making the best of his way back, few officers were to be seen, most of them having left their men to get back as best they could. There were [?], such as Governor Sprague. If the officers had kept with their men they could have retired in good order [?…] orderly retreats. The road was narrow and partly blocked up with wagons and ambulance for the wounded. Some of the men (to their disgrace) threw away their muskets and ammunition, and placed on gun carriages. – After marching some 7 miles, some of the poor fellow’s began to give out, and crawled into the woods, where they were probably taken by the enemy. I could now hear the report of Rifled Artillery, and began to think the Rebels had cut off our retreat. – Still onward, was the road to Centreville. – Crossing the open space, which I mentioned before, I found the enemy playing upon our retreating forces, those that could, took to the woods on the left. While the long line of ambulances and wagons kept straight on the road. As night came I reached the open road, where we had left the centre column in the morning, with such exultation. What a change now, as we went to battle in all the pomp of war, we looked in fact, invincible, but were now returning a disorganized mass of humanity. We had brought nearly all our cannon from the battle field, but as we came toward the bridge, had to leave some behind. The enemy allowed us to pass in the morning without interruption, but were now hitting the bridge most accurately with shot and shell, while another battery was playing with grape and canister on our poor fellows, passing down the road towards the bridge, the dead and wounded teamsters were laying by, just as they fell from their horses, while some of the ambulances were upset, and the wounded thrown out to be left at the mercy of the enemy. Arriving at the bridge, I found it blocked up with broken wagons, dead men, and horses, so that we could not possibly pass. Most of the men made their way through the water, while over their heads rattled the cannon balls. Crossing the river we got into the woods, but were not safe from the enemy’s artillery, their shot and shell came down amongst us, and fell and exploded not a yard from me. Feet sore and exhausted, I at last arrived at our camping grounds of the previous night, – a little rest, and onward again. From Centreville to Arlington, is 22 miles, as the night wore on some of our boys gave out, some took off their shoes and stockings and limped along as best they could. I got into camp about 10 o’clock next morning, and was right glad to get a cup of coffee once more. We had marched from Centreville on Sunday night from 2 till 11 A. M., had fought 6 hours on the battle field, and retreated forty miles in thirty-six hours.

W. D.

Oxford (NY) Times, 8/14/1861

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Contributed by John Hennessy





Unknown Officer, U. S. Infantry Battalion, On the U. S. Regulars in the Battle and on the Retreat

16 02 2023

The following from the Phil. Press, so far exceeds our ability to describe the events of the day, that we give it in place of our own imperfect description:

P. S. – I attach to this letter a copy of a letter addressed by an officer of the regular army to a friend, who has kindly consented that I may use it. It is graphically written, and will tell you many things which only an officer can tell:

The march from our bivouac, near Centreville, was taken up at 2:30 A. M. on Sunday. Among officers and men the impression prevailed that the action would occur at Bull’s Run, the scene of General Tyler’s repulse a day or two previously. In this they were disappointed. Tyler’s brigade posted themselves at the bridge over Bull’s Run, where they were ordered to feign an attack as soon as Col. Hunter’s division were known to be in position. This order was partially obeyed. Hunter’s division, composed of Burnside’s brigade and Porter’s brigade, after proceeding a mile beyond Centreville, made a detour to the right, and proceeded over a wood road, well covered from observation, to the left flank of the enemy, at Manassas, a distance of about eight miles. At six o’clock firing was heard on the heights at Bull’s Run, from a battery in Tyler’s brigade, which was promptly answered by the enemy’s batteries. Their position thus revealed, the advance division (Hunter’s) ascended a hill at double quick, and almost immediately the Rhode Island battery and Griffin’s West Point battery were in brisk action. The former was supported by the first regiment Rhode Island Volunteers, who maintained their ground nobly for half an hour. At this moment, Porter’s brigade composed of the Fourteenth, Seventh and Twenty seventh New York, with a battalion of U. S. Marines under Major Reynolds, and a battalion of U. S. Third, Second, and Eighth infantry, under Major Sykes, took their position in line of battle upon a hill, within range of the enemy’s fire. Burnside’s battery being sorely pressed, the enemy having charged closely upon it, the gallant Colonel galloped to Major Sykes, and implored him to come to his assistance. Major Sykes brought up his men at a run, and, with a deafening shout, they charged upon the enemy’s skirmishers, who fled before them several hundred yards. Forming in columns of divisions, Sykes’ battalion advanced a considerable distance, until they drew upon themselves an intensely hot fire of musketry and artillery. This was a trying moment. the volunteers expected much of the regulars, and gazed upon them as they stood in unbroken lines, receiving the fire, and returning it with fatal precision. Impressions and resolutions are formed on the field of battle in an instant. The impression at the moment is a happy one, and Heintzelman’s brigade coming up into line, our forces steadily advanced upon the retreating rebels. The batteries, which had been meanwhile recruited with men and horses, renewed their fire with increased effect, and our supremacy upon the field was apparent. The enemy’s fire was now terrific. Shell, round shot, and grape from their batteries covered the field with clouds of dust, and many a gallant fellow fell in that brief time. At this juncture the volunteers, who hitherto had behaved nobly, seeing their ranks thinned out, many losing their field and company officers, lost confidence and in a panic fell back.

Three fresh regiments coming on the field at this time would have formed a nucleus upon which a general rally could have been effected, but while the enemy had reinforcements pouring in upon them momentarily, our entire force were in the field and badly cut up. This was our action maintained for hours. The panic was momentarily increasing. Regiments were observed to march up in good order, discharge one volley, and then fall back in confusion. But there was no lack of gallantry, generally speaking, and not a great many manifestations of cowardice. Our artillery, which made sad havoc upon the rebels, had spent their ammunition, or been otherwise disabled by this time, and in the absence of reinforcements, a retreat was inevitable. – The time for the last attack had now come. Nearly all the rebel batteries were in place, though silent. There was a calm – an indescribable calm. Every man on the field felt it. I doubt whether any one could describe it. Gen. McDowell was near the front of our lines, mounted on his gray charger. And here let me say emphatically that, whatever may be the criticism upon his conduct by the military or the abominable stay at home newspapers scriblers and politicians, no braver man trod that turf at Manassas than Gen. McDowell. Major Sykes’ battalion of eight companies, five of Third Infantry, two of Second, and one of Eight, were marched several hundred yards to the right, and formed the right flank of the line. Several volunteer regiments were deployed as skirmishers on the centre and left. Thus they advanced to the crest of the hill. The enemy met them with batteries and a thousand cavalry on the right. The fire was terrific. We maintained our position for a half hour. Then it was discovered that the rebel cavalry were attempting to outflank our right. We had no force to resist them, and the bugle of the regulars sounded the march in retreat. – This, so far as they were concerned, was conducted in good order. On Major Sykes was imposed the responsible duty of covering the retreat of the army. In this he was assisted on part of the route by the United States cavalry under Major Palmer, The enemy followed us with artillery and cavalry, shelling us constantly, until we reached Centreville. Here we bivouacked for an hour, and then again took up the line of march. But of the retreat let me say a word, and pardon, my dear fellow, this incoherent letter, written in an excited Centreville bivouack, on my sound knee, the other severely scratched.

As I said, Major Sykes, with his Third, Second, and Eighth infantry, in all but eight companies, and they decimated, conducted the retreat. Three of his officers had been wounded, and one killed, or captured. Several of them were detached, endeavoring to rally the volunteers in front, and have them march off in some sort of order, so as to protect themselves against the enemy’s cavalry, known to be in rapid pursuit. On this duty, I recognized his special aide, Lieutenant McCook, of our Stat, I believe, and another infantry officer, who was also mounted. The road by which the retreat was conducted, the same by which we advanced, had been, I think discovered by the rebels a day or two since. The engineers, in reconnoitering the enemy’s position had been accompanied by a body of troops, who caused such a dust to rise from the road as to make their march easily observable from the heights at Manassas. Retreating by this route, no difficulty occurred in ranging their guns directly upon our line. Major Sykes quickly discovering this, and the cavalry advancing to reconnoitre the pass near Centreville, and charge it if necessary, obliqued in column, getting them upon the turf perfectly protected from the enemy’s shell which were continued to be fired upon the line of dust which was raised in the wake of the galloping cavalry. It was an admirable piece of strategy, reflecting great credit upon the gallant Major, whose conduct in the entire action, to my knowledge, drew forth the most enthusiastic expressions of admiration from both volunteer and regular officers. Were the infantry my arm, I could ask for no braver or more capable commander than he. But we are about to renew our march towards Washington, and entrusting this note to the driver of an ambulance in front of our line, in the expectation that it will reach you early, let me say that if we halt near Alexandria or Arlington and my horse can stand the pressure, I will not be long in grasping your hand. Till then, my dear fellow, believe me, your disgusted and worn out friend.

(Camden, NJ) West Jersey Press, 7/24/1861

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Contributed by John Hennessy





U. S. Congressmen on Blackburn’s Ford

13 12 2022

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

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ACCOUNT BY CONGRESSIONAL EYE-WITNESSES.

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Defeat of the Federals.

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JEALOUSY BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICERS.

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TYLER AND McDOUGAL AT LOGGERHEADS.

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MASKED BATTERIES AND RIFLE PITS.

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RAPID RETREAT OF CONGRESSIONAL AMATEURS.

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SUPERIOR FIGHTING MATERIAL OF SOUTHERNERS.

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BEAUREGARD’S POSITION TOO STRONG TO BE TAKEN BY THE NORTHERN ARMY.

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Excesses Committed by Federal Troops.

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The following account comes through our occasional correspondent at Washington, on whom we have great reliance:

The following account on the battle of Bull’s Run is given by honorables Wm. A. Richardson, John A. McClernand, of Ill., and John W. Noel, of Missouri (all members of the house), qho were eyewitnesses of the battle, and aided in several instances of bearing from the field members of the New York 12th, who were wounded.

The action commenced under the direction of Gen. Tyler, of Connecticut, at half-past one o’clock on Thursday afternoon at Bull Run, three miles from Centreville, between several companies of skirmishers attached to the Massachusetts First, and a masked battery situated on a slight eminence. The skirmishers retreated rapidly and were succeeded in the engagement by Sherman’s battery and two companies of regular cavalry, which after continuing the contest for some time were supported by the New York 12th, First Maine, Second Michigan, First Massachusetts and a Wisconsin regiment, when the battle was waged, with great earnestness, continuing until five o’clock. The Federal troops were then drawn back in great confusion beyond the range of the Confederate batteries, here they bivouacked for the night.

During the conflict the Michigan, Maine and Wisconsin regiments held their ground with a fortitude which, in view of the galling fire to which they were exposed, was most remarkable, but […] regiments retired in great disorder from the field, a portion of them throwing away knapsacks, and even their arms in their flight. A number of members of the former regiments openly asserted that their confused retreat was the fault of their officers, who evinced a total lack of courage, and were the first to flee.

After the retreat had been commenced, Corcoran’s New York 69th (Irish) and Cameron’s New York 79th (Scotch) regiments were ordered up to the support, but arrived too late to take part in the action.

There were three batteries in all. The first to open fire, which was the smallest, was situated on the top of an eminence; the second and most destructive, in a ravine, The latter was totally concealed from view by brushwood, etc., and it was in attempting to take the first by assault that the Federal troops stumbled upon it. The battle occurred at a point in the declivity of the road, where it makes a turn, forming an obtuse angle, and the third battery was so placed as to enfilade with its fire the approaches towards the junction.

Much jealousy, it is stated by the same authority, existed between the regular officers and those of the volunteer corps, each appearing desirous of shifting to the other side the responsibility of any movement not advised by themselves, and the jealousy, it is feared, will seriously affect the efficiency of the “grand army.” Thus, General McDowell expressly states that the battle was not his own, but that of General Tyler. The former officer said that he would not advance further until he had thoroughly and carefully reconnoitered the position of the batteries, their capabilities, etc; and the inference derived by my informants from his remarks, it that he deems his present force entirely insufficient to carry the opposition before him.

One of the gentlemen mentioned at the commencement of this account, gives it as his opinion that Manassas Junction cannot be carried by 50,000 men in two months, and all agreed in saying that the force under Beauregard has been entirely underrated numerically, and that their fighting qualities are superior. The cheers with which they rushed to the fight frequently rang above the din of the battle. Their numbers were not ascertained, but it is estimated that upwards of 5,000 South Carolinians, under command of Gen. M. L. Bonham, of South Carolina.

Their artillery was of the bestkind. A shot from one of their batteries severed a bough from a tree quite 2 miles distant, and but a few feet from where the vehicle of two Congressmen was standing. Our ball fell directly in the midst of a group of Congressmen, among whom was Owen Lovejoy, but injured no one, the members scampering in different directions, sheltering among trees, &c.,

It is said to have been admirably served too, as the heavy list of killed, and the disabling of Sherman’s battery, amply testifies.

There were a number of rifle pits also in front of the batteries, from which much execution was done by expert riflemen.

The Congressmen were greatly impressed with the extent and magnitude of the earth-works, entrenchments, &c., erected by the Confederates from Alexandria to Centreville and beyond. They were all of the most formidable and extensive character.

It is thought by them that Manassas Junction is encircled by a chain of batteries, which can only be penetrated by severe fighting. All the entrenchments evidence consummate skill in their construction. The entire column under General McDowell fell back at 8 o’clock on Thursday evening, a short distance from Centreville, where they encamped. They were joined during the evening by Heintzelman’s command, and on the succeeding morning by that of Col. Burnside, all of which troops are now encamped here.

Early in the evening Gen. Schenck’s brigade of Ohio troops was sent forward on the Hainesville road to flank the batteries, but no tidings had been heard from them up to 8 o’clock yesterday (Friday) morning, when the Congressmen left Gen. McDowell’s headquarters, bring with them his despatches to the War Department.

These dispatches put the loss of the Federalists in killed at 5, but Mr. McClernand sates that he himself saw a greater number than that killed. All of these gentlemen agree in estimating the number of killed at one hundred. The disparity between the statements of these gentlemen and the official despatches is accounted for by the fact that the latter are based upon the returns of the surgeons, and that many of the killed are oftentimes never reported until after the publication of the official accounts.

One remarkable fact which commended the special attention of the members of Congress was the absence from the portion of Virginia visited by them of all the male inhabitants capable of bearing arms. They state that they saw but few people, and those were chiefly old women and children – The women seemed to regard the soldiers with bitter hostility, and, to quote the language of one of the Congressmen, their “eyes fairly flashed fire whenever they looked at a soldier.”

General McDowell expressed no fears of being attacked, but seemed apprehensive of some of the volunteer corps stumbling upon a masked battery, and this “precipitating a general engagement.”

The loss of the Confederates is not known, but is conjectured by the Federalists to have been heavy. Among the killed is said to be one Col. Fountain – at least, a negro, deserted, so stated.

The excesses of the Federal troops in Virginia are exciting general indignation among army officers. A member of Congress, who visited the scene this morning, states that the village of Germantown has been entirely burnt, with the exception of one house, in which lay a sick man, who had been robbed, he was told, by an army surgeon of nearly every article he possessed of the slightest value, even to his jack-knife.

Gen. McDowell has issued orders that the first soldier detected in perpetrating these depredations shall be shot, and has ordered that a guard be placed over the principal residences of any town the troops may enter.

The (Baltimore, MD) Daily Exchange, 7/20/1861

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John W. Noel at Wikipedia

John A. McClernand at Wikipedia

William A. Richardson at Wikipedia





Sgt. William Lochern, Co. E. 1st Minnesota Infantry, On the Battle

16 11 2022

On July 3d the regiment embarked on steamers at the navy yard, and, landing on the “sacred soil” at Alexandria, went into camp something less than a mile west of that ancient and decaying town. Here, besides constant drilling, there were daily details of companies for picket duty, and frequent reconnaissances to the west and south. We were here brigaded with some other regiments, under the command of Col. W. B. Franklin, forming part of the division of Col. S. P. Heintzelman. Strict orders against meddling with private property of the inhabitants were promulgated; but as the rations were poor, and the people about us all secessionists, a few of the boys foraged a little, but with such address that other regiments, usually the New York Fire Zouaves, bore the suspicion and the blame. In a few days Oscar King, our enterprising sutler, appeared with a full stock of sutler’s goods, which he opened in a large hospital tent, and at once had a thriving trade with our men and those of other regiments. It was soon known that he had liquors, though none were sold to enlisted men ; and some of the men, by furtively feeling the packages through the tent cloth, located a barrel of whisky against the side of the tent ; and soon after dark one cloudy night they quietly drew a couple of the tent pins and rolled the barrel out and to an adjoining field that had been dug in places for various purposes, where it was tapped, and a dozen canteens and a couple of camp kettles filled, after which the barrel, still more than half full, was buried. The raiders were all from one Sibley tent, which contained fourteen men, in charge of a sergeant, and they had filled their own and most of their comrades’ canteens. Though the night was very dark, some one about the sutler’s tent soon observed the loosened pins, and the loss was discovered, complaint made to the colonel, and the lieutenant of the guard sent with a squad to detect the culprits. The delinquents had been on the watch, and, seeing this movement, at once confessed to their sergeant, and besought his aid in enabling them to escape detection. While disapproving their act, he was inclined to stand by his men, and even risk his chevrons to shield them from exposure and punishment. He therefore watched the proceeding of the lieutenant, observing that he stopped at the entrance of each tent, ascertained the number of its inmates, and called for and examined their canteens. Returning to his own tent, he found that but two canteens besides his own were empty, and getting these where they could be reached, and instructing a couple of men how to aid him, he awaited the officer, who soon approached and called, for him. ” Sergeant, how many men have you?” “Fourteen.” “Pass out their canteens.” With a peremptory order from the sergeant to the men to pass up their canteens rapidly, an empty canteen was handed to the officer, smelled of, and dropped at his feet as a second one was handed him, while a man, lying down where he could reach safely in the darkness, passed the dropped canteen back to the sergeant, to be presented to the officer again, and thus the three canteens were each examined five times and nothing found in the fifteen canteens supposed to have been searched. The camp kettles stood quietly at the rear of the tent and escaped suspicion; and as the search frightened the boys, and made them careful in the use of the liquor, they were never discovered.

BULL RUN.

For some time a general movement against the enemy had been expected, and on July 16th, leaving ten men of each company, mostly sick or ailing, in charge of the camp, the regiment joined in the advance of the army toward Manassas Junction, where the enemy was known to be in large force. The movement was slow, and we bivouacked that night near Fairfax Court House, on a ridge densely covered with young pine. The next day we reached Sangster’s Station, on the Orange & Alexandria railroad, where we halted early in the afternoon. Blackberries were plentiful, and eagerly gathered. The men had not yet come to relish hardtack and salt pork; and, although strictest orders against foraging had been issued, a squad of our men, bringing the dressed quarters of a young beef into camp, were accidentally met by Col. Franklin, the brigade commander, and his staff. Col. Gorman, who chanced to be mounted, rode up while Franklin was questioning the delinquents, and, in his magnificent, stentorian voice, overwhelmed the men with such denunciation and invective as no one but he was capable of, ending with an entreaty to Franklin to leave the men to him for such punishment as would be an effective example to the regiment. Franklin acceded to the request, and rode away, and Gorman, turning to the trembling culprits, said: “Now, you, take up that beef and goto your regiment, and don’t disgrace it by ever getting caught in any such scrape again.” The men were gleeful at escaping the punishment which seemed certain, and determined to profit by the colonel’s rather equivocal advice, at least to the extent of being more wary in the future.

On July 18th Capt. Bromley of Company B resigned, and Lieut. Mark W. Downie assumed command of that company, receiving soon after his commission as captain. Lieut. Geo. H. Woods of Company D succeeded Downie as regimental quartermaster. Companies A and B, with Lieut. Col. Miller in command, made a reconnaissance some five miles in advance, and till the rebel line was reached. During the same time the advance division of the army, under Col. Tyler, had a brisk engagement with the enemy near Bull Run. On July 19th our division (Heintzelman’s) marched to Centreville, where the entire army was concentrated, and remained the next day, while the enemy’s position along Bull Run was examined, and considerable skirmishing took place. On Sunday morning, July 21st, we were called up at one o’clock, and, an hour later, marched to the top of the hill at Centreville, where we were kept under arms until about six o’clock, while other troops, batteries and wagons were passing us. Congress men and other sight-seers, from Washington, began to throng the high ground near us, armed with field glasses. About six o’clock we moved through Centreville, and, on reaching Bull Run, turned to the right, and marched by a circuitous route, that seemed many miles in the sweltering heat, to the vicinity of Sudley Church, where we got the first extensive view of the battlefield, from which the continued roar of musketry and artillery had hastened our march. This view was obtained from Buck Hill, from which the Confederates had retired before our arrival. I have received from Gen. William Colvill, who was captain of Company F, a narrative of the battle, going into details more than I had purposed, but so interesting that I give it substantially entire:

Buck Hill was held by two Confederate brigades, Bee’s and Evans’, and the attack there was made by Hunter’s Division in front along the Bull Run slope. There was a series of attacks and repulses, and the end was long delayed, until a regiment of our (Heintzelman’s) division struck the enemy’s flank by way of the Sudley road, and, getting in a cross-fire, demoralized and broke
the Confederates, who fell back to Stonewall Jackson’s position, about a half mile to the rear. This position was almost the counterpart of the first, the right resting on the bluffs of Bull Run, and the left on the Sudley road, occupying the top of a long slope, screened all the way across by thickets of pine and oak. The distance across was about half a mile. In the thickets, and ex
tending across from valley to road, Beauregard says he had 6,500 men and fourteen guns about the time we reached Buck Hill. A study of his force in detail shows at least 8,000 men, and more guns, at the time we went in with Rickett’s Battery. Imboden says he counted twenty-six guns, saw them properly sighted and the fuses cut. These were in addition to his own battery, which had been retired from action. By order of Gen. Bee this battery had been placed at the Henry House, covering the Sudley road flank of the Buck Hill position, where it had done good service and exhausted its ammunition. Sherman’s Brigade came by the right flank of Buck Hill, from his crossing of Bull Run, about forty rods above Stone Bridge, just after the brush was over, and he assisted in the pursuit across Young’s creek. We arrived at Buck Hill soon after Sherman, and then saw his brigade, the Second Wisconsin, the Sixty-ninth New York (Irish) and the Seventy-ninth New York (Highlanders) drawn up across Young’s creek, close under the hill and out of fire, his line extending from the Warrenton pike nearly to the Henry House. At that time Griffin’s Battery of Porter’s Brigade, and Rickett’s Battery of our (Franklin’s) brigade, were pounding vigorously at a battery near the right of Stonewall’s position, the former from the northwest, and the latter from the northeast, angle of the cross-roads, and the enemy made but feeble reply. Stonewall had his trap set, and did not choose to disclose it. He was the strong man of that day. We drew up at Buck Hill, with eight other regiments, all screened from the enemy. There was our commanding general, and every division and brigade commander who had crossed Bull Run except Hunter, who was wounded, and Howard, who was held back at Sudley Ford. The commanders were all in consultation. The result was that Rickett’s Battery, supported by the First Minnesota, and Griffin’s Battery, supported by the Fourteenth New York of Porter’s Brigade, were sent to take position at the Henry House hill, within eighty rods of the enemy’s position. Near the Henry House a wood came down from the thicket, extending sixty rods along the left (east) of the Sudley road. This wood was surrounded by a rail fence, grown up on our side with scrub pine, so thick as to be impenetrable to the sight. We led off, marching by the flank, and followed by the batteries, coming under fire the first time, to the Warrenton pike, and then, on low ground, out of range, to the Sudley road again, which we followed across the creek (Young’s), and to the foot of the hill on the other side, when we filed left into the field, and then up the hill, coming by company into line, and then forward into line, with intent to form on the brink of the hill, the batteries to pass through the line at the centre, taking position a short distance in front.

When the first two companies on the right of the regiment came into line on the brink, we found ourselves about two rods from the Henry wood, the left of my company, the Second, about on a line with its northeast angle ; and, at the same time, Gen. Heintzelman, who had led our regiment to the foot of the hill, where it filed left, and then rode on by the road to the top, and across along the brink, gave our two companies the order, “Feel in the woods for the enemy,” to which we responded by volleys, and then by a continued fire. It would have been more sensible to have pushed a few skirmishers into the wood, who, in two minutes, would have notified us of the near approach of the enemy, although I suppose that within two, or at most three, minutes the regiment was in line at the brink, and the batteries in position, and the fate of the batteries determined. For they had barely unlimbered, and got in altogether but two or three shots, when the concentrated fire of all the enemy’s guns had killed all their horses and many of their men, practically disabling both the batteries. Griffin ascribes all his loss to the enemy in the woods, but the position of the dead horses close around the guns, and some barely detached from them, proves my account. There was, in fact, coming down the wood to meet us, at the time we opened our musketry fire, a brigade of the enemy, — that part of Stonewall’s masked line that had been stationed in the rear of this wood, — and which, on discovering the batteries, had pushed the Fourth Alabama Regiment to our front to cover that flank, and formed the other three regiments in close column, and advanced on the guns. Their advance from the woods was deliberate and quiet, and though perceived from the batteries, they were senselessly held by Griffin and Maj. Barry, the chief of artillery, as friends ; and so, coming close up, our regiment withholding its fire on account of the Griffin-Barry statement, delivered the first volley, which took effect in the centre of our regiment as well as the batteries, killing our color sergeant, and wounding three corporals of the color guard, and killing and wounding thirty men in the color company. Capt. Lewis McKune of Company G was killed, other companies suffered severely, and the colors were riddled with bullets.

The men of our regiment, at the centre and on the left, dropped on the slope and returned the fire, and we on the right, engaged in front, now for the first time discovering this enemy, turned our fire on his left rear at close range. But they pushed over the batteries, pretty well jammed up, and finally faced about toward us, and we expected their volley. Instead came a frantic waving of arms and fearful yells, of which we could not distinguish the words because of our-fire, which was kept up till the enemy faced to the rear, and after awhile gained distance enough to step out, and then to run, when we broke through the fence to follow alongside. We found the woods full of fleeing Alabamians, and picked up half a dozen too badly demoralized to run. I should have stated that before we crossed the fence, and at the height of our fire, we captured a mounted officer of the Second Mississippi, who had come around to us by the woods and Sudley road to “remonstrate against firing on our friends.” He was astonished on learning who we were. The Alabamians wore home-made clothing, — mostly red shirts ; and our red shirts, dim through the smoke, and in the supposed direction of the Alabamians, had misled the enemy’s charging column, and they got a taste of their own medicine. Beauregard says this charge was made by part of the Thirty-third Virginia. We saw distinctly three sets of colors — stars and bars — at the guns. We sent our prisoners to the Fourteenth New York, then drawn up very comfortably at ordered arms at the foot of the hill, with its right on the road. I never saw that regiment again, nor heard of the prisoners. Is it not strange that during all the while that our regiment was hotly engaged but a few rods in front, this regiment was held out of fire, to be stampeded (Griffin says), a few minutes later, by a few rebel horsemen? Generals of the regular army were there. The way was open, by the Sudley road and the thicket, to the enemy’s rear by a ten minutes’ march; and Beauregard’s charge or advance with his whole force, ten minutes after the repulse from our guns, above shown, left all his guns uncovered and unprotected for at least half an hour. After Griffin’s and Barry’s blunder in going into the concentrated fire of twenty-six guns at close range, and not un seen, and by the side of a wood filled with the enemy, their batteries were disabled in a minute. Yet they claim the guns were lost for lack of support. Were they not well supported when such an overwhelming and sudden attack was repulsed effectually by our regiment? Kirby of Rickett’s Battery was able to, and did, get off some of his guns. Could not Griffin have done the same? Beauregard says that just prior to the charge the Second Mississippi and Sixth North Carolina had been put in these woods, and engaged a large force, upon which they had inflicted severe loss on account of their superior marksmanship. Our two companies were the only men in the woods on our side who fired a shot above the brink of the hill prior to that charge. As for loss, one man in Company A was slightly wounded. The Eleventh Mississippi was brigaded with the Second Mississippi and Sixth North Carolina, and was probably with them in this charge: and the Thirty-third Virginia was in Stonewall’s Brigade. Gen. Bee and Col. Jones, Fourth Alabama, and Col. Fisher, Sixth North Carolina, were all killed about this time. Bee’s Brigade had rallied on Stonewall, which accounts for these regiments being together. To return: We followed the enemy to the thicket, where they disappeared. Our two companies then extended to a skirmish line, penetrating the thicket by cattle paths, and keeping up a lively skirmish fire as any of the enemy were seen dodging about. Then came the real rebel yell, as from their cover, down through the fields outside the woods, charged Beauregard’s whole command (except one brigade, still going the other way) to the guns. Now came the struggle between this force and Heintzelman, Sherman, Wilcox and Franklin for their possession. Beauregard says that from that time on he held our two batteries, as well as the plateau. The fact is not a man could stay on that plateau after the fight was over. It was covered effectually by the guns of both armies. I had forgotten to mention the Black Horse Cavalry, which passed and returned along the Sudley road, and were noticed as we penetrated the thicket. After the struggle for the guns, came Lieut. Col. Miller with reinforcements from the right companies of our regiment, which extended our skirmish line for some distance to the right across the road. Two or three regiments of the enemy appeared, but were held off by the skirmish fire, and disappeared. . After this came a charge of Howard’s Brigade into this wood, making a great racket, and firing, fortunately for us, overhead. Before they reached the front their fire subsided, and they were gone. The firing was heavier and more prolonged to the right. Beauregard says he sent then a brigade that cleared out Howard and Sykes’ regulars. I have no evidence of this. Long after this firing, and all sounds of battle, had ceased, being restive and anxious for news, I left my command and came back to the guns, which stood, powder-stained and grim, in the midst of slain men and horses. They looked forsaken; not a living creature was in sight in any direction. Soon, up the hill from behind the guns, came Gen. Wilcox, taking in the scene with sorrowful gaze. On inquiry I found he knew nothing of our troops or of the enemy. He then rode along the fence for the front. Hearing firing from my men, I left him at the southeast angle of the wood, at the edge of the thicket, and hastened toward them. They were watching the cattle paths, and now and then getting a shot. I explored for some distance, finally striking a field hospital, nurses and surgeons busy, and withdrew. Directly there was sharp firing in the wood across our rear, and, avoiding it, we drifted out to the road. Col. Miller, with the same feeling which had induced my visit to the guns, had moved toward them with his men, and met Preston’s Virginia regiment, and exchanged fire. Capt. Wilkin had joined him, and with my company I joined him as he came to the road, in a cut, where we made a good fight, and the enemy fell back toward our guns. We were now in some disorder, and got Company I’s flag (it is still preserved in Wabasha), borne by a gallant fellow, who, the next day, succeeded to the regimental colors, and formed upon it, counting off into two fair companies. We advanced along the fence toward the guns, driving the enemy into the thicket. Soon we got no reply, and, peering through the brush, found that the enemy had again relinquished the fight for the guns. Soon a lonesome feeling came over us — no other men in sight, and most of us suffering greatly from thirst. The men began to fall off, and Miller, with a reluctant glance toward the guns, gave the order to retire. Even then some lingered for a parting shot. The last, perched on a fence, and there himself a good mark, stayed till I insisted on his leaving. This poor fellow, Fred Miller of my company, had advanced furthest to the front of any man that day, and was at one time cut off from us by the enemy. On leaving the field he came across three of his comrades carrying a fourth to hospital, and, helping, was captured before the hospital was reached. He spent a long time in Southern prisons, and never rejoined the regiment. I had intended to omit some passages of my own adventure, but thinking one of them may shed some light on the general subject, I will give it. Gen. Beauregard mentions the last fight of the day, save some artillery firing from the Chinn house, as having occurred in the southwest angle of the cross-roads, where, as he says, Kershaw’s command attacked and drove off Sykes’ and Howard’s commands, who still lingered there. I suppose I was the force driven off. As I was about to start from the scene of the last action near the guns, I heard a man crying, and saw, about thirty rods to the right of the wood toward Chinn’s house, a soldier sitting on the ground, and went to him. He had dragged himself from the wood and was crying at seeing us leave, thinking himself abandoned. His leg was broken, the bone protruding. I quieted him, and, seeing a troop of our cavalry, hurried back. As I reached them I saw also what appeared to be a great force of our men advancing by the front of Buck Hill right about Dogan’s house. Just then one of the cavalry exclaimed, “The devils are coming,” and every horse whisked about, and the cavalry was off like a streak. I turned to see what was the matter, as a platoon of the enemy was making a left wheel out of the woods to the right into the road. Their sweep would have taken me in. Instinctively I broke for the ravine, putting into Chinn’s brook, the ravine being four or five rods from the angle of the woods. As I reached it I heard the chuck of the muskets, as they fell forward into the left hands, and dropped on my back on the slope, as the bullets buzzed like a nest of hornets past my head. I sprang up and, glancing back, saw a row of blank faces, astonished at seeing me break down the ravine, soon out of their fire. When I reached the brook three or four of our men were drinking. A Wisconsin man dropped dead in the brook as we started. A Fire Zouave jumped the brook at my side, and ran up the hill. He also dropped, but with my help reached the top and the shelter of a tree. The battery from Chinn’s house at this time threw shells down the brook, which is in line with the course of Young’s creek below their junction. My eye took in the course of the valley for half a mile, and there was not half a dozen men in the entire distance — boys lingering along the stream for water, whose retreat the shells expedited, and made ludicrous by their ducking to avoid them. This is the shelling which Beauregard describes as playing through, mangling and dispersing vast crowds of men. The platoon that routed myself was of Kershaw’s command, and was the only force of the enemy that, up to that time, had reached that angle. I soon reached the head of the column, near Dogan’s house, at the Warrenton pike. Gen. McDowell was there, his face turning alternately red and white with every pulsation, with Arnold’s Battery directed to the wood on the right of Chinn’s house, and its gunners ready to fire. Now, advancing in fine order down the plateau toward our abandoned guns, were two of the enemy’s brigades in line of battle, with cadenced step and bright uniforms, and arms glittering in the evening sun. Our own column, made up of men of all commands, was fast melting away, four men disappearing where one was put in line; and Gen. McDowell, on a suggestion that it was of no use to try to hold the place, with great staff officer dignity directed his aid “to please request Capt. Arnold to recede in this direction,” pointing to the Sudley road. Capt. Arnold was within six feet, heard the direction, and was ready, and had his horses on the gallop almost as soon as the message was transmitted, the general and staff following close after. Looking back, our column had disappeared, breaking across lots for Sudley Ford. As I passed along a fence a glance showed the enemy making a final charge on, and leaping with huzzas upon, our abandoned guns, from which they had been thrice driven, twice by our regiment alone. I will close by the observation, impressed on me at the time, that, except at the guns, on their first two advances, the enemy behaved timidly, and advanced with hesitation and seeming dread. This was apparent when they were held so long in the woods by a thin line of skirmishers, and when a whole regiment, making the third attack on the guns, was repulsed by not more than two companies. Company A brought in one captured officer, a Col. Coon of a Georgia regiment.

There is little to add to Gen. Colvill’s narrative, save some further account of the left companies of the regiment, which were separated from the right companies when Rickett’s guns were taken back through the centre of the regiment, and by the movements of the right companies, described by Colvill, which took them away from the left. In moving by company into line, in the brush, as we neared the top of the hill, the left companies were the last to get into line at the edge of a narrow clearing, into which the batteries had just passed. There was already firing at the right of the regiment, but the occasion was not understood. In a few minutes a strong body of infantry appeared in the edge of the wood just opposite us, and fifteen or twenty rods away, dressed in gray, but without showing colors. Many called out that this was the enemy, and prepared to fire. But from the batteries came the word that these were friends, and Col. Gorman forbade firing. Our Massachusetts volunteers and some others wore gray uniforms, which probably was the cause of the mistake. Almost at the moment of Gorman’s order we received the fire of this line, which extended far beyond, opposite us, on the left; and, at the same time, the enemy’s batteries, less than eighty rods away to our left, and in plain view, opened a heavy enfilading fire, and, between the two, the regiment and batteries with us suffered as detailed by Gen. Colvill. Kirby’s men got off a part of Rickett’s Battery, but all other guns were deserted by the surviving gunners, all the horses, and many of the men, being killed or disabled. The left companies dropped on their knees, and, as the enemy made a rush for the guns, poured in an effective fire, which, aided by the fire from, the right, described by Gen. Colvill, caused them to retire after the guns were reached. Getting again in the shelter of the wood, they returned our fire, which was steadily kept up, and their batteries again opened on our line. As this enfilading fire from the artillery was effective and well directed, and the enemy had mostly disappeared from our immediate front, we were ordered back, and retired in good order to the foot of the hill, where we remained for a considerable time, and were then ordered back to Buck Hill, where our knapsacks had been left. We were thence conducted across the Sudley Ford, and found the remains of several regiments which had been engaged. Here we were joined by a considerable part of the right companies of our regiment; and, as it grew late in the afternoon, Gov. Sprague, then commanding a Rhode Island regiment, rode up with information, confirming our fears, that the general result of the battle was disaster, and proposed retreat to Centreville. Gen. Gorman offered the First Minnesota as rear guard, but as Sprague insisted on taking that position, our regiment moved off next to the rear, in perfect order, in column by platoons. After awhile a large body of our cavalry came, in a disordered rush from the rear, along the road, and our men had to break to the right and left to let them pass, and did not afterward try to keep in regular order. All the way was found, in broken wagons and abandoned material, confirmation of the disaster; and at one place, not far from Centreville, the enemy was shelling the road over which we passed. Going through Centreville, we halted near our bivouac of the night before about dark, so much fatigued that most of the men dropped upon the ground, and were asleep at once, expecting a renewal of the battle the next day. In about half an hour the cooks called us up for coffee, and to receive the order to inarch at once for Alexandria. This was the hardest of all. We knew we had met with a repulse, but had not realized that it was to be accepted as defeat, and the prospect of a march of twenty-five miles, after such a day of phenomenal heat, long marches and hard fighting, seemed an impossible undertaking. How it was accomplished cannot be told. The writer, carrying knapsack, haversack, musket, and complete soldier’s outfit, was, on this march, several times awakened from deep sleep by stumbling against some obstruction. In the forenoon of the next day we were back in our tents at Alexandria, thoroughly exhausted and soon asleep, but in the afternoon were called up and marched to Washington, six miles or more, by way of Long Bridge. This was done in a heavy rain, and we were compelled to stand on the street more than an hour, in torrents of rain, when churches and halls were assigned for temporary shelter. Some, assigned to Bishop Mcllvaine’s church, were immediately supplied by the good bishop with coffee and plenty to eat, and, in other places, our constant friend, Col. Aldrich, appeared promptly with a troop of colored servants, bearing pails of hot coffee, baskets of eatables, and other comforts, most acceptable in our drenched and exhausted condition. The regiment never had a warmer or more efficient friend than Col. Aldrich. Generous and open-handed, he was always ready and alert to do everything in his power for the regiment, or for any man belonging to it, while his cheery voice and genial humor brought jollity and good-feeling whenever he appeared.

An obvious fault on the federal side in the battle of Bull Run consisted in putting the troops into action in small detached bodies, without properly ascertaining the position or strength of the opposing force, or even properly regarding what was in plain view. The result was that in almost every attack our force there was too small, and was beaten in detail. When we came upon Buck Hill we saw the New York Fire Zouaves, which had been sent from that position, alone go up to the attack of the enemy’s line, and it was of course defeated in brief time. There was no reason why several regiments there idle were not sent with it, or with us, when we were sent just after. Even the Fourteenth New York, which followed us, was not put into action with us, but left idle at the foot of the hill. And it is hard to understand why we and the two batteries were put on that plateau at all, swept as it was by so many Confederate batteries, so near and plainly in sight. Untenable as the position was, the men of the First Regiment fought like veterans, and it received special commendation in the reports of both Franklin and Heintzelman. The character of its fighting appears from its losses, which were forty-two killed, one hundred and eight wounded, and thirty missing, one hundred and eighty in all, being more than twenty percent of the men engaged, and the heaviest loss, in proportion to men engaged, of any regiment in that battle. The missing were nearly all wounded prisoners in the hands of the enemy. The surgeon and assistant surgeon remained in attendance upon the wounded on the field, when they might have escaped with the retreating troops, and were detained as prisoners. Their skillful care of our wounded doubtless saved many lives, and as they were treated with marked consideration by the Confederates during their captivity, and allowed to look after the welfare of their men to some extent, they attended to the cures, and alleviated, in many ways, the condition of their wounded comrades. They never returned to the regiment, as their places had to be filled before they were released, and for the time being they were nominally transferred to other organizations. Both were gentlemen of highest professional standing and skill, and of most genial, companionable traits. Surg. Stewart had been mayor of St. Paul, and, being a man of untiring energy, had, aside from his professional duties, always taken an active, intelligent part in all public affairs, in which his sagacity, disinterestedness and personal magnetism gave him great influence. After being exchanged he remained at St. Paul on duty connected with the mastering in of troops. After the war he was elected member of Congress, and afterward appointed United States surveyor general of Minnesota. He died at St. Paul, Aug. 25, 1884. Asst. Surg. C. W. Le Boutillier became surgeon of the Ninth Regiment Minnesota Volunteers, and died in the service, April 3, 1863.

William Lochren, “Narrative of the First Regiment,” in Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars 1861-1865, Minnesota. Board of Commissioners (Minneapolis: Pioneer Press Company, 1892), pp. 7-13.

Contributed by John Hennessy

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Capt. William Colvill, Co. F, 1st Minnesota, On the Battle, Retreat, and Revisiting the Battlefield

14 11 2022

BULL RUN.

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A Proud and Thrilling Reminiscence of the War – The First Minnesota on the Historic Field.

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Address of Col. Wm. Colvill at the Re-Union of the Survivors of the First Minnesota, June 21, 1877.

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The official reports of the first battle of Bull Run give a very vague idea of the plan of operations – of what was actually done, or of the part taken by different regiments; and there has been no account of it that does anything like justice to this regiment. While my account will be mainly confined to the part of our regiment in it, I will try to so connect it as to make the whole tolerably clear. I shall have to state it in great part from what I actually saw, and it will make the narrative somewhat person, but as such personal expression will give some notion of the individual experience of each of us, I hope it will be thought excusable.

The maps accompanying Gen. Pope’s report of the second battle of Bull Run, as published in the report of the Congressional committee on the conduct of the war, cover the ground that was the scene of the first battle, and will do for a study of it, although it must be borne in mind that at the time there were vast forests covering most of it, which at the time of the second battle had almost entirely disappeared.

Centreville is six miles north of Manassas, and four miles northeasterly, by the Warrenton pike, of the Stone Bridge. Bull Run is midway between Centreville and Manassas and flows southeasterly so that the Warrenton pike runs diagonally up the valley from Centreville and the bridge. The road to Sudley’s Springs turns off to the west, half way between Centreville and the bridge, and winds for four miles up and down the heights to the Springs, which are two miles above the bridge. The Warrenton pike pursues a straight course from Centreville to Gainesville at the crossing of the Manassas road six miles west from the bridge, and from the bridge follows the general course of Young’s creek – a small rivulet heading near Gainesville – which it crosses several times. The creek puts into the Run one mile below the level of the country, and just below the toll-gate where the fight commenced, and where the stream crosses the Manassas pike, blowing north is about forty rods wide. The hills are low and generally of easy slopes.

Roads diverge in all directions from Sudley’s Springs. Three of them cross the pike between the bridge and Gainesville – the most easterly of which runs due south to New Market and then passes southeasterly about a mile in the rear or to the west of Manassas. At the toll-gate, the point where it crosses the pike, this road is one and a half miles south of the Springs. From the toll-gate to Manassas is six miles. A direct road runs from the bridge to New Market. There is also a direct road six miles from the Springs – to Hay Market, which is two miles north of Gainesville on the Manassas railroad. The railroad runs almost due east from Manassas and therefore crosses the valley of Bull Run diagonally.

We struck the enemy’s outposts on the 18th of July, six to ten miles east of Bull Run, and they withdrew from both sides toward and along the railroad.

Centreville is on higher ground than Manassas, but the latter and Bull Run in that direction were at that time entirely hid by dense and seemingly interminable forests. To the south and east from Centreville we overlooked nothing but woods as far as the eye could see.

In these woods in the early part of the night of the 20th was a continuous roll of picket firing. At 2 o’clock of the morning of the 21st, when we drew up in Centreville ready to march, this had entirely subsided, and the sun rose out of the woods, as we still stood watching the passage of our noiseless columns, as it rises out of the sea revealing nothing of its gloomy and silent depths. Of itself this omen was sombre and saddening, and the thought that within these depths were thousands of enemies thirsting for our blood, made the solemnity awful. We turn our eyes to the west, to the long lines of our soldiers, with uniforms and arms bright and gleaming in the sun and become more cheerful.

Hunter’s division has passed, followed by a train of carriages containing headquarter officials and citizens. In the venerable form of some portly Senator some one has recognized General Scott, and with a thrill of enthusiasm at the thought that this grand old soldier is to direct the battle we step out on the march. Our Colonel’s face beams with excitement as he recalls the glories of Mexico, and our chaplain, with head bent forward, is dreaming of the campaigns of Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon – of the knightly adventures of the Crusaders, and whatever his historical reading recalls – and he has come actually to bear a part in such things. Our column of march, before and behind, as far as the eye can reach, is brilliant with the blue, gray, green and scarlet uniforms of the different regiments, trumpets and drums, artillery, cavalry, Highlanders, Moors, Turks, Germans, Irish – making up a lively scene and coming up to his most realistic ideas of the pomp and panoply of glorious war.

Following Hunter’s division, we strike the timber beyond Cub Run and turn off along the Sudley Springs road, winding up over the wooded heights, from which a great part of the way we overlook the valley of Bull Run to the left. Our march is slow. At length we hear the boom of the 32 pounder, announcing that Tyler’s column has come into position at the Stone Bridge. We see the smoke of the shell as it explodes high in the air. It is not answered, but miles away beyond we see the black smoke of a locomotive and hear the clatter of the cars – a long train, with speed accelerated by the shell, rushing towards the Blue Run mountains – misty in the distance – for reinforcements. After another hour Bull Run comes in sight in front, and we see our regiments – resting at ease in the meadow below – and the Sudley’s Church. The heat has become intense, and we anticipate our rest and lunch with great pleasure, but now comes the sound of quick cannonading – now sharp volleys of musketry. The enemy has attacked our advance beyond the Run and Burnside is pushing his brigade, which has to lead, to force him back down the stream. This he does by moving up ravines, flanking his – the enemy’s – position, when he falls back again and opens fire. This is again and again repeated, the fire becoming faster, and in the meantime we come to the stream and fill our canteens. Regiment after regiment, rushes over the Run – part of Hunter’s command – to Burnside’s support. We cross over and marc about a quarter of a mile down the valley, halt, unsling knapsacks and wait for orders. The fight grows more furious; wounded men are carried back to the church – now a hospital; our people are cheering; now the roaring of guns and musketry is constant. Who? the rebels! We are now fuming and fretting, our Colonel fidgety and swearing. “We are not going to have a chance at all.” “Keep cool, Col. Gorman,” says Gen. Franklin, riding by, “you will soon have enough of it.” After a few minutes, which seemed hours, an aid comes dashing back and we are ordered to the front – double quick. We leave our knapsacks in heaps and follow him along a bridle path, running through the woods, up the hill. We meet Hunter wounded, who cheers us on. After a mile or more, out of breath, we come out in a field, and to a halt, the head of the regiment near the toll gate on the Warrenton pike. In front of us to the east is the valley of Young’s Creek, in which are drawn up several regiments. We notice the Highlanders and Ellsworth’s Zouaves, conspicuous from their uniforms.

We see groups of officers at sheltered points watching the enemy. He has a battery half a mile away on the summit, between us and Stone Bridge. Another battery is upon a knoll and protected by earthworks, and is about forty rods to the south of the first battery and across the pike from it. A house with shrubbery and orchard is between it and the pike. Both batteries are firing over our men – out of their site in the valley of Young’s Creek – at Rickett’s battery of 12 pounder Napoleons, which is in our front, near the edge of the hill. It answers them, the gunners springing to their work with every nerve. To our right, across the pike and about 40 rods away, we see the New Market Road leading down to the valley of Young’s Creek and up the other side, where, as it rises the hill, it enters the woods and is soon lost to sight. The woods on the left of it are second growth pine; on the side fronting us, about 30 rods across – this wood is bounded on the left by the pasture extending from thence to the pike, in which is the entrenched battery. The wood on the right of the New Market road is a heavy growth of hard timber, extending indefinitely to the southwest.

It seems the plan is, for us, Hunter and Heintzelman, 20,000 strong, to follow this New Market road a sufficient distance to clear the Stone Bridge and then to join with Tyler, who is to cross when we are opposite and sweep down between the New Market road and Bull Run, on the rebel rear, stampede them with a rush to the direct road between Centreville and Manassas, then give the hand to our reserved division at that point 10,000 strong which has been all the time menacing that crossing of Bull Run, and together sweep over and gather up what is left of the enemy at Manassas, and end the war before night.

We must give the hand to Tyler and we are already several hours behind time, and these two batteries between us and Tyler, and commanding both positions, must be driven away.

McDowell, Heintzelman, Franklin, Wilcox, Burnside, Gov. Sprague and others are on the field, and at length have a consultation. Rickett’s smooth bores can’t reach the enemy’s guns. He is to move down the New Market road and then out into the field to the left, near the left corner of the pine wood, and open upon them at half distance, and the First Minnesota is to support him. Gen. Franklin has given Gorman his chance, and so notifies him. Gorman, with that decision which was his characteristic, immediately gave us the order “forward.” We gaily file across the pike, our banners – each company has one – fluttering. The chaplain rushes to the front, tears the fence away to let us through, and commences his speech. Each company as it passes picks up the sense of it. It is “to remember Minnesota, whose honor is in our keeping.” It is appreciated and our eyes gleam an answer. In the field across the pike we for the first time draw the enemy’s fire. Their shot came dropping down almost perpendicularly on account of the elevation of the guns, now one side and now the other, and we answer each with a bow – too low to be graceful – but you see we are an awkward squad. “Shame! stand up like men!” exclaims Lieut. Welch, indignantly. “The d—-dest politest regiment I ever saw,” says Orderly Maginnis. There was a laugh and no more ducking. We are in the New Market road hurrying down the hill. Our battery has limbered up and followed us and in its turn drawn the enemy’s fire. We cross the creek, file into the field towards the designated position. The leading company half way up the hill – we come company into line, then forward into line double quick. Capt. Wilkins, Co. A, now just beyond the brink, is halted, say two rods from and fronting the pine wood, which is so dense that we cannot see into it at all. Company F joins on his left, its left extending to a point opposite the corner of the wood; Company D is coming up; gen. Heintzelman, riding from the New Market road by the rear of the first two companies, directs to “feel in the woods for the enemy,” and we open with volleys fires low, repeated rapidly. There is no answer. Now the color company, C, is coming into line, when our battery gallops between it and the right color company, H. Rickett unlimbers his first gun to the front, fires one shot, and in answer the enemy concentrate the fire of their two batteries upon him. In an instant his guns are horseless and most of his men killed or wounded. We on the right, still firing into the woods, hear a tremendous volley to the left, and looking that way see where the guns stood in sight a moment ago a great mass of men in gray. They have come out of the woods – but a few rods to march – and with Union colors at their head, came up to the guns and fired almost in the faces of our center companies – till then in doubt whether they are friends or not. That fire caused awful destruction. One-third of the four center companies were laid prostrate. The remainder, with Company D on the right and K on the left, instantly fall as skirmishers on the slope of the hill and answer their fire; they still move obliquely to the left, but the left companies, E and B, have now come into line and with the two right companies pour an oblique fire through and through them. They are faced quartering towards the left of the regiment, and answer the fire in that direction; we fairly riddle them with bullets; they try to face about; they gesticulate desperately – we suppose they yell, but cannot hear them; we fire away. Along comes some one shouting “They are friends – it is all a mistake.” We point to the three sets of rebel colors now unfurled in a group directly opposite us, and answer with a volley. We keep firing, and they are in an awful state of desperation – still gesticulating frantically. As I look over the lines of Company F at the enemy some one touches my right shoulder, and looking up there is a horseman in gray. We have many regiments dressed in gray and I think nothing of it, but he says “why do you fire on your friends?” “Where do your belong?” Second Mississippi brigade.” “We are the First Minnesota.” The officer dismounts and is sent under guard to the Brookly Zouaves – 13th New York – which we now observe is drawn up at the foot of the hill. Directly the guard reports that he has been received by Capt. Butts of that regiment, who promises to take good care of him. We never saw the prisoner or that regiment afterwards.

We maintain our fire; the enemy gradually gain space and step out towards the rear, we following through the woods and along the fence on the left of it, but they soon get into a run and are out of sight. We find many men lying dead or wounded in the wood, some skulking. We pick up dozens of them, who are sent to Capt. Butts. In a moment we have learned the story. They belong to an Arkansas regiment that had been placed to hold the line of the wood, with instructions not to fire until the battery came up. Our volleys had surprised and stampeded them. The main force, to their left rear, supposed that this fire was that of this Arkansas regiment, and immediately started for the guns. Not being faced towards us on the right, and our six centre companies dropping instantly on to the slope of the hill, made such a gap that when they did see us we appeared to them to be a separate command, which they took to be the Arkansas regiment. This conviction was aided by the fact that that regiment had no regular uniform, except a red shirt like ours. Our two companies in the wood at length skirmished to the upper end of it, Capt. Wilkin extending his right to the New Market road. We came out upon a long brush and bramble pasture, intersected with sheep paths. A short distance up, but partially hidden by the brush, we see numbers of men, apparently resting, but in no regular order. At the same instant, with a terrific yell, up springs a large force of men at the left side of the brush lot, and charged in three lines – still yelling – past us towards our guns. They are soon lost to sight, but we hear their volleys and the answering fire. The firing soon receded towards their batteries, and soon was taken up with rapid volleys and yells and answering volleys and cheers towards the Stone Bridge, and in that direction is now a heavy and constant cannonading. There is lively skirmishing in the woods to the right of the New Market road, and from that direction and also from our rear there is a constant “whiz” of bullets. Numbers of our men are wounded here. After some time – in the excitement we have not taken note of it – all becomes quiet, the woods are dark and the silence dismal. We think it best to rejoin the regiment – half a dozen of us. We are so scattered and the woods so dense that the rest are out of sight, and we grope our way back to the point where we entered the woods. We find a few men walking about, piles of dead, and four of our guns, black and begrimed with powder, still in the same place and no one with them. They look desolate enough. While looking about in surprise and doubt at the silence and absence of troops, I will give an account of what I afterwards learned of the performance of our own and other regiments while we were in the woods. After the first regiment had been relived from the attack first mentioned it had its dead and wounded to carry back and care for and the left was drawn up further down the valley under the shelter of the hill, which was there more precipitous. The Fire Zouaves, the Highlanders, the Brooklyn Zouaves and a Michigan regiment, all in Wilcox’s command, had in turn charged the rebel batteries and been repulsed. Many of the Fire Zouaves in fleeing stopped with our left and with it and other troops repulsed the attack last mentioned. This last force of the enemy, either repulsed or ordered back, had retired in the direction of their batteries and soon, with other of their regiments, became engaged with the Irish brigade, part of Tyler’s command, which brigade had in the meantime forced the crossing of the Run. The Irish whipped the enemy beautifully and drove them clean from the field, artillery and all, but soon, for want of discipline and efficient commanders, had scattered and finally joined the rout back to Centreville – the panic having then commenced in Tyler’s command on the Centreville side of Bull Run, among those who had not fired a shot or seen an enemy. Our Colonel Miller had rallied the scattered men of our regiment, and with a number of Fire Zouaves advanced with them into the wood on the right of the New Market road and maintained a constant skirmish fight. Afterwards this command repulsed the charge of the Black Horse cavalry, which came down this road. This, I suspect, was very easily done.

But to return to my story. By this time a few more of the boys found their way out of the woods and joined us. Along came Gen. Wilcox from the left, quite forlorn, with perhaps a dozen of his command grouped about him, but inquiring for the enemy. Mentioning the position where we had seen the enemy “resting” we started up through the woods for the place, keeping near the fence on the left side, where the was more clear for his horse. We met skulkers in the way, who surrendered without resistance. A Zouave was about to bayonet one of them when Wilcox interfered and saved him. If living he may remember this incident. At length we came to the upper edge of the wood. The General continued straight on, going carefully, with a few men about him, while our boys started towards a large tree off to the right, which was a good post for observation. We found the place occupied as before, but in much greater numbers, and we open fire upon them. An officer approaches from their direction, waving his hand. It afterwards appeared that he was a surgeon, and this was a temporary field hospital. The number of wounded here must have been very large, as this field, as far as we could see it, was all occupied by the same purpose. Drawing back from the hospital we now looked for Wilcox, but could see nothing of him or his party. He was taken, as we afterwards learned, near this place. He was for a long time confined with Lt. Welch at Richmond. There was now a lively skirmish from towards the point where we had entered the woods – probably those who had taken Wilcox – and working to the New Market road and around it, we came down and found our brave Col. Miller hotly engaged with his independent command. His position was disadvantageous, being outside of the woods, while the enemy, less in numbers, were covered. His command was disheartened, and though the Colonel “rallied” incessantly at the top of his voice, was fast stealing away. Some one thought of a flag. Capt. Pell was also “rallying” with the greatest vigor some distance down to the left, and we observed the colors of his company and called the bearer to us, and advanced it to the wood, getting in line for a moment and pushing the enemy back. The color bearer, Sergeant Knight, behaved most gallantly. This flag under which the last stand was made and the last fighting done that day is preserved at Wabasha, and should be among the collections of our State Historical Society. To return. It was useless; before we realized it out men were mostly gone, and the Colonel with reluctance fell back with the flag. As for myself, stealing along the woods to the right to keep out of the line of fire, I found abundant evidence of a severe conflict in that direction – numbers of wounded and dead. The wounded, alarmed at the idea of being left, calling for aid. With a few words of assurance they are quieted. Happening at this point to catch a view of our old position at the toll gate, there appeared a large column of men, vast numbers apparently pushing up from the ford. At the same time a squadron of our cavalry gaily trotting across the valley from that direction. The impression received was that we were to make another and decisive advance. Getting back to the road along the line of the wood, this cavalry had then halted, and while I was trying to make out the movements of our large column at the toll gate, quick as a flash about turned this cavalry and off at the gallop. Stupidly gaping after them, I was aroused by the sound of footsteps, and looking around saw a platoon front of the enemy, marching double quick and within a few feet distance. This startled me out suddenly as a partridge, and my movement startled them as much. Instinctively I started for the slope of the hillside towards the creek and diagonally from the road. It was but a few rods, but that distance was never made more quickly by a race horse. You should have seen me with a secesh smooth bore on my shoulder, a large artillery sword in my hand, make my long shanks spin.

There was no sign of fatigue, although before I considered myself just about used up. Turning my head when about half way to the bank – the platoon was in the act of wheeling around the corner of the wood towards me; a step or two farther – I heard the chuck of the muskets brought briskly to the palm of the hand, and then with a mighty leap and feet thrown out I landed on my back with head crouched downwards, just below the top of the bank, and at the same instant, through the space I filled when they pulled trigger, buzzed a hundred bullets. You should have seen the surprise – the actual astonishment in their faces, as jumping up, I rushed down to and up the creek, out of fire behind the bank. Here were men, in spite of the fire, stooping to drink. A little further up we crossed the creek together and ran towards the hill, on the other side. As we ascend this hill a new battery opens down the creek from the southwest, firing at some stragglers near the pike, who quickly disappear. We rush over the hill, pass a house full of wounded men – where we find our regimental colors with part of the guard – hurry them out and take to the pike, to our large column, which we find to be a great mass of men without regimental or company organization. Here was Miller again, “rallying” fresh as ever. Everybody “rallying, but this last shelling was too much; back into the woods and out of sight our men were dropping away, but with a dogged, sulky look, as if they felt that this last rallying was beyond the limits of good sense. Looking towards the front, beyond the scene of our engagement in the forenoon, we saw three regiments of the enemy, marching to their front with perfect line and step, the setting sun gilding their uniforms and arms. It was a beautiful sight. In a moment, turning towards our men, not one was to be seen; they had vanished.

In the turnpike was Gen. McDowell; just beyond a section of artillery directed to the southwest. In a quizzical humor and looking towards the enemy’s regiments, I suggested that he had better rally in the woods. His face at that time was turning alternately red and white with each pulsation. A whole history could be read in it at a glance. He preserved his dignity, however, and paying no attention to my impudence, calmly directed an aid to request Capt. —–, the commander of the battery, to recede in this direction, pointing out the road to the ford. The gunners were prompt; never were horses put to and on the gallop more quickly. That is when it was a case of merely receding.

We are now at the ford – the church and space about it filled with the wounded, with our regimental surgeons and nurses nobly resolved to stay by their charge. We have hardly time to say good-bye, when a rapid skirmish fire from the direction of Hay Market urges us on, and were up over the hill, speeding our way to Centreville. Our loss in the fight was 280 men killed and wounded, thrice more than any other regiment on our side.

Here the story ends. Every one knows about the retreat that evening and our “masterly advance” on Washington the next day. Anything new about it would be a mere statement of personal incidents, of which you have already had a surfeit. One thing, however, I must mention, as I learned it subsequently. In that long, wavering line, extending from the toll gate almost to the ford that I before mentioned, and which so suddenly disappeared, far on the left, were three or four organized regiments – the First Minnesota and Burnside’s Rhode Islanders. Even these began to feel the wavering impulse common to the mass, and the men began to drop out. At this time our colors have rejoined. Gen. Sprague is lecturing the Rhode Islanders, telling them that their safety depends upon maintaining their organization. In van! Up to the First Regiment the whole mass has drifted away, when Gorman, with his clear and ringing tones, gives the order to form column by platoons, and this the First Regiment executes with the same precision as upon dress parade, and amid the cheers of the mob away it marches, bringing up the rear in good order.

The true story of Bull Run is of itself a sufficient criticism and commentary upon that battle.

The enemy spread out like a fan resting upon Manassas as its base, and extended behind Bull Run from the Stone Bridge to the Occonquan, twelve miles front with sides of six miles. This triangle, whether attacked from the south of the Occonquan – from the east by the railroad or on its left, as was done from Sudley’s Springs, would necessarily, as its lines were compressed, have presented a stronger front to the attacking force. Suppose that we had been well handled, and our whole right and centre put in on time, and had forced the enemy back two or three miles further; or as it was, suppose he had judiciously offered less resistance and voluntarily fallen back: – At evening, in case there had been no panic, we would have been that much further from our base and cut off from it by the march of Johnson directly from Hay Market, on our rear, and soon enveloped by double our force, would inevitably have been taken.

Again the enemy’s generalship – Beauregard with the bulk of his army, not exhausted as he pretended – for he had not moved it from its position fronting Centreville and the east, from which direction he expected the main attack, deeming our attack on his left as but a feint – had a line of advance on the railroad to Alexandria, more direct and nearer than ours from Centreville, and by that route he would have met no serious opposition. Such an advance, made with promptitude and decision, would have cut off the greater part of our army and probably have terminated the war in the enemy’s favor; at least Washington would have been an easy capture. He lost this decisive opportunity, and the moral effect of this battle upon our people and the lessons it taught our commanders and soldiers in the end, proved it to be the most important and valuable in results to us as any battle of the war.

Two years after, while we were at Manassas Gap watching Lee on his advance to Gettysburg, by leave I took a day to go over the old ground. The woods were all gone, even the stumps all hacked up for fuel, and the whole face of the country seemed to have been leveled off. I could not trace our line of march or recognize any starting point. At the mansion near which the rebel battery had been entrenched during the fight and which for some reason had been preserved with its orchard, garden and flowers in the original freshness – an oasis in the scene of desolation and death – a good natured darkey who had been a spectator of the fight, after answering my inquiries about it, offered to show me the place, the grand point in his mind of the whole fight, where the Zouaves and Tigers “had it.” It was but a short distance away, and when on the spot, all the surroundings arranged themselves in order in my mind, and I was at home. It was the place of the repulse of a whole brigade of the rebels from Ricketts’ battery by the First Minnesota regiment, and at which, from that regiment alone, the enemy sustained more loss on that day than from the whole army beside.

Our red shirts and blue pants had possessed the enemy with the idea that they had been engaged with the indomitable Fire Zouaves. But the record of course is that we supported the battery.

We had with us ever after, until his death, that greatest of artillery captains, Kirby, who after the repulse of the enemy, succeeded Ricketts – who was wounded – in the command, and by the greatest exertion succeeded in saving two of his guns and bringing them off; the other four, not through the courage of the enemy, for they remained for hours in possession, had to be abandoned for want of means to remove them. This Kirby ever after would have no other regiment to support his battery, and we afterwards did so on many a hard-fought field, standing fast, as at Bull Run, even when, as at Fair Oaks, the surging masses of gray had at the turning point of the fight, charged up to and been blown from the very muzzles of his guns.

Red Wing (MN) Argus, 7/5/1877

Clipping image

Contributed by John Hennessy

Colvill appears to refer to the path taken from Cub Run to Sudley Springs Ford as the Sudley Springs Road, the Sudley Road as the New Market Road, and the Stone House as the Toll House. Ricketts’s battery was comprised of 10-pounder rifles, not smooth bore Napoleons.

William Colvill at Ancestry.com

William Colvill at Fold3

William Colvill at FindAGrave

William Colvill at Wikipedia





Lt. Nathaniel Rollins, Co. H, 2nd Wisconsin Infantry, On the Battle

26 10 2022

THE WISCONSIN SECOND IN THE BATTLE

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A FULL AND GRAPHIC ACCOUNT

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(Correspondence of the State Journal)

Arlington Heights, Va.,
Near Washington, July 15, 1861.

I have just received your paper of the 22d, and do not feel justified in allowing the grossly false accounts of the battle of Bull’s Run, given in your telegraphic dispatches, to go uncontradicted. I wish to give a sufficient explanation of the battle to let our friends know that it was not cowardice of the men that caused the defeat.

We left camp near this place, on Tuesday afternoon, and proceeded by way of Vienna and Germantown to Centreville, the rebels retreating before us. About one mile beyond Centreville we encamped in an open field, without tents; and while in this vicinity we had the battle of Thursday, in which a few were killed, and of which your readers have doubtless heard. On Saturday we received orders to march at 6 P. M., but near evening this order was changed to march at 2:30 A. M., on Sunday. The next morning, at 2 o’clock, we got up, prepared in light marching order, formed a column, and advanced towards Bull’s Run, directly west, marching left in front. Our column was under Maj. Gen. Tyler. To the north of us advanced a column under Gen. Hunter; to the south of us advanced a column under Col. Richardson, and another under Gen. Schenck, all moving westerly, to attack the rebels at different points. We proceeded about three miles, when our column filed to the north, into the woods, made a turn in the woods, and came back to the road, so that our left rested on the east and west road, and our line extended north. The other regiments were formed at different points, covering batteries. – Carlisle’s battery was placed in front of us, and the 32 pound rifled cannon, of which we had one, instead of eight, as stated in your report, was stationed in the road. These movements were all made very quietly. At precisely 6 o’clock the performance was opened by a shot from the 32 pounder. It was instantly answered by a gun from the north-west, probably from Hunter. Again all was quiet as a Sabbath morning in a country village. By dressing our line forward, we advanced by the front through the woods, near to the open fields, where we found our batteries had been placed ready for action. Here we halted and sat down in line. The regiment was behind a rise of ground and about fifteen rods from our battery. We shortly heard from Richardson’s guns at the south of us, near where the battle of Thursday had been fought. Very soon our guns opened fire across the open field in front of us. The field here is about one hundred rods wide, skirted on the west by thick bushes and farther on and up the next hills by heavy woods. The firing continued from this position for about one or two hours. A few shots were returned but they fell short. Many of our officers went up near the guns to see the sport which we watched with much interest. After the fire had continued perhaps an hour we saw the line of Hunter’s column moving rapidly forward on the road north of us, and bending to the south, evidently coming in to the rear of the rebels. He was discovered by them shortly after he was by us, and they at once began to change the direction of their forces to meet him. His column soon emerged from the woods on to a large elevated plain, where they encountered the rebel army in considerable force. This plain is about one and one half mile from the position occupied by us and across Bull’s Run. The fighting that ensued there was of the sharpest kind. In a few minutes that field was covered by a dense cloud of smoke, through which we could see the blaze of Hunter’s cannon as he advanced and drove the rebels into the woods to the south west of the plain. They soon appeared to be reinforced and rushed from the woods and renewed the fight. But Hunter was too much for them still and again drove them back. This much of the fighting had been in plain sight of our position. Still the heavy cannonading continued at the south of us, near the battle ground of Thursday. Hunter’s condition becoming critical by the continued reinforcements of the enemy, our brigade was ordered across Bull’s Run to reinforce Hunter. We flanked to the right and moved rapidly off to his assistance. We passed round over a high ridge of land to the north west of our former position and before descending the hill to cross the run, we halted and relieved the men of their blankets and then proceeded at double quick time down the hill, then about one half mile to the run. Here we were halted and filed on the right into line of battle along the north-east bank of the Run. Sherman’s Battery came down, but being unable to cross the Run there, returned up the hill. When they returned our Brigade flanked to the right and filed across the Run and up the rugged bank on the opposite side and hastened on to the high ground. When we reached the upper plain several regiments were already there and the rebels had retreated. On the north-west side of this plain is timber from which Hunter emerged. On the south-west side is the timber in which the rebels first retreated. This high plain contains several large farms. To the east the ground descends about one hundred and sixty rods. The high ridge extends around to the south in a circle forming a basin of about one mile in diameter with an outlet to the north-east toward Bull Run. We now occupied the high ground on the west side of the basin. The rebels occupied the east side, where they had a strong battery or fort that had already opened a fire upon us of cannon balls and shells. Our batteries of flying artillery now began to come up the hill. Several regiments of infantry were now formed fronting the enemy’s battery, and we began to move down the hill to the east. Some regiments were in advance of us and some following. The plain in the rear of us showed signs of hard fighting. Many dead and wounded men were lying on the ground, although most of them had been carried into the edge of the woods. This battery of the rebels with several others near it, was masked by thick woods, and from our position we could see nothing of it except the smoke from their guns. As we moved down the hill the balls and shells plowed up the ground all around us, frequently throwing dirt all over the men. The bottom of the ravine is not smooth, but the water from the high land around had cut it into numerous smaller ravines. When we had got to the foot of the western slope of the basin, we were ordered to halt and lie down. Here we laid for some minutes. The most of our line by lying close to the ground were a foot or two below the range of their sot, which flew over us thick and fast. While lying here, some things occurred worthy of note.

Our 32 pounder had been brought across the run and planted at our left on the high ground, and opened a sharp fire on the enemy’s battery on the hill. Most of our other batteries had been brought across and planted on the high ground in our rear, when all (six batteries, I think) commenced fire on the same battery of the rebels. This firing continued from one to two hours with perfect fury. While lying here I was a regiment coming down the hill behind us in column of companies. A cannon ball aimed at the column hit their color bearer, cut his head off, and broke the flag staff. The colors were caught by one of the color guard before it struck the ground, was raised to its place. The companies closed in, and in less than a minute the column was moving on again at quick time as if nothing had happened.

During this cannonading one battery after another of ours was silenced by the guns of the rebels. Still the enemy’s fire was as fierce and effective as ever. The air seemed to be full of balls and bursting shells. During the firing, we got up, flanked to the left, and filed over the hill side down further into the ravine, and immediately to the bottom of the hill on which the enemy’s large battery was located. Before we left our first position, the fire from our batteries had nearly ceased, and while lying there (which was by order of the General) we saw the New York Fire Zouaves, Ellsworth’s regiment, charge on the hill. They were repulsed and driven back after a terrible resistance, by a large body of infantry and cavalry. The fight between the Zouaves and the rebels became so hot that all lines and forms were broken up, and they were entirely overpowered by numbers; their retreat was of course a confused mass. We afterwards learned that this was the point at which the rebels had just been reinforced by twenty thousand fresh troops under Johnston. When the rebel cavalry charged on the Zouaves, they turned on the rebels and swept their men and horses like chaff. By this time all our cannon except one or two were silenced, and the enemy’s battery appeared to work as briskly as at first. As the Zouaves began to fall back, the battery opened on them such a fire of grape shot and bullets as we have never seen before. Under this fire it was absolutely impossible for men to form and rally, but before they had got fairly to retreating down the hill, another regiment of infantry was ordered to charge in the same place. Our cannon was now silent, demolished, ruined. We were ordered forward. We had come from our first position to the foot of the last hill, during the charge of the Zouaves and two or three other regiments. A narrow road is cut into the hill on the south side leading up to near the battery. On the North side of the road, next to the battery the bank is some three to five feet high. On this side of the road the water had cut a ditch one or two feet deep. Here the road, and especially the ditch was crowded full of dead and wounded men. By getting close to the bank they were partially protected from the enemy’s fire, and here the poor fellows had crowded in, and crawled one upon another, filling the ditch in some places three or four deep. I will not sicken your readers by a description of this road. By this time the ground on the lower side of the road was covered with men from different regiments, who had charged up to that battery and been overpowered by the superior numbers, and fallen back. – They were already in such a confused mass that they could not be reorganized without much trouble, even if they had not been exposed to a fire, much less could they do it when the air was literally full of grape shot and rifle bullets. Under these circumstances the 2d Wisconsin Regiment were moved forward along this road and halted. The smoke prevented us from seeing the length of our line, and the noise from hearing commands, even if any were given. By a sort of mutual consent we rushed over the dead men, climbed up the bank, over the fence, and up the hill to the rebels’ guns. Here the rebels displayed a Union flag, when a part of our officers cried out, “They are friends, don’t fire.” By means of this delusion they gained an advantage over us, when down went the Union flag, and up went the emblem of treason. This piratical warfare is a favorite game of theirs. We had rushed up too near to be much effected by cannon, when our men commenced the wickedest kind of a fire ever known. The woods in front of us was full of men firing on us. The fort now plainly seen was full of men, and its embankments lined with the fire of musketry aimed at us. Under this fire they stood some minutes returning it steadily but with terrible effect, when they fell back three or four rods toward the road, firing all the time, here they stopped retreating and rallying again rushed back to the rebels and poured three or four rounds into them. On their side ten guns were fired to our one. The bullets whistled all kinds of tunes, but mostly in quick time. As we fell back a little toward the road again, the New York 69th, about which there has been so much gas, fired a full volley into us from the rear. Our men after standing such a fire from the rebels, and then a rear fire from a set of fools from our own side, retreated to the road, and there got mixed with other regiments, and as was an inevitable consequence retreated down the hill in confusion. The 69th after firing one or two rounds broke and ran in perfect confusion. As we went down the hill they opened a terrible cross fire from the woods on our left, at the same time the fort in our rear kept up a constant fire of grape shot and shell after the retreating regiments. The regiments had been sent up one at a time, not near enough to render each other any assistance, and still so near as to be in each others way when they were forced back. As the men retreated there were no officers of high rank to stop them and rally them again. No reserve had been prepared to cover our retreat in case of defeat. We went into the battle with not more than thirty thousand to the outside. The rebels had full sixty thousand in the morning and were largely reinforced during the day. Their artillery was better and heavier than ours. They were at home, acquainted with the country, and had been fortifying these hills for months. The result is before the world. The retreat was bad enough, Heaven knows, but I deny positively, that it was through any fault or cowardice of the men. Through the battle Lt. Col. Peck led his regiment as became a soldier. The fault on the field was higher up than the rank of Colonel. But it commenced with certain parties at the North, such as the editors of the New York Tribune, in urging this battle before the army was ready. There is no doubt it was fought, at this time, very much against the wish of Gen. Scott. Northern impatience wanted a battle and they have had it. But let the proper parties father the imp and not charge it upon the men who fought like tigers against every odds and disadvantage. – During the engagement Col. Coon acted as aid to Col. Sherman, (acting Brigadier General.) and did his duty bravely and well. I have made this letter much longer than I had intended. We all hope your next news from us will be more cheering.

N. R.

Wisconsin Daily State Journal, 7/30/1861

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Unit History – 2nd Vermont Infantry

18 07 2022

Cols., Henry Whiting, James H. Walbridge, Newton Stone, John S. Tyler, Amasa S. Tracy; Lieut.-Cols., George J. Stannard, Charles H. Joyce, Newton Stone, John S. Tyler, Amasa S. Tracy, Enoch E. Johnson; Majs., Charles H. Joyce, James H. Walbridge, Newton Stone, John S. Tyler, Amasa S. Tracy, Enoch E. Johnson, Erastus G. Ballou. The 2nd regiment was organized at Burlington and there mustered into the U. S. service for three years on June 20, 1861. It left Burlington for Washington, June 24, and encamped on Capitol hill until July 10, when it was ordered to Bush hill, Va., where it was attached to Howard’s brigade, Heintzelman’s division, with which it fought at Bull Run on July 21. It was next sent to Chain bridge for guard duty along the Potomac, and assisted in the construction of Forts Marcy and Ethan Allen. In September it was formed with the 4th and 5th Vermont regiments into the Vermont brigade (later known on many battle-fields), the 2nd brigade of Smith’s division. Winter quarters were established at Camp Griffin and occupied until March 10, 1862, when the regiment marched to Centerville, thence to Alexandria, where it was ordered to Newport News and participated in the Peninsular campaign. It was in action at Young’s mills, Lee’s mills and Williamsburg. In the organization of the 6th corps, the Vermont brigade, to which had been added the 6th Vt., became the 2nd brigade, 2nd division. From April 13 to May 19, 1862, the brigade was posted at White House landing. On June 26 it shared in the battle of Golding’s farm and in the Seven Days’ battles it was repeatedly engaged. It was ordered to Alexandria and to Bull Run late in August. The corps was not ordered into the battle and was next in action at Crampton’s gap and Antietam in September. It fought at Fredericksburg Dec. 13, 1862, after which winter quarters were established near Falmouth and broken for the Chancellorsville battles in May, where the 6th corps made a gallant charge upon the heights. It fought at Gettysburg, and from Aug. 14 to Sept. 13, 1863, the brigade was stationed in New York to guard against rioting and then rejoined the corps. Winter quarters were occupied with the Army of the Potomac near the Rapidan and a large number of members of the regiment reënlisted. The command continued in the field as a veteran organization and broke camp May 4, 1864, for the Wilderness campaign. On the opening day of the fight at the Wilderness Col. Stone was killed and Lieut.-Col. Tyler fatally wounded. A number of the bravest officers and men perished in the month following, during which the Vermont brigade fought valiantly day after day with wonderful endurance, at the famous “bloody angle” at Spottsylvania, at Cold Harbor and in the early assaults on Petersburg. On July 10 it formed a part of the force ordered to hasten to Washington to defend the city against Gen. Early, and shared in the campaign in the Shenandoah valley which followed the fatiguing marches and counter-marches and the battles of Charles town, Fisher’s hill, Winchester and Cedar creek. During the last named battle the brigade held its ground when it seemed no longer tenable and only withdrew when it was left alone. Returning with the 6th corps to Petersburg in December, it participated in the charge on March 25, 1865, and the final assault April 2, after which it joined in the pursuit of Lee’s army and was active at the battle of Sailor’s creek, April 6, where it is said to have fired the last shot of the 6th corps. The service of the 2nd closed with participation in the grand review of the Union armies at Washington, after which it returned to Burlington. The original members who did not reënlist were mustered out on June 29, 1864, the veterans and recruits at Washington, July 15, 1865. The total strength of the regiment was 1,858 and the loss by death 399, of which number 224 were killed or died of wounds and 175 from other causes. In his well-known work on ‘Regimental Losses,” Col. Fox mentions the 2nd Vt. infantry among the “three hundred fighting regiments” of the Union army.

From The Union Army, Vol. 1, pp. 108-109





Unit History – 3rd Michigan Infantry

16 06 2022

Cols., Daniel McConnell, Stephen G. Champlin, Byron R. Pierce, Moses B. Houghton; Lieut.- Cols., Ambrose A. Stevens, Edwin S. Pierce, Moses B. Houghton, John Atkinson; Majs., Stephen G. Champlin, Byron R. Pierce, John C. Hall. This regiment was organized at Grand Rapids in April and May, 1861, and was mustered in June 10. It left the state June 13 and was attached to Richardson’s brigade, Tyler’s division, McDowell’s corps. It was engaged at Blackburn’s ford and Bull Run, and a detachment was in the engagement at the Occoquan river. The regiment encamped near Alexandria during the winter under command of Col. Champlin, Col. McConnell having resigned, and in the spring was assigned to the 3d brigade, 1st division, 3d corps. It participated in the battle of Williamsburg and at Fair Oaks lost 30 killed, 124 wounded and 15 missing. In the Seven Days’ battles it fought at Savage Station, Peach Orchard, Charles City cross-roads and Malvern hill, July 1. Prince de Joinville, speaking of the brigade, said of its work at Fair Oaks: “It advanced firm as a wall into the midst of the disordered mass and did more by its example than the most powerful reinforcement.” The regiment was engaged at Groveton, sustaining heavy losses, and was at Chantilly on Sept. 1. It then was on the march and in camp at various points in Maryland and Virginia, finally going into camp at Falmouth on Oct. 23. It was under fire three days at the first battle of Fredericksburg, and then encamped near Falmouth until May 1, 1863. It fought at Chancellorsville, losing 63, and at Gettysburg, losing 41. It then moved to Manassas gap and was engaged at Wapping heights. It was ordered to New York during the draft in August, but returned to Culpeper in September; was in a skirmish at Auburn heights in October; and in the battle at Kelly’s ford on the Rappahannock the following month. It took part in the Mine Run campaign, engaged the enemy at Locust Grove, and at Mine run charged the enemy’s works, driving him from three lines of rifle -pits. The regiment went in camp at Brandy Station on Dec. 2, where 207 of the men reënlisted and were furloughed home, rejoining the regiment in mid -winter. On May 4, 1864, the regiment encamped at Chancellorsville, being then in the 2nd brigade, 3ddivision, and corps, and in the battle of the Wilderness it sustained heavy loss. It fought at Todd’s tavern; participated in a successful charge at Spottsylvania, capturing a number of prisoners and 2 flags; was engaged at the North Anna, its losses in the engagements of May being 31 killed, 119 wounded and 29 missing. It fought at Cold Harbor, and on June 9 the regiment, with the exception of the reënlisted men and recruits, was ordered home for discharge. The remaining officers and men were formed into a battalion of four companies and attached to the 5th Mich. The regiment was mustered out at Detroit June 20, 1864. Its total strength was 1,000; its loss by death, 224. As soon as it was mustered out orders were issued to reorganize the regiment. This was done during the summer and it was mustered in at Grand Rapids on Oct. 15. It left the state Oct. 20, reported at Nashville and was ordered to Decatur, Ala., where it was stationed during November, being in a small engagement on the 23d. It was then ordered to Fort Rosecrans, Murfreesboro. The pickets being forced in and the town possessed by Faulkner’s brigade, four companies of the 3d joined other troops in a spirited engagement, repulsing the enemy. The regiment was in numerous small affairs and on Jan. 16, 1865, it moved to Huntsville, Ala., where it was assigned to the 3d brigade, 3d division, 4th army corps. It moved to Jonesboro, and was ordered to Nashville on April 20. On June 15 it was sent to Texas, reaching Green Lake July 11, and on Sept. 12, it started for San Antonio, reaching there two weeks later. It engaged in provost guard duty and during the winter two companies were on duty at Gonzales. The regiment was mustered out at Victoria May 26, 1866. Its original strength was 879. Gain by recruits, 230; total, 1,109. Loss by death, 158.

From The Union Army, Vol. 3, pp. 391-392

3rd Michigan Infantry roster





Unit History – 2nd Tennessee Infantry PACS

27 05 2022

Was organized in May 1861, and mustered into Confederate service at Nashville, Tennessee, and mustered into Confederate service at Lynchburg, Virginia. Its members were recruited in the counties of Rutherford, Maury, Davidson, Bedford, Trousdale, Shelby, and Sumner. The unit was assigned to J. G. Walker’s and French’s Brigade, fought at Aquia Creek and First Manassas, then in February, 1862, returned to Tennessee. Later it was attached to Cleburne’s, L. E. Polk’s, Tyler’s, and Palmer’s Brigade. After fighting at Shiloh, Richmond, and Perryville, the regiment participated in the campaigns of the Army of Tennessee from Murfreesboro to Atlanta, then was involved in Hood’s Tennessee operations and the Battle of Bentonville. It lost thirty-seven percent of the 300 at Richmond, had 4 killed and 39 wounded at Murfreesboro, and of the 264 engaged at Chickamauga, more than sixty percent were disabled. The unit totalled 262 man and 146 arms in December, 1863, had 133 in action at Ringgold Gap, but could muster only 65 after the battle of Nashville. Few surrendered on April 26, 1865. The field officers were Colonels WIlliam B. Bate and William D. Robinson; Lieutenant Colonels John A. Butler, David L. Goodall, and William J. Hale; and Majors WIlliam R. Doak and William T. Driver.

From Joseph H. Crute, Jr., Units of the Confederate States Army, p. 276





Unit History – 17th Virginia Infantry

17 05 2022

Was organized at Manassas, Virginia, in June, 1861, using the 6th Battalion Virginia Infantry as its nucleus. Men of this unit were recruited in the counties of Warren, Fairfax, Loudoun, Prince William, and Fauquier. After fighting at First Manassas under General Longstreet, it was assigned to General Ewell’s, A. P. Hill’s, Kemper’s, and Corse’s Brigade. The 17th fought with the Army of Northern Viriginia from Williamsburg to Fredericksburg, then participated in Longstreet’s Suffolk Expedition. During the Gettysburg Campaign it was on detached duty at Gordonsville and later served in Tennessee and North Carolina. Returning to Virginia it fought at Drewry’s Bluff and Cold Haror, saw action in the Petersburg trenches, and ended the war at Appomattox. This regiment totalled 600 men in April, 1862, lost 17 killed and 47 wounded at Williamsburg, had 18 killed and 41 wounded at Seven Pines, and had 17 killed, 23 wounded, and 73 missing at Frayser’s Farm. It reported 48 casualties at Second Manassas, 13 at South Mountain, and of the 55 engaged at Sharpsburg about 75 percent were disabled. At Drewry’s Bluff 7 were killed and 23 wounded. Many were captured at Sayler’s Creek, and 2 officers and 46 men surrendered on April 9, 1865. The field officers were Colonels Montgomery D. Corse, Arthur Herbert, and Morton Marye; Lieutenant Colonels William Munford and Grayson Tyler; and Majors George W. Brent and Robert H. Simpson.

From Joseph H. Crute, Jr., Units of the Confederate States Army, pp. 368