Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston to Brig. Gen. Samuel Cooper on Intent to Move to Manassas

CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA FROM APRIL 16 TO JULY 31, 1861

CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. – CONFEDERATE

O. R. – Series I – VOLUME 2 [S #2] CHAPTER IX, p. 982

Headquarters,
Winchester, July 18,1861.

General S. Cooper:

General : I have had the honor to receive your telegram of yesterday. General Patterson, who had been at Bunker Hill since Monday, seems to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, twenty-three miles to the east of Winchester.

Unless he prevents it, we shall move toward General Beauregard today. I am compelled to leave the sick and most of the baggage for want of means of transportation. There are wagons enough to carry but four days’ provisions, but the urgency of the case seems to me to justify a risk of hunger. I am delayed by provision for the care of the sick.

I leave General Carson here with two brigades of Virginia militia, with orders to fall back if the enemy should approach in force.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. E. JOHNSTON

President Jefferson Davis to Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston on Reinforcements

CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA FROM APRIL 16 TO JULY 31, 1861

CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. – CONFEDERATE

O. R. – Series I – VOLUME 2 [S #2] CHAPTER IX, pp. 976-977

Richmond, July 13,1861.

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston:

My Dear General : I have just received yours of yesterday,[*] and am surprised at the extreme inaccuracy of the young officer who reported to you that about 15,000 volunteers, extremely well armed and equipped, were assembled in North Carolina, but were not accepted because they offered to serve for but twelve months. The truth is, that about ten days ago it was reported to me that three regiments for twelve months and five for the war were ready for service; they were all ordered to proceed immediately ; one of the twelve-month’s regiments arrived about three days ago, with a special request that, as they were mountaineers, they should be sent to General Garnett; they were imperfectly equipped, but as soon as ready were sent forward. Another, for the war, came yesterday; it was fully equipped, and to-day has gone to your column. Another, imperfectly armed and equipped, two days since was reported as subject to my orders at Danville; it is on its way here by my order. I have written and telegraphed to hasten the movement of the troops promised and the organization of others, and have asked if they could not be raised that arms would be sent to me for troops who would promptly respond. So much for the fiction of the 15,000 men. The same story with variations has been circulated here, and you will not be surprised if, weary and heart-sick from fruitless exertions to obtain the troops necessary to re-enforce our different columns, I have come to speak harshly of men who circulate stories so destitute of truth. From Mississippi I could get 20,000 men, who impatiently wait for notice that they can be armed. In Georgia numerous tenders are made to serve for any time at any place, and to these and other offers I am still constrained to answer, “I have not arms to supply you.” I have seen the opportunity which the incapacity of the enemy offered to beat his columns in detail, but have neither had the men nor the transportation to avail of the occasion. From day to day have sought such arrangements as would secure the more steady and rapid advance of the troops and then to leave here to share the fortunes of the Army in the field, but have never seen the occasion when I might go away without leaving everything behind me in such condition as would cause my absence to be injuriously felt.

I will not weary you with details of delay and mismanagement, but I could not permit you to suppose that I had allowed any rule to stand in the way of the one great object of giving to our columns capacity to take the offensive and prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces. I recollect Captain Pendleton well, and when we were all younger esteemed him highly as a soldier and a gentleman. I some days since directed that he should have rank as a colonel and be put in command of the batteries of your army. General Lee’s attention has been called to your remarks about intrenching tools and the muskets which had been promised. He will endeavor to supply your wants. I realize the difficulty to which you refer of a retreat, and feel that it would expose Virginia to temporary, if not permanent, disintegration; it is therefore only to be contemplated as a necessity, and the evil consequences only to be repaired by such a vigorous attack upon the enemy east of the mountains as would drive them across the Potomac, and, by threatening the capital, to compel the withdrawal of Patterson within the strong intrenchments from Alexandria to Arlington Heights; the results would certainly be doubtful, and if it failed nothing would remain to prevent the enemy from occupying the valley and cutting off the communication between our army and Richmond. I have therefore resorted to a call for the militia in all the counties north of James River from the Alleghany to the Atlantic. If they come with promptitude and spirit and the sixteen regiments which I hope for from the cotton States should arrive in time, we may yet drive the invaders from Virginia and teach our insolent foe some lessons which will incline him to seek for a speedy peace. I need not assure you that my confidence and interest in you both as an officer and as a friend cause me to turn constantly to your position with deepest solicitude.

I recollect but imperfectly the country about Winchester, and have feared that the position had but little natural strength if the enemy can turn it. He will not hazard an attack upon your intrenchments if he has the little sagacity which would be necessary to show him the advantage of pressing to the rear to seize the Manassas Railroad, and occupy the strong places in the mountains through which it passes.

---

Very truly, your friend,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

[*Not found.]

Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston to Brig. Gen. Samuel Cooper on Enemy Advancing on his Front

CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA FROM APRIL 16 TO JULY 31, 1861

CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. – CONFEDERATE

O. R. – Series I – VOLUME 2 [S #2] CHAPTER IX, p. 969

Headquarters,
Winchester, July 9,1861.

[General Cooper?]

General : I was so unwell yesterday as to be unable to write fully, and therefore trusted to the information contained in the note from Colonel Edmundson,* of the correctness of which, in the main, I have no doubt. Similar information from other sources gives me the impression that the re-enforcements arriving at Martinsburg amount to seven or eight thousand. I have estimated the enemy’s force hitherto, you may remember, at 18,000. Additional artillery has also been received. They were greatly superior to us in that arm before.

The object of re-enforcing General Patterson must be an advance upon this place. Fighting here against great odds seems to me more prudent than retreat.

I have not asked for re-enforcements, because I supposed that the War Department, informed of the state of affairs everywhere, could best judge where the troops at its disposal are most required. The arms ordered by Colonel Thomas for the militia are not here yet. The two generals expect some 2,200, but at present we cannot arm them all, and they have their own ammunition to fix, being furnished with powder and lead.

Most of the regiments which have joined since my arrival have incompetent officers, and are therefore still uninstructed.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON,
Brigadier-General, &c.

*See p. 967 [same volume]

President Jefferson Davis to Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston on Reinforcements

CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA FROM APRIL 16 TO JULY 31, 1861

CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. – CONFEDERATE

O. R. – Series I – VOLUME 2 [S #2] CHAPTER IX, pp. 973-974

Richmond, July 10, 1861.

General Joseph E. Johnston:

My Dear Sir: General Gist, the adjutant-general of South Carolina, goes to your headquarters to make himself useful to you in any way he can serve you, and it gives me pleasure to commend him to your polite attention.

Your letter found me trying by every method to hasten re-enforcements to you, but small as our force is, the want of transportation does not allow me to send such as we have except at a rate which makes me heartsick. I am still endeavoring to induce an increase of transportation, and hope, if not too late, to be able in a few days materially to increase your force. Everybody disappoints me in their answers to my requisitions for troops, and the last hope of a large force of militia coming to your aid seems doomed to add another to past disappointments.

I know you will [do] whatever is possible, and that you will only follow the dictates of your own good judgment and true patriotism. The anxiety of the reckless and the short-sighted policy of the selfish may urge you to fight when your judgment decides otherwise. The responsibility is great. I have tried for a week to get off and join you, but have not been able to do so, without having arrangements for procuring and forwarding troops to be delayed if not deranged.

I have ordered two officers of experience to go to you to-morrow; Colonel Forney’s regiment, will, I suppose, get off in the morning, if not this evening, and more shall go as fast as the railroad will permit. General Beauregard is expecting an attack, and asks for ten thousand men. Magruder wants four thousand. Garnett is lamentably weak, but with re-enforcements now on the way will, I hope, prevent a junction of McClellan and Patterson. Mansfield was reported to be in Washington on yesterday.

May God bless and direct you in this critical hour of our national existence.

Your friend,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston to Brig. Gen. Samuel Cooper on Developments in His Command

CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA FROM APRIL 16 TO JULY 31, 1861

CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. – CONFEDERATE

O. R. – Series I – VOLUME 2 [S #2] CHAPTER IX, pp. 948-949

Headquarters,
Winchester, June 24, 1861.

General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Va.:

General: I was informed yesterday by a person just from Baltimore, and strongly recommended to me by a friend in that place for his principles and means of information, that General Patterson’s troops are still occupying Hagerstown and Williamsport, the main body being in the former place, and six or eight thousand men under General Cadwalader in the latter.

He says that General Patterson has been corresponding with the authorities of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in relation to repairing the road, and talks of occupying Harper’s Ferry. Should he do so with less than ten or twelve thousand men, an equal force attacking him would have the advantage of ground.

Colonel Jackson, who is in the neighborhood of Martinsburg to support the cavalry which is observing the enemy, has, according to his instructions, destroyed all the rolling stock of the road within his reach. I have directed him to have such of the large stock of coal as the inhabitants require sold to them, and accounts to be kept of the sales, and the proceeds to be used in purchasing provisions in the neighborhood. I have had the pleasure to receive the order for Capt. W. E. James to report to me with his company of cavalry. We require three or four more companies of that arm from the great extent of country to be observed. Another officer capable of commanding a brigade and four or five competent to the duties of quartermasters and commissaries are greatly needed. In this connection I recommend the appointment of Lieutenants Davis and Morgan as assistant quartermasters. They have proved themselves competent to the discharge of the duties of that position.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON,
Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.

Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Updates Maj. Gen. George B. McCellan on Developments in Virginia

CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA FROM APRIL 16 TO JULY 31, 1861

CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. – UNION

O. R. – Series I – VOLUME 2 [S #2] CHAPTER IX, p. 746

July 21,1861.

Major-General McClellan, U. S. A., Beverly, Va.:

I sympathize with you on the subject of Cox. You will soon redeem blunders, and so will McDowell. Johnston has amused Patterson and re-enforced Beauregard. McDowell is this forenoon forcing the passage of Bull Run. In two hours he will turn the Manassas Junction and storm it to-day with superior force.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Those Plans (Plural) of June “24,” 1861

Today’s update to the Correspondence – USA Official page of the Resources section is Irvin McDowell’s June 24th response to Winfield Scott’s June 20th request for a plan for his force to cooperate with that of Maj. Gen. (of PA Militia) Robert Patterson’s force to “sweep the enemy from Leesburg to towards Alexandria.” A few things to keep in mind:

• McDowell took four days to respond to Scott’s request. Patterson’s response came in just one day.
• Neither man seemed very enthusiastic about the project, to put it lightly.
• McDowell’s response to Scott’s request should in no way be construed as having anything at all to do with his plans to move against Beauregard at Manassas Junction. In my opinion, some historians have done exactly this, particularly pertaining to McDowell’s plans against Bory having some sort of “requirement” regarding Patterson’s responsibilities. McDowell clearly cast out that excuse after the fact and the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War (JCCCW) took the bait, but I see no validity in it whatsoever.
• McDowell’s plans for the movement against Manassas is dated by the compilers as “about June 24, 1861.” This seems odd because McDowell sent his plan for the Leesburg/Alexandria proposal on June 24th. So why was he sending another plan on the same day? I suspect it was written later, but perhaps it was written after some discussion with Scott on the 24th (the second plan was submitted, McDowell says, “in compliance with the verbal instructions of the General-in-Chief”). If so, McDowell sure came up with that plan fast. Another possibility is that he didn’t like the plan to co-operate with Patterson and anticipated that he would be asked for an alternative, and so came up with one in advance. Maybe that’s why it took him four days to respond. Would love to know the compilers’ reasoning for the assumed date. Guess I’ll need to see the actual document. (Keep in mind that the published Official Records – the “ORs” – are NOT in and of themselves primary documents. They’re transcriptions of primary documents.)

McDowell’s Plan for the Proposed Movement from Alexandria to Leesburg

CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA FROM APRIL 16 TO JULY 31, 1861

CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. – UNION

O. R. – Series I – VOLUME 2 [S #2] CHAPTER IX, pp. 718-719

Hdqrs. Department Northeastern Virginia,
Arlington, June 24, 1861.

Lieut. Col. E. D. Townsend,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters Army:

Colonel: I have the honor to submit the following, in answer to your letter of June 21, in reference to a column to co-operate from this position with a movement to be made with a portion of Major-General Patterson’s command “to sweep the enemy from Leesburg towards Alexandria.” For a better understanding of what follows, I have the honor to transmit a map, which I have had prepared, showing the position of our troops and of that of the enemy in front of it. There is at Manassas Junction and the places in its front or immediate vicinity a force of from 23,000 to 25,000 infantry and about 2,000 cavalry and a supply of well-provided artillery. The advanced position of this force is at Centreville, Germantown, Fairfax Court-House, and Fairfax Station, the numbers and proportion at each varying from time to time. How much of a force is beyond Manassas Gap, in the valley, and could be brought within the operations here contemplated, I have no means of judging. There is nothing to hinder their coming, and unless they are kept engaged by our troops around Harper’s Ferry, re-enforcements, in case of serious operations from that section would have to be guarded against, as would also those from places to the south of Manassas, on the line of the railroad to Richmond or Lynchburg, which would be pressed forward whenever it should become known we were moving upon them or they upon us in any force.

I have not learned that the troops in our front are fully provided with transportation, though I am satisfied they are not so deficient as we have supposed, and not as much so as we are at this time ourselves, for the Quartermaster-General, after supplying yesterday transportation for two regiments to move each about six miles, had but three horses left.

We have in this department, good, bad, and indifferent, twenty regiments of infantry, giving an aggregate of less than 14,000; four companies of cavalry, giving about 250; one battery of regular artillery of six rifled guns; one battery of volunteer artillery, smooth-bores—an excellent company, but not accustomed to their guns, and hardly fit for service in the field. There are three companies of regular artillery, but they are in the earthworks, and not available for field service. The General-in-Chief was pleased to say he wished I would fight this project of a combined movement to sweep away the enemy from Leesburg towards Alexandria with him step by step. I take advantage of this permission, if, indeed, I do not obey a command, to say that it seems to me the distance between General Patterson’s force and this one is so great, and the line of march each has to take is such (a flank exposed), that, in my view, the force to move from each position should be constituted without reference to material support from the other. I am thought by those for whose judgment I have great respect, and who have been on the ground, to hazard something in having my advanced position so near Falls Church, when it is thrown forward from the right of the line, Fort Corcoran, and there are means of re-enforcing it promptly by the Georgetown turnpike and the railroad to Alexandria.

What would be our position if a movement is made to the right, at this the right bank of the Potomac, towards Leesburg? In the first place, as we are for any such purpose without means of wagon transportation, we should be obliged to repair and use the railroad; but whether this was done or not, we should march with the left flank of the column exposed to attack from their advanced positions, and on getting as far to the right as Vienna, have our line exposed to interruption, for Vienna is nearer to the enemy than it is to Falls Church or the camps on the Georgetown road.

To go farther to the right could not safely be done, even by a force superior to that the enemy can bring against us. I think a glance at the map will show this. Any reverse happening to this raw force, pushed farther along, with the enemy on the flank and rear and an impassable river on the right, would be fatal. I do not think, therefore, it safe to risk anything from this position in the direction of Leesburg farther than Vienna, seven miles by the Leesburg turnpike from Falls Church, and even to go there the force should be large. Vienna could be supplied or re-enforced—

1st. By the Leesburg road from Falls Church.
2d. By the railroad from Alexandria.
3d. By the dirt road from Ball’s Cross-Roads.

The first two are liable to interruption unless strongly guarded, and the third is an indifferent road and a long one. The force, then, to go as far as Vienna should be large enough to hold the position for several hours, and should be well supplied with artillery and cavalry and strengthened by such defenses as could be readily thrown up. Vienna being held in force, and offensively, would cover the country from the Difficult Creek well towards Goose Creek from any force of the enemy operating from Manassas Junction or its dependencies, and I have never heard of there being over 500 men, mostly local troops, at Leesburg. As it would be constantly liable to be attacked by all the available force of the enemy and is only a few hours’ march from him, it would be necessary to have strong reserves ready at either Falls Church or the camp of the Ohio brigade.

The force sufficient to hold Vienna cannot well be stated, because of the changes which are taking place in front of us. I do not think it prudent to go there with less than 8,000 infantry, a battery of field regular rifled artillery, with some guns in position, and six companies of cavalry, and the line from Fort Corcoran to General Tyler to be held as strong as at present, and a reserve on that line of 3,000 men; some of the force to be organized into small field brigades, as heretofore proposed, under regular colonels.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

IRVIN MCDOWELL,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson’s Plan for the Proposed Movement from Leesburg to Alexandria

CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA FROM APRIL 16 TO JULY 31, 1861

CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. – UNION

O. R. – Series I – VOLUME 2 [S #2] CHAPTER IX, pp. 711-712

Hagerstown, Md., June 21, 1861.

Col. E. D. Townsend,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. 8. Army, Washington City:

Colonel: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the telegram of the General-in-Chief calling for a plan of operations with a portion of my force to sweep the enemy from Leesburg, &c. Inclosed is a copy of my telegraphic reply. The following is my plan more in detail:

To carry out the views of the General-in-Chief I propose—

First. To occupy the Maryland Heights with a brigade (2,100 men); fortify and arm with Doubleday’s artillery, and provision for twenty days, to secure against investment.

Second. To move all supplies to Frederick, and immediately thereafter abandon this line of operations; threaten with a force to open a route through Harper’s Ferry, this force to be the sustaining one for the command on Maryland Heights.

Third. To send everything else available (horse, foot, and artillery) to cross the Potomac near Point of Rocks, and unite with Colonel Stone at Leesburg. From that point I can operate as circumstances shall demand and your orders require. If no blow is to be struck here, I think this change of position important to keep alive the ardor of our men as well as to force an enemy.

The reasons for this change of depot will be so apparent to the General-in-Chief that I need not refer to them. By the employment of the local transportation of the country I can soon make the necessary changes, and will hasten to carry out your orders.

I have many reports in regard to the movements of the force opposite us in Virginia, and have reason to believe that when the regulars were withdrawn, General Johnston, with thirteen thousand men and twenty-two pieces of artillery, was marching to the attack, and that night posted his force, expecting from us an attack the following morning. I regret we did not meet the enemy, so confident am I that, with this well-appointed force, the result would have been favorable to us, and that this portion of Virginia would now be peaceably occupied.

Reports of the enemy having returned to Harper’s Ferry and had driven the occupants to this shore reached me yesterday. I immediately dispatched a strong force to take position in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and protect all parties on this side of the river, and drive back any force which may attempt to cross.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. PATTERSON,
Major-General, Commanding.

[Inclosure.]

Hagerstown, Md., June 21, 1861.

Col. E. D. Townsend, Washington City:

The telegram of the General-in-Chief of yesterday was received at midnight. To carry out proposed plan I think involves a change of depot to Frederick and evacuation of Williamsport and Hagerstown. With an enemy close at hand, a move suddenly, with present amount of transportation, necessitates sending a large mass of stores back to Harrisburg or their abandonment.

Maryland Heights can be secured, and Frederick also, and a strong force of infantry, some cavalry, and artillery sent via Frederick to Leesburg to sweep the enemy from that point to Alexandria. If no blow is to be struck here, and this meets the views of the General-in-Chief, I will at once commence moving, and be in position to act at the earliest practicable moment. I send a regiment to-day to Frederick at the urgent solicitation of the governor. I shall write in full by mail. Reconnaissance of heights being made. Send your telegrams via Harrisburg, Chambersburg, &c. Frederick line cannot be relied upon.

R. PATTERSON,
Major-General, Commanding.

Army A. A. G. E. D. Townsend to Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell on Proposed Movement from Alexandria to Leesburg

CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA FROM APRIL 16 TO JULY 31, 1861

CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. – UNION

O. R. – Series I – VOLUME 2 [S #2] CHAPTER IX, p. 711

Washington, June 21, 1861.

Brigadier-General McDowell, U. S. A.:

Sir: The General-in-Chief sends you the inclosed copy of instructions to Major-General Patterson,* and desires you to propose a column to co-operate from this end, according to the outline plan indicated.
I am, &c.,

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

*See Scott to Patterson, June 20, p. 709.