JCCW – Gen. George Cadwallader

11 09 2009

Testimony of Gen. George Cadwallader

Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 235-241

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1862.

General GEORGE CADWALADER sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What has been your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I hold a commission of brigadier general in the State of Pennsylvania, under which, upon the call of the President last spring, I came into the service for three months. I also held a commission as major general by brevet in the army of the United States, conferred upon me after my commission as brigadier general had terminated. I state that, as it is considered material by General Scott.

Question. When did you commence service last year, and where did you serve?

Answer. I was mustered into service on the 19th of April, 1861, for three months.

Question. Under General Patterson?

Answer. Not at that time. I was assigned to the command of the department of Annapolis, my headquarters being at Baltimore. I succeeded General Butler in that command. I subsequently joined General Patterson’s column, where I commanded the first division of the column, consisting of the three brigades then commanded by General Williams, Colonel Thomas, and Colonel Miles.

Question. Did you accompany General Patterson in that campaign until he returned?

Answer. I joined him at Chambersburg, and remained with him until the army returned to Harper’s Ferry.

Question. What was his force at Martinsburg, Virginia?

Answer. My official position only gave me official knowledge of my own division, and perhaps I can only give an estimate.

Question. Give your estimate, according to the best light you had upon the subject.

Answer. I should say, according to the general knowledge I had, that he had from 18,000 to 22,000 men; perhaps from 18,000 to 20,000 men for duty.

Question. What was the object of that expedition, as you understood it?

Answer. I never was informed there, and never was officially consulted in regard to it by General Patterson. General Scott told me when I left here, and I also knew from the Secretary of War and the President, that the object was to drive General Johnston and the rebel force under him out of Harper’s Ferry. That was the object for which I went there, and I expected to be relieved and to return here the moment that was accomplished. I was so promised by the Secretary of War, but it was not done.

Question. General Patterson followed General Johnston from Harper’s Ferry for a while, did he not?

Answer. My division, as a part of General Patterson’s column, was in the advance. I crossed the Potomac from Williamsport; and when Johnston retreated as we advanced upon Harper’s Ferry, we went down as far as Falling Waters, on the Virginia side. I was there met with an order to send to Washington all the regular troops—they were all under my command— as it was thought that Johnston had fallen back to re-enforce Beauregard, and that Washington was in danger. All the regular troops being ordered to Washington, and the object of dislodging the enemy from Harper’s Ferry having been accomplished, General Patterson was compelled, or rather induced, to give me the order to fall back. I was then on the way to Martinsburg, and had got as far as Falling Waters, some miles on the other side of the Potomac. General Patterson was still at Hagerstown. A great misfortune, by the by, was that recall.

Question. Did you accompany his army into Virginia?

Answer. Yes, sir; I remained with the army until we went on up to Martinsburg, and on to Bunker Hill, which is ten miles from Winchester.

Question. What was Johnston’s force at Falling Waters, as near as yon could estimate it?

Answer. My information was so uncertain, so vague, that I never had any very definite idea upon the subject.

Question. He retreated before you after the battle of Falling Waters, did he not?

Answer. Yes, sir. He fell back first upon Bunker Hill, and then upon Winchester, which is due south about ten miles from Bunker Hill.

Question. Your position at Bunker Hill threatened Winchester, did it not?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know the orders General Patterson received from headquarters here?

Answer. I know now; I did not know then. When I returned here General Scott expressed great astonishment that I had been kept in ignorance of everything of that kind, and directed Colonel Townsend, his adjutant general, to furnish me with copies of everything that had passed between him and General Patterson.

Question. When Patterson was at Bunker Hill with his army, was there any difficulty in his detaining Johnston in the valley of Winchester, and preventing his going down to join Beauregard?

Answer. I always considered our position a false one from the time that Johnston retreated from Bunker Hill. I could see that no movement we could make from there could accomplish the purpose of holding Johnston at Winchester one moment longer than he chose to stay. To the south of him he had the whole country open, while we were directly north of him. I always thought we should have moved more in a southeasterly direction, where we could have been more within supporting distance of a column moving from here, and also in a position more threatening upon Johnston’s right flank—our left upon his right. On the only occasion I ever was consulted, which was at Martinsburg, where the commanding officers of divisions and brigades, and the officers of the engineer corps on duty with our column, were summoned together by General Patterson, I expressed my opinion that, as we were not holding Johnston at Winchester one moment longer than he chose to stay there, we ought to attack him, and move in this direction at once, and unite with the forces that we supposed were about to attack Manassas. That was the advice I gave before all the officers present.

By Mr. Wright:

Question. When did you advise that?

Answer. It was within two days before we left Martinsburg for Bunker Hill. It was at the only meeting of the officers that was held during the campaign. It was a large meeting, and all the principal officers and the engineer officers were present.

By the chairman:

Question. What was the reason given for not attacking Johnston?

Answer. General Patterson gave no reason. He summoned these officers, myself among others, and asked our opinion as to what, under existing circumstances, we would advise being done. And, according to military usage, beginning with the junior in rank, it came to me last. Major General Sanford, of New York, and Major General Keim, of Pennsylvania, among others, were there. I at last gave my opinion, stated it briefly, as I have stated it here. We were not holding Johnston, because, as we were ten miles north of him, he could leave whenever he chose. He could get information much more rapidly from Beauregard than we could get it from Washington, and he knew exactly what the movements over in this direction were. If the intention was to hold Johnston there, we were not accomplishing the purpose; and we could not do it where we then were.

Question. Would it not have been easy to have placed yourself in a position where you could have done so?

Answer. Certainly. If we had moved upon Berryville and got upon his right flank, and he could not have moved one foot without our being upon his flank, we could have been at Manassas sooner than he could, and could have attacked him at any moment. Some of the officers thought that, as our army moved from here under General McDowell, Beauregard might retreat, falling back upon the whole of Patterson’s army, General Johnston uniting with him for that purpose. It was the opinion of two or three of the officers that Johnston might advance and cut us off while Beauregard came with his whole army upon Patterson’s column.

Question. Suppose that Patterson had orders from General Scott to hold Johnston in the valley of Winchester?

Answer. Which, I say, he could not have done without attacking him.

Question. Then, with such orders, he should have attacked him ?

Answer. That was what I thought; either to have attacked him or to have come down here, as we were doing no good there.

Question. You were at Bunker Hill when Johnston turned off to Charlestown?

Answer. Yes, sir; my division was in the advance from Bunker Hill in the direction of Winchester; and I marched with that column from Bunker Hill to Charlestown through Smithfield.

Question If you threatened Winchester while at Bunker Hill, did you not relinquish your threatening attitude when you turned off towards Charlestown ?

Answer. Of course, for we then went away from Winchester.

Question. So, from the time you turned off from Bunker Hill to Charlestown, all hope of detaining Johnston must have entirely vanished ?

Answer. Certainly; we were marching.away from him. In other words, we were on our way to Harper’s Ferry through Charlestown.

Question. Do you know whether General Patterson, when he resigned all hope of detaining Johnston, immediately informed General Scott of that fact?

Answer. I never was consulted about any such thing. Until I came back here I never saw a line from General Scott to General Patterson, or from General Patterson to General Scott. When I so informed General Scott he expressed great dissatisfaction, saying, “General Patterson knew that my communications to him were intended as much for you as for himself.” And it was then that he turned to Colonel Townsend and ordered him to make out and furnish to me copies of everything that had passed between General Patterson and himself.

Question. Is there anything more that you deem material which you would like to state? If so, please go on and state it in your own way.

Answer. I have no desire, nor do I know that there is anything of public utility for me to state, other than I have already stated. There are matters personal to myself; that, of course, I have no right to bring before this committee.

Question. You can state anything that you think best.  We are endeavoring to find out how this war has been conducted, and you can state anything in that connexion that is material for us to know.

Answer. I should like to state some things on my own account; and they are historical, too, so far as anybody may deem them of public importance. You asked me what my rank and position in the army were. When I was in command at Baltimore I was sent for by General Scott to come here. General Cameron was at General Scott’s headquarters, and General Scott handed me my commission as major general by brevet in the army, saying, “That commission of General Cadwalader’s as a major general of the army is a perfectly valid one at this time.” The question was whether I should rank as major general with General Patterson, and whether I was to be assigned to duty under my major general’s commission. Upon that General Cameron promised to assign me to duty under my brevet commission as a major general. He offered me a commission as major general of volunteers, or a commission of brigadier general in the regular service, which was what I had held during the Mexican war. I accepted the commission of brigadier general in the regular service, with the promise of the President, through the Secretary of War, that I was to be assigned to duty under my commission as major general by brevet, with the promise of promotion as major general, when they heard from General Fremont, which they expected to do in two weeks; under the expectation and with the conviction, as they told me, that he would decline the commission tendered to him. With that promise I took the commission of brigadier general, with the understanding that I was to be assigned to duty under my commission as major general by brevet, in preference to the commission of major general of volunteers.

Question. When was that?

Answer. That was the 8th of June. I addressed a letter to the Secretary of War before I left here, reminding him of the promise so as to avoid all mistakes, and which he perfectly remembers. General Fremont, unexpectedly to them, returned and accepted the commission offered him, which prevented their being able to give me that. For some reason General McClellan was brought here, and had I been commissioned major general, I would have ranked him. That prevented their being able to do one thing or the other. In the mean time they made major generals of volunteers, whom I would have ranked, that ranked me. They could not comply with their promise to me, and I went home, as they did not want me. That was the military position I occupied, and those are the reasons I am not now in service.

Question. You say they were convinced that General Fremont would decline. Upon what did they found that conviction?

Answer. I do not know. That was what General Cameron told me.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Did they desire that General Fremont should decline?

Answer. That I do not know; I merely tell you what passed. They told me that I was to have that commission; that they knew he would decline. That was the offer to me. I certainly would not otherwise have accepted the commission of brigadier general in the regular army, when I had the commission offered me of a major general in the volunteers. My commission of major general by brevet dates back to 1847, and ranks all except General Wool. They were unable to do what they had promised. They had appointed as major generals of volunteers General Banks, General Butler, General Dix, &c., and to come in then would have placed me very differently from what their own proposition was. I had not asked for that; they had sent for me and asked me to take it. I considered it a very complimentary and a very handsome thing; but, as I have said, they were unable to give it to me, for it interfered with other places. I told the President that if it deranged any of their plans, I was perfectly willing to exonerate him from any promise; if the interest of the service required it, I was perfectly willing and ready to serve; and it was not my fault that I went home.

Question. To come back to the other subject. You have not stated yet what you supposed Johnston’s force at Winchester to be.

Answer. I desire my remark about his force at Falling Waters to apply to his force at Winchester. I had no reliable information upon which to base an opinion.

By the chairman:

Question. Had you any reason to believe that Johnston’s army was materially increased after he reached Winchester?

Answer. By general rumor it was said to have been greatly increased.

Question. From where was it supposed the troops came?

Answer. From the south; we did not know from where.

Question. From Manassas?

Answer. We did not know. It was just the sort of rumor that would be current among the people of the country, entirely unreliable.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Have you ever made any written statement of the force under Johnston at Winchester? If so, please state when and under what circumstances you did so.

Answer. I never made any official statement of any kind of the forces under Johnston at Winchester, having no knowledge of my own in regard to it. After many of our regiments had started on their march home, their term of service having expired while we were at Harper’s Ferry, a Mr. McDaniel, a civilian, came to me on the 23d of July, with a statement of some information which he said he had obtained in regard to the force under Johnston, at Winchester. I asked him to let me copy it, which I did as he read it to me. I put no date to it, merely writing down what he read. I was about leaving, but before I went I showed it to General Patterson, as something that might be of interest to him. I did not give it as information obtained by myself, or express any opinion in regard to its reliability, giving it merely as information which McDaniel said he had obtained—not as information of my own.  General Patterson asked me to allow him to take a copy of it, promising to return me the original. He, however, did not return me the original, but sent me a copy of it.

By the chairman :

Question. Did you attach any importance to the paper as containing reliable information?

Answer. Not the slightest; and if I had, it could not have influenced General Patterson in what he had done, for he had got back to Harper’s Ferry, and the troops had crossed the river on their way home, before either of us knew anything about this.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. When you were at Bunker Hill, if it had been known that General McDowell was about to attack Manassas, and that it was expected that the army under General Patterson would detain Johnston so as to prevent his forming a junction with Beauregard and taking part in the action at Manassas, what should have been done by Patterson’s army to have accomplished that object?

Answer. I do not think he could have detained him in any other way than by attacking him. He could have prevented his taking the route by which he did go to Manassas, by taking up a position on his right flank, that is, to the eastward of Winchester. Johnston, however, would have had open to him the route by the way of Strasburg, which was the one they had always received and sent troops by. The way he actually did go was east, over the mountains to Piedmont, Strasburg lying west of south of him. If we had not attacked him, but had taken a position to the east of Winchester, Johnston could have gone by the way of Strasburg, but could not have gone the way he did go, over the mountains to Piedmont. Believing that we were not holding him where we then were, and that the object of any such instructions or suggestions, if any such existed, as I subsequently learned they did exist, could not be accomplished except by attacking Johnston, I advised that we should attack him, or if that was not done, that we should unite with the main body of our troops here in the attack upon Manassas. The expression used by General Scott, in one of his letters to General Patterson, which I saw afterwards, was “to consider the route by the way of Leesburg.” It is true that in the telegrams that came from General Scott it was indicated that General Patterson was to hold General Johnston if he did not attack him. But there was no possibility of holding him if we did not attack. To use General Johnston’s own expression in his report, he was merely waiting there looking at us.

By the chairman:

Question. Then if he was to hold him, and attacking him was the only way to hold him, it meant that he should attack him?

Answer. Attack him or consider the route by way of Leesburg.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Could Patterson have come down that route in time to have taken part in the battle here?

Answer. Yes, sir; if he had moved on Berryville, we would have been on Johnston’s flank all the way.

Question. And you could have reached Manassas before Johnston could?

Answer. Certainly, if we had moved in time. According to McDaniel’s memorandum, Johnston started from Winchester at one o’clock on the day we left Bunker Hill. It was more with a view to the time when Johnston started than for any other purpose that I showed that memorandum to General Patterson. We started from Bunker Hill at daylight, and if you take the official report of Johnston, recently published, you will see that on that very day he got his instructions to go to Manassas, and that at one o’clock on the day we left Bunker Hill for Charlestown, Johnston left Winchester for Manassas.

Question. And you should have gone from Bunker Hill to Berryville, so as to have prevented Johnston from going to Manassas by the route he did go?

Answer. If we had done that, we could have gone to Manassas also. We had but 10 miles further than Johnston to go if we had gone by the way of Winchester; and we had not much further to go if we had gone by the way of Berryville, for we were almost as near Berryville as he was.

Question. So that you could have prevented his going the route he did?

Answer. We could have attacked him, which I think would have prevented him. I think he knew that, because he would not fight us in the open ground. He showed that his object was to elude us, according to his own expression.

By the chairman:

Question. And General Scott’s idea was to detain him by fighting or in any other way?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Then Johnston could have been prevented from forming a junction with Beauregard, and the force under Patterson might have been ready to have taken part in the attack upon Manassas?

Answer. We might have attacked Johnston, and if we had been successful, which I think we would have been, we could have prevented the junction. And if we did not attack him, if we had marched in due time, we could certainly have been at Manassas in time to have taken part in the battle. The way was open to us, and the suggestion of General Scott was “to consider the route by way of Leesburg.” If I had had any discretion, I should have gone at once to Leesburg, which was half-way to Manassas, and on a good turnpike road directly there.

Question. Will you furnish the committee with the copies of the telegraphic despatches you received from General Scott?

Answer. I will.





JCCW – Maj. William W. Russell

3 09 2009

Testimony of Maj. William W. Russell

Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 228-234

WASHINGTON, March 5,1862.

Major WILLIAM W. RUSSELL sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am major and paymaster of the marine corps.

Question. Were you attached to the staff of General Patterson during his advance into Virginia; and if so, how did you become so attached, being an officer of the marine corps?

Answer. From current reports and rumors I became convinced that General Patterson’s column would be engaged in the valley of Virginia, and I sought leave of absence from the Secretary of the Navy to endeavor to join General Patterson’s staff, where I thought I could be useful. I held a semi-civil position here as paymaster of the marine corps at the time. Having a great many friends south, and being a southern man myself, when my brother officers were resigning all around me, I thought it my duty to endeavor to do something for the government which had supported me for eighteen years, and something out- aide of my ordinary semi-civil duties. I obtained permission from my department and authority from the commandant of my corps to transact my business during my absence. General Cameron gave me a letter to General Patterson. General Scott, finding that I was going, also gave me a letter, though I made no application to him for it. I went up and joined General Patterson at Martinsburg, and he immediately placed me on his staff as one of his aids.

Question. What movements did General Patterson make after you joined him?

Answer. On the 15th of July he moved from Martinsburg on Bunker Hill with about 18,000 men and took possession of that place. He remained there until Wednesday morning, the 17th, when he marched to Charlestown. The only rebel force we observed on the march was a detachment of cavalry, said to be commanded by Colonel Stuart. The Rhode Island battery, on the right of our column, expended several shots in dispersing them.

Question. Were you aware of any reconnoissance being made from Bunker Hill towards Winchester?

Answer. No, sir; I was not. I heard some rumors of a reconnoissance made by some of General Sanford’s staff, but there were so many stories told I did not rely upon them. Colonel Thomas advanced several miles on the road with a portion of the cavalry under his command. I do not think any extended reconnoissance was made.

Question. What information had you relative to the force of the enemy?

Answer. A deserter presented himself at the headquarters of General Patterson at Bunker Hill, who seemed to be of a very communicative disposition. From his statement, the captain of engineers made a diagram of the works and defences of Winchester. I have it here. It reads “Defences of Winchester, obtained from a deserter from the confederate army, and believed to be reliable. J. H. Simpson, captain of engineers.” The deserter was so very communicative that I had some curiosity to find out something about him. I asked him where he was from, and he told me he was from the neighborhood of Bunker Hill. A son of a merchant whose house we occupied there was a smart, bright little fellow of some thirteen or fourteen years of age. We were very careful to protect the property left in his charge, and at my request sentinels were posted about his father’s store. He had every confidence we would protect the property and pay for what we got there. I asked him about this man. In the first place, ae a deserter I did not believe him, because he was a perjured man, and had deserted the flag he had sworn to support. This boy stated that this man and his brother were worthless characters, who resided within two miles of Bunker Hill; that he would work a few days and then loaf about the drinking establishments ; that he had no character or reputation in the community in which he lived. I stated the information I had thus gained.

Question. Did you state it to General Patterson?

Answer. I think I stated it in his presence. I said that on general principles I would not believe a deserter, because a man who would be false to his oath would be false in his statements.

Question. What was your opinion at that time relative to the force of the enemy?

Answer. I had no opinion about it. I did not believe a word that I heard. We had no positive means of getting information. They were all idle rumors, that I did not think were reliable at all. On the 17th we marched to Charlestown, not seeing any rebel force on that march, and encamped in and around that place with the whole of our army.

Question. During your service with General Patterson, were you aware of the receipt by him of any despatches from General Scott, relative to the movement of his column? If so, state what they were.

Answer. On the night of the 17th, General Patterson and his staff having all retired, I was sitting on the porch of the house we occupied as headquarters. Between twelve and one o’clock at night a special messenger arrived with a despatch for General Patterson. He was accompanied hy one of General Sanford’s aids; I do not now recollect who it was. That despatch I took up to the adjutant general of the column, Colonel Fitz-John Porter. I woke him up, and he read it in his bed, I reading it at the same rime. Colonel Porter arose from his bed, and exhibited it to Captain Newton, the chief of the engineer corps of that army. After some little discussion, of which I do not recollect the particulars, (it did not amount to much,) Colonel Porter requested me to take the despatch to General Patterson and wake him up. I suggested that I had but lately joined his staff, and would prefer his doing it. I thought it was a despatch of very great importance. He said, “You better take it.” I replied, “I will do so,” and proceeded to General Patterson’s room, where I aroused him from his sleep, and handed the despatch to him. It was as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

“July 17, 1861—9.30 p.m.

“I have nothing official from you since Sunday, but I am glad to learn from the Philadelphia papers that you have advanced. Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front, whilst he re-enforces the Junction with his main body. McDowell’s first day’s work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-House. The Junction will probably be taken to-morrow.

“Major General PATTERSON,

“United States Forces, Harper’s Ferry.”

I read from a copy which I got at the War Department, and I believe it a true copy of that despatch. After General Patterson had read it twice over he turned to me and asked me if I had read it. I told him that I had. He then asked me what I thought of it. I replied that I had lately joined his staff, and would beg that he would ask Colonel Porter, or some other officer who had been with him longer than I had, as I did not like to give him an opinion. He said, “I desire your opinion, sir.” I then replied, “I will give you my opinion, honestly and without hesitation. I look upon that despatch as a positive order from General Scott to attack Johnston wherever you can find him; and if you do not do it, I think you will be a ruined man. It will be impossible to meet the public sentiment of the country if you fail to carry out this order. And in the event of a misfortune in front of Washington, the whole blame will be laid to your charge.” Those were as nearly the words as I can now recollect. He said, “Do you think so, sir?” I repeated that that was my honest conviction. He then said, “I will advance to-morrow. But how can we make a, forced march with our trains?” I said, “Sir, if you cannot send them across the river into Maryland, we can make a bonfire of them.” I then said, “General, have you positively made up your mind to this advance?” He said, “I have.” “Then,” said I, “I hope you will allow no one to influence you tomorrow in relation to it.” The next morning orders were sent to the different brigades and divisions to cook three days’ rations, and to be ready to march at a moment’s notice. I had no conversation with any one in relation to my interview with General Patterson up to 9 o’clock in the morning. About 9 o’clock I was in the room occupied as an office, when several prominent officers of the column appeared. I think they had been summoned there by the general. General Patterson entered and said, “Gentlemen, I have sent for you, not for the purpose of consulting you as to the propriety of the movement I intend to make, but as to the best mode of making it.” I then left the room. After these officers had separated I was told by the general that he did not think the Pennsylvania troops would march, and that an order had been issued for them to be assembled on their parade grounds that afternoon, that he might consult them in person. He did so. He appealed to them in very strong terms to remain with him a week or ten days; that they had promised him that in the event of a battle taking place they would stand by him, and he desired them to intimate, when the command “shoulder arms” was given to each regiment, whether they would comply with his wish. Several of the Pennsylvania regiments came to a shoulder when the order was given—one (Colonel Patterson’s) with but one exception; but the majority in the others failed to respond. I was near General Patterson during the whole time, and heard his speech to them. The advance was not made.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. Did General Patterson, at any time when he was addressing the troops, propose to march on to Winchester?

Answer. No, sir; not to my knowledge. General Patterson did not ask the troops whether they would advance against the enemy at Winchester. He asked them if they would remain with him. I think it due to those troops to state their condition as to clothing. They were very poorly clothed, indeed. Many of the men had their pantaloons patched with canvas from the flies of the tents, and their garments were particolored. They had received very hard treatment; were very badly clad, and many of them were without shoes. I did not hear General Patterson, before any regiment of Pennsylvania troops, ask them if they would advance against the enemy.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Had you any conversation with any of the officers in relation to this advance?

Answer. After I left the room, which I did while this discussion was going on, and which I had no curiosity to hear, Colonel Abercrombie, who commanded one of the brigades, came to me and asked me what I thought of the proposed movement of General Patterson. From the relations that existed between Colonel Abercrombie and General Patterson, I felt satisfied that he already knew my views about the proposed movement. When conversing in reference to the movement of the trains, and the suggestion that if they could not be saved, I thought that, under the circumstances, they should be burned, Colonel Abercrombie desired to know how the men could get along without their cooking utensils. I suggested that there were plenty of trees and bushes between Charlestown and Winchester, and the men could cook their meat as they did in California, by holding it before the fire. Then he remarked, “You would place everything on the hazard of the die; sacrifice our line of communication, and in all probability cause the command to be cut off.” I told him that I thought General Patterson was just in the position to place everything at that hazard; that if he failed to move, I was satisfied that, no matter how pure his intentions might be, he would be overwhelmed by public sentiment. I told him that as to cutting off our communication, I felt perfectly satisfied that the people of this country would open the line of communication if he took the risk suggested. The colonel did not agree with me, and our conversation ceased.
Question. You spoke some time ago about some information furnished by a deserter. Had General Patterson, that you know of, any reliable information in regard to the enemy?

Answer. Not that I know of. I think I should have heard it if he had had any.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. You deemed Bunker Hill an important position for the purpose of holding the enemy?

Answer. Well, sir, Bunker Hill was, I think, 10 miles from Winchester, and at Charlestown we were 22 miles in another direction. By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Did you not at Bunker Hill directly threaten Johnston?

Answer. By our advance from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill we threatened him.

Question. When you turned off to Charlestown from Bunker Hill, did you not intimate to the enemy that you were leaving him, and that he was free to move where he pleased?

Answer. If putting more miles between us and the enemy was such an intimation, we made it.

By the chairman:

Question. As a military man, in your judgment, was there any insuperable obstacle or barrier to your detaining Johnston there, if you had pursued him vigorously from Bunker Hill?

Answer. I think if we had advanced on Johnston, our men could, in all probability, have marched as fast as he could. Having only 10 miles the start of us, he could not have got to Manassas much before we could. If he had attempted to pull up the railroad as he passed along, we should then have overhauled him.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Did General Patterson send you to Washington with despatches for General Scott? If so, what took place at that interview?

Answer. General Patterson sent me to Washington to explain to General Scott the reason of his not moving against Winchester. He sent me on Friday, the 19th, and I arrived here on Saturday morning. I immediately called upon General Scott at his private quarters, and found him there with several of his staff. I stated to him what General Patterson had directed me to say to him, as nearly as I could. I exhibited to him the sketch made by the captain of engineers, giving the plan of the fortifications at Winchester, and the forces that occupied them, as stated by the deserter. General Scott seemed very much annoyed at the failure of the troops to advance, and said to me, “Why did not General Patterson advance?” I said, “Sir, General Patterson directed me to say to you that he understood your orders to him were to make demonstrations; to hold Johnston, not to drive him.” The general turned in his chair very fiercely on me, and said very excitedly, “I will sacrifice my commission if my despatches will bear any such interpretation.” Seeing the excited manner of the general, I begged to be excused for the present, and said I would call on him again at 12 o’clock, at his office. I then left him. I called at 12 o’clock, and he informed me that the Secretary of War had the day before relieved General Patterson from the command of that column, and had ordered General Banks to succeed him. I will state, also, that at this time I urged upon General Scott the request of General Patterson that re-enforcements should be sent him to enable him to make the movement on Winchester. And after my return my impression was that if they would give General Banks 25,000 men, and let him force his way through and take possession of Winchester and Strasburg, it would be an important movement at that time. That same movement seems now to be taking place under General Banks, other troops being placed in position at his old camps. On Monday morning, the 22d of July, I left this place on my return. On my arrival at Sandy Hook, a mile this side of Harper’s Ferry, I observed some officers I had left at Charlestown, and a number of troops. I called to them and asked them what they were doing there. They said that the whole army was at Harper’s Ferry. That was the first knowledge I had of any contemplated movement from Charlestown to Harper’s Ferry.

Question. Did you not understand when you advanced from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill that your object was to whip Johnston, or at least to hold him there?

Answer. To hold him; not to allow him to re-enforce Manassas. There is another thing that convinced me that my view of the despatch to which I have referred was correct. Another despatch was received by General Patterson from General Scott, on the 18th, as follows :

“SIR : I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy; if not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or at least had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and I suppose his superior, in numbers. Has he not stolen a march, and sent re-enforcements towards Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win victories. The time of volunteers counts from the day of mustering into the service of the United States. You must not retreat across the Potomac. If necessary, when abandoned by the short-term volunteers, intrench somewhere and wait for re-enforcements.”

By Mr. Odell:

Question. What was the temper of the troops on the receipt of orders to move from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill, and while at Bunker Hill?

Answer. The march from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill was made in admirable order. I rode along the line several times to convey orders from the right to the left, and there did not seem to be any dissatisfaction that I could observe. The men preserved the order of march, and seemed to be in very good spirits.

Question. Did any dissatisfaction manifest itself at Bunker Hill?

Answer. I heard of none. The men violated the regulations somewhat, by foraging around, as all soldiers will.

Question. Did you hear of any expression of opinion to the effect that the men did not want to make an advance?

Answer. I heard some of the officers speak of the certainty of the Pennsylvania troops claiming their discharge at the expiration of their term of service.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question Where was that?

Answer. I do not know. It was a general rumor.

Question. At Charlestown you heard of great dissatisfaction?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Was there any dissatisfaction among the troops at going to meet the enemy?

Answer. I do not know that the men ever had that point—that they were going against the enemy—presented to them. Many of the men were in very bad condition as to clothing, &c. There was a regiment there from Indiana that was in as bad, if not a worse, condition than any regiment I have seen. General Patterson did not address that regiment. But they volunteered through their colonel to remain, without the suggestion of any one. Many of the men had no shoes, and the feet of some of them were so cut and injured by the flinty roads over which they marched that their officers had to order them to be carried in the wagons. Yet they volunteered through Colonel Wallace, their commander, to advance on Winchester, or against the enemy.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. Did the troops know they were retreating when they left Bunker Hill?

Answer. I do not think that either the officers or the men were aware that they were retreating, except from the direction that they took. After General Patterson was relieved, General Banks invited me to remain and occupy the same position on his staff that I had on General Patterson’s. I did so until after he moved across the Potomac with the main body of his army and encamped on this side. The movement across the river was made hy General Banks after full consultation with all the highest officers in his command, who voted each separately that it would be highly imprudent and dangerous to attempt to continue the occupancy of Harper’s Ferry with the small force left under his command; and that it could be held by means of guns mounted on the Maryland side, and without risk to his troops. On their advice he acted. He never surrendered, during the time I was up there, the place of Harper’s Ferry, but always kept a guard there for its protection.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. Did you, before you went up there, hare any conversation with General Scott; and if so, what did he tell you as to what he wanted done?

Answer. After receiving permission, and the order from General Cameron to proceed to join General Patterson, I called on Colonel Townsend, the assistant adjutant general, and offered to convey any despatches he might have for General Patterson’s column. While there General Scott heard my voice and called me into his room, and inquired when I was going. I told him. He then asked why I did not come to him for a letter to General Patterson. I told him I knew he was very much engaged, and I was almost afraid to ask to see him. He then directed Colonel Townsend to write a letter and bring it to him to sign. I think he remarked that we were in the same boat, meaning that we were both southern men, he from Virginia and I from Maryland. I said to him, “General, I have made up my mind that the column of General Patterson will be engaged by Sunday.” He replied, “It may be before that, but it cannot be long before it is.” I told him then that I would hurry and try to join General Patterson as soon as possible, which I did. I will remark here, that what I have stated in my testimony are entirely impressions of my own. And my advice, if it may be so called, to General Patterson as to an advance, was to meet the sentiment of the country, and what I conceived to be the first wish of the people—the defeat of the army of the rebels in front of Washington.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. What were your relations with General Patterson while with him and subsequently?

Answer. The first time I ever met General Patterson was at Martinsburg, when I presented the letters of General Cameron and General Scott, recommending me to his notice. General Patterson’s bearing towards me was exceedingly kind; he extended to me every courtesy and confidence during the time I was with him, and, in consequence, I have always felt the liveliest feelings of gratitude towards him. His impressions of my services may be obtained from this letter:

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,

“Harper’s Ferry, July 25, 1861.

“MAJOR : I regret that in relinquishing the command of this department I can no longer avail myself of your services on my personal staff. For the promptness and gallantry with which those services were tendered at a critical moment, and the zeal and fidelity with which they have been discharged throughout, I can only offer you my cordial thanks.

“I remain, with great regard, very sincerely, yours,

“R. PATTERSON,

“Major General Commanding.

“Major W.W.Russell,

“United States Marine Corps, &c.”





JCCW – Dr. Ira Tripp

19 08 2009

Testimony of Dr. Ira Tripp

Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 226-228

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1862.

Dr. IRA TRIPP sworn and examined.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. What has been your connexion with the army?

Answer. My position was hospital steward.

Question. In the three months’ service?

Answer. Yes, sir; under General Patterson, in the 8th Pennsylvania regiment. I was taken prisoner on the 2d of July, near Falling Waters.

Question. Well, go on and state about that.

Answer. We were captured near Falling Waters on the second day of July, and taken to Martinsburg that day. There our horses were taken away from us.

Question. By whom?

Answer. By a rebel captain; I forget his name now. That evening we were taken about three miles beyond Martinsburg, and encamped there during the night.

Question. What force had the enemy at that time?

Answer. As near as we could judge, Johnston had about 5,000 men at that time. We were with them but one day there. The next day we were taken to Winchester, where they had about 2,000 more troops, as near as we could ascertain, making their entire force at that time about 7,000.

Question. What day were you taken to Winchester?

Answer. The 4th of July.

Question. What was done with you there?

Answer. We were kept in jail there two weeks.

Question. How many of you were there?

Answer. I think there were 45. During that time the enemy received re-enforcements of men, varying from perhaps a regiment down to a company, coming into Winchester at different times during the two weeks we were there. As near as we could calculate, their re-enforcements might amount in all to 5,000 or 6,000 men.

Question. Do you know from what direction these re-enforcements came?

Answer. I should judge, from the way they came into Winchester, that they were from Strasburg and in that direction.

Question. They did not come from Manassas?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think any of them came from Manassas.

Question. What was the condition of their fortifications at Winchester at the time you went there?

Answer. They were very light. They fortified a little, not a great deal, during the time we were there. After we had been there about a week, some of our men were taken out to the fortifications and made to work to try to mount a gun, as they told us when they came back. That was the only gun they saw; they saw some little intrenchments on each side of the road, not to exceed twenty rods altogether.

Question. Rifle-pits?

Answer. No, sir; not rifle-pits. They had some empty barrels there and a trench thrown up. There was no fortification of any strength at that time.

Question. You only knew of one gun there?

Answer. That was all at that time—one large gun; they had some seven or eight pieces of light artillery that we saw. They got a few after that—some four or five that we saw come in. They never had at the outside over 13,000 men at Winchester, I think, before the battle of Bull Run.

Question. Would there, in your judgment, have been any difficulty in Patterson’s taking Winchester?

Answer. No, sir; not at all. I do not think there would have been any trouble in his doing it.

Question. Did they appear to expect an attack from Patterson?

Answer. Yes, sir; daily.

Question. What do you know of any preparation to leave in case of an attack?

Answer. We hardly knew of any preparation they had to leave. They expected an attack. We had that from the jailer there and from the officers themselves. A great many of them left the day we did. I have no doubt that they expected that Patterson would come on and take Winchester after their troops left. I judge so from seeing so many going away the day we did; we saw their carriages, &c., on the road to Strasburg.

Question. What day did their army leave?

Answer. On the 18th of July.

Question. What number left?

Answer. As near as we could calculate, about 10,000 men in all left for Manassas.

Question. That would leave how many at Winchester?

Answer. Perhaps 2,000.

Question. Did they all leave at one time?

Answer. They left during the night of the 17th and the morning of the 18th, as near as we could get at it. We left on the 18th.

Question. By what route did they go to Manassas?

Answer. I do not know the route. I am not acquainted with that country. We got to Manassas in the morning on the 19th, about nine o’clock, I should judge.

Question. What time did you leave Winchester?

Answer. At noon of the 18th, in a great hurry.

Question. By what route did you go?

Answer. We went to Strasburg, about eighteen miles from Winchester, and there we took the cars to Manassas.

Question. What did you see of these troops after you left Winchester?

Answer. We saw some of the cavalry at Manassas on the 19th, and saw General Johnston himself there. We knew three of the cavalry, because they were of those who captured us.

Question. How long did you remain at Manassas?

Answer. From nine in the morning until nine or ten o’clock at night.

Question. Do you know whether these troops came into Manassas before you left?

Answer. Only a portion of them. All I know of their being there was seeing a portion of the cavalry and General Johnston himself. There were large re-enforcements coming in that day from the direction of Richmond. That is what I suppose kept us there; we could not get away because the track was occupied by these troops coming in. I should judge that that day and the day following there were 15,000 of re-enforcements from between Manassas and Richmond, coming in from the south on different roads. We had to guess at it, but that is about as near as we could get at it. Heavy trains were coming in constantly all the day long.

Question. Did you, on your way to Winchester, see any strong fortifications anywhere, after you were captured?

Answer. No, sir; we did not see any anywhere. There were no strong fortifications made after that I am certain. I do not think they ever expected to stand a battle at all against Patterson.

Question. Did you, while at Winchester, look for Patterson to come there?

Answer. We looked for him every day. We just as much expected he would come as we were living. We expected to be taken out by our own men or hurried off by the rebels.

Question. Our force was double theirs?

Answer. Yes, sir; nearly so. I calculated that Johnston had not more than 12,000 at the outside. And knowing the difference between the strength of the two armies, we constantly expected Patterson would take the place.

Question. What was the character of the re-enforcements that came into Winchester? Were they well armed and equipped?

Answer. All had arms; not very good arms. They looked like old muskets. Some came in in the night, and we could not tell what they had. Some of them were not very well uniformed, such as we saw. Some had citizens’ clothes on— no uniform at all. They looked like they had just been gathered up right out of the fields, with no uniform at all. There was in the jail yard a big pile of stone that had been pounded up for pavement, and getting on that pile we could see their encampment, and all over the country there.

Question. Did you see any fortifications at Winchester, except the small one at the terminus of the railroad from Charlestown?

Answer. That is all that we saw.





JCCW – C & O Canal Superintendent A. K. Stake

17 08 2009

Testimony of A. K. Stake

Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 225-226

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1862.

A. K. STAKE sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Where do you reside, and what is your present occupation?

Answer. I reside in Williamsport. I am officially connected with the Chesapeake and Ohio canal—as general superintendent of the canal.

Question. Have you any knowledge of the force under Johnston at the time when Patterson was at Martinsburg?

Answer. None except from intercourse with Virginians whom I knew to be refugees. They corroborated all that Mr. Spates has said about it. I know that it was the impression throughout the community, and in the army, that there was not more than 10,000 men under Johnston; and there is this additional fact, ascertained since from perfectly reliable gentlemen, that there never was at any time, in Winchester, as many as 14,000 men, and of these there were, perhaps, 4,000 or 5,000 militia. The gentleman from whom I received this information is perfectly reliable. He is a southern man, and says there was not at any time as many as 14,000 men at Winchester, and of these there were from 3,000 to 5,000 militia, badly armed and equipped. I am not aware what information General Patterson may have had; but I should think he could have had the same information in regard to that matter that outsiders had.

Question. It was obtainable—current information?

Answer. Yes, sir. There was a party about him—McMullin’s men, “scouts,” as they were called ; they were so constantly about him that very few persons could approach him with matters of that kind. I could sometimes get to his headquarters about other matters, but not upon subjects of that kind. General Patterson told Mr. Spates and myself afterwards, at Harper’s Ferry, that he had positive information that Johnston had 42,000 men at Winchester. Of course, we believed as much of that as we pleased.

Question. Were you at Martinsburg when Patterson moved his force to Bunker Hill?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know the feeling of the troops at that time?

Answer. When he moved from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill the supposition was that he was going out to attack Johnston, and the troops were in fine spirits about it. They had laid there at Martinsburg four or five days, and were tired of that, and were anxious to meet the enemy, and when they turned off towards Charlestown they became very much dissatisfied; but the officers allayed a great deal of that feeling by asserting that they were going down to Wizard’s Cliff, (a place on the road between Charlestown and Winchester,) from which they were to approach Winchester, so as to avoid the masked batteries that would be in their way if they went direct from Bunker Hill. But when they came to Wizard’s Cliff and passed on towards Charlestown there was a great deal of dissatisfaction; and at Charlestown, as I learned afterwards—I did not go there myself—was the first distinct refusal on the part of the three months’ men to follow General Patterson any longer. They declared that they had no disposition to be bamboozled any longer in that way, and as their time was up they would go home, unless he was disposed to go out and attack the enemy. He rode up before two regiments at Charlestown and announced to them that their time was up, and he had no further claim upon them; but he desired them to remain with him, as he hoped to meet the enemy in the field. My opinion is that there was not a word of dissent at that time; but when they retreated still further, to Harper’s Ferry, they became still more dissatisfied, and determined to go home. I had this from those who had official positions about him at that time. I heard General Cadwalader say, at Martinsburg, that the enemy had from 25,000 to 30,000 men. I do not know where he got his information, for there was no man outside of headquarters that estimated Johnston’s force at over 10,000 or 15,000 men.





JCCW – C & O Canal President Alfred Spates

17 08 2009

Testimony of Alfred Spates

Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 224-225

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1862.

ALFRED SPATES sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler :

Question. You are president of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you along upon the line of the canal during the past summer?

Answer. Yes, sir; from May last up to the present time.

Question. Were you there, or in that vicinity, at the time General Patterson crossed the Potomac and went to Martinsburg?

Answer. I was in that vicinity.

Question. Have you any knowledge of the force of the enemy under Johnston at or about that time?

Answer. I have no personal knowledge. I have knowledge from information obtained from those constantly coming from the river—from the section at which this army was then stationed. I have that kind of knowledge.

Question. Please state it.

Answer. From the best information I could obtain—from those said to be familiar with the amount of force there—I should say it was between 8,000 and 10,000 men.

Question. Were you generally acquainted in that vicinity?

Answer. Yes, sir; intimately.

Question. Were you in frequent communication with persons on the Virginia side of the river?

Answer. I frequently saw men from the other side of the river. We were doing some work on the canal about that time, and for a part of our force the work was on the Virginia side, and within five or six miles of Williamsport, Patterson being then at Martinsburg.

Question. The general impression, in that vicinity, was that Johnston’s army was between 8,000 and 10,000 men?

Answer. Yes, sir. I never heard any man put it higher than 10,000 men.





JCCW – Wagon-Master Nathaniel F. Palmer

16 08 2009

Testimony of Wagon-Master Nathaniel F. Palmer

Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 221-224

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1862.

NATHANIEL F. PALMER sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Will you state in what capacity you served in the army under General Patterson?

Answer. I was appointed wagon-master in the 8th Pennsylvania regiment by Colonel Lumley.

Question. When did you enter the army?

Answer. On the 15th day of May last.

Question. You were captured by the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. On what day and in what engagement?

Answer. I was taken on the 2d day of July.

Question. At the battle of Falling Waters?

Answer. There were two divisions of the army after we crossed the river; they came to a fork of the road, and one part took the right and the other the left. The 15th Pennsylvania regiment was on the extreme right of the right wing; they had an advance guard thrown out, and Dr. Tripp and myself were taken with it.

Question. Where were you taken after your capture?

Answer. To Winchester.

Question. When did you arrive at Winchester?

Answer. On the morning of the 4th of July.

Question. Can you tell what number of troops Johnston had at the time you were taken—his whole force at Winchester and with him?

Answer. After we were taken we were taken with their retreat through Martinsburg. We came around to Martinsburg from Falling Waters. We were not on the road at Falling Waters, but on the road west of it. But it was all the same engagement. They then retreated three miles out of Martinsburg to a place they called Big Springs. There we lay over night with three regiments of infantry. I do not know how much cavalry they had, for they were scattered, coming in and running out, helter-skelter, and I could not get much idea of them. We then lay there until, perhaps, the next morning at 9 o’clock, when we fell back three miles further towards Bunker Hill, and went into a field, where they drew up in a sort of line of battle. There they were met by two more regiments and six pieces of light artillery. I think four of the guns were brass, and the other two were iron. We lay there in that field until alter dark; I do not know what time in the evening it was; and then we were put on their baggage wagons, and everything was sent into Winchester—all their traps.

Question. Did the force there go into Winchester at that time?

Answer. No, sir. We left them on the ground there, but all their wagon trains went into Winchester.

Question. Tell us, as near as you can, the whole number of Johnston’s force at that time, what you left behind you, and what you found at Winchester.

Answer. From the best calculations that we could make—and we got our information from very good sources—we concluded that they had about 7,000 men, besides their cavalry. That was scattered about in such confusion that we could not tell anything about it.

Question. How long did you stay at Winchester?

Answer. Until the 18th of July.

Question. Did Johnston’s force continue to increase while you remained at Winchester; and if so, to what extent?

Answer. There were squads coming in there every day. I do not think there was a day but what some came in. They would come in two or three companies at a time; no full regiments ever came in while we were there. By counting up the squads and calculating the best we could, we concluded that by the 18th there was but very little over 13,000 there.

Question. Did this increase of force come in from Manassas or from other points?

Answer. They did not come from Manassas. They were reported to us as coming from towns off in Virginia. I cannot remember the names of them. We made inquiries, and they were reported to us as coming in from different places in Virginia; that is, they were volunteers that had been picked up through the country.

Question. What was the condition of the fortifications at Winchester when you arrived there?

Answer. I did not see anything of any fortifications myself. Some of our men were taken out to work on the 5th of July, I think. When they came back they reported that they had been working at a cannon to mount it on a little fortification they had in the edge of the town where the Charlestown rail-road comes in at Winchester. They reported that there was a little fortification there, with a sort of rifle-pits or trench dug for some fifteen or twenty rods.

Question. Is that the only fortification you heard of there?

Answer. That is the only one we ever got information about.

Question. How many guns had they there?

Answer. Only this one they tried to mount.

Question. You left Winchester on the 18th of July?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you state where you went and what you saw on the road?

Answer. We were taken from Winchester to Strasburg, and arrived there in the evening about nine or ten o’clock. We lay there until the next morning until two o’clock; when we were put in the cars for Manassas. On our way to Manassas, I should think twenty miles from there, we ran a foul of Johnston’s men. One of them came into the cars whom I knew, because he stood guard over me while I was at Big Spring. He said they had three regiments then bound for Manassas, and that there were more coming on behind. While we lay there on one side, there were two trains that ran in there and went by us. We got into Manassas about nine o’clock in the morning. In the course of a couple of hours or so these trains came in with these men on and unloaded.

Question. How many regiments were there in all that came in?

Answer. There were three came in there. Whether they brought them all down there is more than I can tell. They had perhaps four or five switches at Manassas, where the headquarters were. They ran in there and ran past us, unloaded the trains, and then they went right back again. They were gone until nearly night, when they ran in again and unloaded some more men there.

Question. How many men were brought into Manassas while you were there?

Answer. We were told that there were 7,000 of them.

Question. Was Johnston there himself?

Answer. That is what we understood that he was there.

Question. Did you hear of any battle when you had got to Manassas?

Answer. We heard before we got there of the battle of the 18th. We heard that at a station called the Plains. There was quite a gathering and hurraing there. Some men had shot guns and threatened to shoot us through the windows of the cars.

Question. When did you leave Manassas?

Answer. On the 19th, about ten o’clock in the evening.

Question. Where did you go?

Answer. We ran down to Culpeper Court-House. I lay there until the next day, the 20th, at one o’clock, when we left.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. Why did you lay there so long?

Answer. To let trains pass coming from the south.

Question. From Richmond?

Answer. I do not know as they all came from Richmond. Some of them came in from Gordonsville.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. How many troops, according to your estimate, passed you going to Manassas, while you were on your way from Manassas to Richmond?

Answer. We calculated that if Johnston brought 7,000, there were then taken there twenty-two regiments.

Question. Including the 7,000 brought down by Johnston?

Answer. Yes, sir. There were three in Richmond that night; two trains were loaded, and another regiment was at the station, standing and sitting about there.

Question. The whole you think amounted to twenty-two regiments?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You do not know, of your own knowledge, what became of the force Johnston left behind at Winchester?

Answer. No, sir; I could not tell anything about that.

By the chairman:

Question. Were there any large re-enforcements at Winchester at any time?

Answer. No, sir; they came in there in small squads. I do not think there was any number at one time come in higher than perhaps four or five companies.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. And none of those came from Manassas?

Answer. No, sir; none of them were reported as coming from Manassas.

By the chairman:

Question. And in all they had not more than 13,000 there?

Answer. No, sir; there could not have been more than that.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. Did they get that gun mounted while you were at Winchester?

Answer. We did not know. They were pretty much all young men who were taken out for that work. After they found out that that was the work they had to do, we came to the conclusion that we would not work on their fortifications or their guns. The fact of it was, we thought if we were going to be murdered by them, we might as well have it done first as at last. I protested against going out, and all the other men came up and declared that they would not go out and work on the fortifications, let the consequences be what they might. The result was that they did not come for us again.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What time did Johnston start with his men from Winchester?

Answer. He started the 17th, in the night some time. We heard in the evening that he was going to start.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. You started the next day after?

Answer. Yes, sir; the next day at 1 o’clock.

Question. Would there have been any difficulty in Patterson’s force coming and taking Winchester when you arrived there?

Answer. No, sir; they never could have made a stand at all. We expected them hourly all the time, and had got the wall of the jail fixed so that we could get out in five minutes. And all over town, at every door almost, there was a horse and wagon hitched, so that they might be ready to get right in and leave the town—standing there day and night.

Question. Looking for Patterson to come in?

Answer. Yes, sir, hourly.

Question. How did you keep the jailer from knowing that you had fixed the wall?

Answer. We hung blankets over it. The fact is, I had a scheme of my own to attend to that jailer. When we were first brought there, he came in, and when he saw me he said: “Damn you, you are the fellow I have been looking for. I am going to hang you on the bars here.” As he was not armed, I answered him pretty sharply. While that was going on, Lieutenant Buck, who was a gentleman, came in and chided the jailer for treating a prisoner that way. He was a brute, that jailer, if ever there was one. There was an old man named Martin, over eighty years of age, taken because he was a Union man, and brought there a prisoner from Martinsburg. The way that the old man was treated was shameful. And I had just made up my, mind to attend to that jailer if our troops came. I could have got out there in five minutes, and finished with him before our troops could get through the town; but they did not come.





JCCW – Lt. Horatio B. Reed

8 08 2009

Testimony of Lt. Horatio B. Reed

Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 220-221

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1862.

Lieutenant HORATIO B. REED sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank in the army?

Answer. I am second lieutenant in the fifth regiment of United States artillery.

Question. Where are you now stationed?

Answer. Minor’s Hill, Virginia.

Question. Were you at the battle of Bull Run?

Answer. Yes, sir; I was chief of line of caissons in Griffin’s battery.

Question. Can you tell us the movements of the battery just before it was lost, the orders given, and what led to the loss of the battery?

Answer. Our battery was in battery five times. We first came in battery I do not know by whose orders. I had charge of six caissons, a battery wagon, and forge. I left the battery wagon and forge some distance below where we came in battery the first time. Our battery was again ordered in battery—by whose orders I do not know. General Barry—then Major Barry—came to my captain, and I am under the impression my captain made some protest against going forward on account of the want of support. But we then advanced in a field upon the right. We found that was not where we had been ordered, and we then went upon a hill and came in battery for the fourth time. That was on the left of the house there. We then came in battery on the right of the house. I was chief of the line of caissons, and my position was in the rear. As we advanced upon the hill I wanted to go with the battery, and I left the caissons and went forward. I think we came in battery with two pieces; Lieutenant Hasbrouck in command. There was a body of troops coming up, and I know there was something said about those troops being our own, sent by some one to support us. I have heard since that it was said General Heintzelman sent them, but I did not hear the name mentioned then. We did not fire there until the troops advanced so near that they fired upon us and cut us down.

Question. Why did you not fire upon them?

Answer. We had orders not to fire.

Question. Who gave those orders?

Answer. I am under the impression that General Barry gave them.

Question. Did you hear the order given by General Barry?

Answer. I heard the order given by some one to Captain Griffin and Lieutenant Hasbrouck—and I am under the impression that it was General Barry— not to fire upon that body of men, for the reason that they were troops sent up to support us. Just after that they fired upon us and cut us down.

Question. Was General Barry there at that time?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Could you have broken up that body of men by your battery if you had opened on them?

Answer. We could have done so unless they were better troops than we saw that day; I think we could have swept them off with canister; we could have scattered any body of troops, I think, no matter how efficient—that is, to the best of my belief.

Question. Was Ricketts’ battery captured at the same time?

Answer. I presume it was. My horse was shot from under me at the time, and I was somewhat stunned by falling on my breast. We advanced together, but I never met Captain Ricketts except on that occasion, and he rode up in advance of his battery, and I was in rear of ours.

Question. Did the panic on the field commence immediately after the capture of those batteries?

Answer. Well, sir, the Ellsworth zouaves were ordered to support us, but they ran away before that.

Question. Did you have any support at that time?

Answer. No, sir; we were ordered there without any support but these zouaves.

Question. Did not the marines support you?

Answer. No, sir; they could not get up there. When we first went into battery, we went ahead of them.

Question. Was your battery without support during the day?

Answer. Yes, sir. I went after the 14th New York, and they went up with us for a little time, and then they left; their officers did all they could.

Question. About what time did the loss of your battery happen?

Answer. I have a very faint idea of time on that day, for I did not exactly know what time we came into battery; I was without a watch. We left our camp about 12 o’clock at night, and I suppose we went into action about 11 o’clock; and if we did, I think this was about 4 o’clock.





JCCW – Lt. Charles E. Hazlitt (Hazlett)

6 08 2009

Testimony of Lt. Charles E. Hazlitt

Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 218-219

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1862.

Lieutenant CHARLES E. HAZLITT sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank in the army?

Answer. First lieutenant of artillery.

Question. Where are you now stationed?

Answer. On Minor’s Hill, over in Virginia.

Question. Were you at the battle of Bull Run?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you in Griffin’s battery?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was your rank then?

Answer. The same as now.

Question. Can you tell what led to the loss of Griffin’s and Ricketts’ batteries in that battle?

Answer. As far as I am able to judge, it was in consequence of the battery being sent to such an advanced position without any support.

Question. Will you give us the particulars of the loss of that battery—what occurred just previous to the loss of it, and at the time?

Answer. I do not know what occurred just at the moment of the loss, as just before the time the battery was put in position they changed and took up the position where they were lost. Another officer and myself stayed where we were in order to get away two guns that were left there; one had two horses killed, and we had to send for horses; and another one that had a wheel which was broken, and we were engaged in putting on a spare wheel, so that we were not with the battery in the last position. All that I know is that we had been in action some time, and I understood that there was an order for us to move the battery forward up on a little hill where there was a house. I do not know who the order came from. I only knew we were to go there. The officers of the batteries were all averse to going there, as before that we had had no infantry with us that was put there as our support. We were told to go up to this place. We talked about having to go there for some time; and I know it was some time after I was told that we had an order to go that we had not gone. I heard Captain Griffin say that it was no use, and we had to go. We started to go up on this hill. I was in advance of the battery, leading the way, and I had to turn off to a little lane to go to the top of the hill. Just as we turned off the lane in the field, an officer of the enemy on horseback appeared about 100 paces in front. As he saw us turn in, he turned around and beckoned to some one on other side of the hill, and we supposed the enemy were just on the other side of the hill waiting for us, as they had been there just before. An officer hallooed up to me and said we were not to go there, that we had to go to another hill to the right, which was the place we had spoken of going to, where we wished to be sent instead of to the other position. We then started off towards the hill on the right, but I do not think we had got more than half-way up the hill when I was told to go back to the hill we had started for first. We then went back there and came into position. We had been in action there for some time; the fire was exceedingly hot; and being in such close range of the enemy we were losing a great many men and horses. We were in full relief on top of the hill, while they were a little behind the crest of the hill. We presented a better mark for them than they did for us. I do not think there was any order to move the battery around to the right of the little house on the hill. I remember asking Captain Griffin if I could not move the piece I was firing to another place, as it was getting almost too hot there, and I wanted to go to the left. The enemy had just got the range of my gun, and I wanted to move it out of range. The captain said I could do so. And then it is my impression that I asked him if we had better not move the whole battery away from there, as they had got our range so well. And then we started to move. Lieutenant Kensel and myself stayed back to get away the two guns I spoke of. .Just after we got them started off we saw the battery in this other place flying all around, and the horses with the caissons running in every direction. That was the time the battery was lost, but we were not there at the time.

Question. Did you see the regiment that fired at the battery when it was lost?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. You know nothing of the loss of the battery further than you have stated?

Answer. That is all.

Question. You do not know who gave Captain Griffin the order to move forward?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. And nothing of any orders given after that?

Answer. No, sir; only what I have stated that we had orders to go up to his place. We put it off for some time and it was repeated.





JCCW – Col. William W. Averell

4 08 2009

Testimony of Col. William W. Averell

Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 213-218

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1862.

Colonel WILLIAM W. AVERELL sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank in the army?

Answer. I am lieutenant in the 3d regiment of regular cavalry and colonel of the 3d regiment of Pennsylvania cavalry, now commanding the second cavalry brigade.

Question. Were you at the battle of Bull Run?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In whose division?

Answer. I was in General Hunter’s division, acting as assistant adjutant general to Colonel Andrew Porter at that time.

Question. What, in your judgment, caused the disaster of that day?

Answer. They commenced, I presume, almost from the time we started from Arlington, from the other side of the river. There were great many causes that combined to lose the day to us. The most apparent cause, however, at the time we first felt we were beaten, that we had to retire—and that we had felt for some time beforehand—was the want of concentration of the troops; the feeling that we ought to have had more men in action at one time.

Question. The want of concentration on the field?

Answer. Yes, sir. We crossed the run with 18,000 men. I do not believe there were over 6,000 or 8,000 actually engaged at any one time.

Question. There were more than that number engaged during the day?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Was it impossible to bring more men into action, or were not the proper steps taken to do so?

Answer. I am unable to say. I was not present at the council the night before, although I was almost immediately made aware by Colonel Porter of all that had taken place in the council. But as to what orders were given to other commanders of divisions or brigades I do not know.

Question. All you know is in relation to the management of your own division on the field?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were or not as many men of your own division brought into battle at any one time as could have been brought in?

Answer. I think they were.

Question. Was not the nature of the battle-field such that it was exceedingly difficult to bring a large body of men into action at any one time?

Answer. I think it was about as fine a battle-field as you can find between here and Richmond. I have no idea there was any better.

Question. Was the field favorable for the movement and manoeuvering of large bodies of men?

Answer. One or two divisions of the size we had then could have manoeuvred very well.

Question. I speak of the field as a whole?

Answer. Well, sir, to come to the causes of the disaster, another cause was perhaps the fall of General Hunter, who was wounded at the beginning of the action. That took Colonel Porter away from his brigade to look after the brigade that Colonel Burnside commanded. It was thrown into confusion, and Burnside was in danger of losing his battery, and came to Colonel Porter for a battalion of regulars to help him. That was diverted from the position it was originally intended for; from the extreme right to the extreme left of our division. They were the flank of the division, thrown out to lash the enemy, as you might say; that battalion being to our extreme right what the knot is to the lash. At the beginning of the action they could have inflicted very severe and telling blows upon the enemy. But as it was they were taken to the extreme left of the division. General Porter went to look after the affairs of that division. The enemy were repulsed and commenced giving way rapidly. In the mean time I had formed the brigade into line, developed it, and deployed it. The report of General Porter will tell you how it was done. The whole line of the centre of the enemy gave way, followed by the wings as far as we could see, and we drove them rapidly back. For the first two or three hours it seemed as though nothing could stop us. At the end of two or three hours, Heintzelman’s column came on the same ground; the 2d Minnesota, the 38th New York, and the 5th and 11th Massachusetts. There was a want of a headquarters somewhere on the field. All the staff officers who knew anything about the position of the enemy had to act without orders. I had the command of Colonel Porter’s brigade for about an hour and a half or two hours. After standing a half an hour in line, under a severe fire, without venturing to give an order to move, I formed the 8th and fourteenth New York in column, and pushed them down the road right straight to the house where we afterwards lost the batteries and everything. They went down in fine style, perfectly cool and in good order. They were going so rapidly that the enemy could not keep the range—were constantly losing the range; and the column was not cut much—had but very few casualties. When they got down to where the road they were on crossed the turnpike, then, by some misunderstanding, an order was sent to them to turn up that road, instead of keeping on according to the previous purpose, and thus those two regiments were diverted to the left. If they had gone up to that hill at the time the enemy were going away, they could, I believe, have taken that house and held that position.  And then Griffin’s battery could have gone up there in safety, and they could have cut off the retreat of those rebels who were flying before Burnside’s brigade and Sykes’s battalion, probably 2,000 or 3,000 of them. Turning up this road kept our troops under the fire of the enemy’s batteries, and subjected them to a desultory fire from those running rebels, which broke them up. The eighth New York broke and never afterwards formed to any extent—not over 200. The field officers left the field and went back off the ground. There were only two officers in that regiment who afterwards displayed any courage and coolness at all that was observable—two field officers, the quartermaster and the major, I think. Griffin’s battery was then without support; and as I was passing by his battery at that time, he called to me and said he was without support, and asked what he should do. I saw the fourteenth New York collecting in little masses over to the left of the field. I rode as rapidly as possible over to them, collected them, and marched them over to the rear of Griffin’s battery.

Question. How many men did the regiment have then?

Answer. It was pretty nearly formed. .

Question. Pretty nearly full?

Answer. Yes, sir; I should think that three-fourths of the men were there. They formed very well, did very well, indeed. The officers behaved well; but, as I said before, this feeling was uppermost: want of orders. Lieutenant Whipple, who was acting assistant adjutant general to the division commander, and reported to Colonel Porter after General Hunter fell, and myself met about this time. We talked over the position of affairs, and came to the conclusion that that hill in front of us was the key-point of the enemy’s position, and must be taken before the battle would be given up. We felt that we had won the battle; but in order to make it decisive and hold the position, we would have to take that hill. We agreed upon a plan which was to collect the regiments in the centre of the field : the fifth and eleventh Massachusetts, the second Minnesota, the thirty-eighth New York, and, I think, Colonel Coffer’s regiment, sixty-ninth, I think—five or six regiments—and to send them up on the hill in line. Put the fourteenth on the right, with the marines and zouaves, and then move them all up together with Griffin’s battery in the centre. That would make an embrasure of troops for the battery to fire through, and they never could take the battery as long as these supports were on its flanks, neither could their cavalry ever charge upon the infantry line as long as the battery was there. We went over to the centre and succeeded in getting these five regiments started. I found Colonel Franklin and two or three other officers there who assisted me. Colonel Franklin was conspicuous. Colonel Wadsworth was also conspicuous in starting these regiments. Just about this time I became aware that General McDowell had come on the field from this fact. We saw the battery moving up on the hill. I had gone to Griffin and notified him of this plan, telling him these troops were going to move up, not to mistake them for the enemy and fire upon them. He had necessarily, from his position, to fire over their heads at one point of the movement, if he kept up his fire. A great many incidents occurred along about that time that I presume you have heard many times.

Question. We want the main statement.

Answer. The battery was seen moving up on the hill, and without any support except the marines and zouaves. The New York 14th was then down in a hollow; they had followed Griffin’s battery for about half the distance. There were two slopes coming down to each other; Griffin was on one slope and the enemy was on the other, which was a little higher than-the one we were on. The 14th went down into the hollow and there waited. The marines and zouaves went up with the battery, and had to cross a deep run with high banks on each side.

Question. Did Ricketts’ battery go with Griffin’s?

Answer. It joined it in this movement. I immediately rode over to the right of the field and inquired where General McDowell was. I found him on top of a little hill in a little field beyond the turnpike. In going over I had spoken to the 14th, and told them to push up to the woods on the right of Griffin’s battery. They went forward finely in line. I followed the 14th, going around the right flank of it, and got up on the hill where General McDowell was. General McDowell called out to the colonel of the 14th to march the regiment by flank. There was probably a delay of two or three minutes in executing that movement. I spoke, then, to the General, and said: “General, if that battery goes up on the hill it will be lost; the woods are full of the enemy, for I have seen them there. I had then been on the ground seven hours watching closely with a glass all the movements. Said I, “For heaven’s sake let the 14th go up in the woods.” Marching them by the flank, changing the movement, was sending them up in rear of the battery, where they could have no effect upon the enemy on the flank. General McDowell said: “Go and take the 14th where you want it.” I immediately went to the 14th, changed its direction to the woods, and told it to take the double quick. The battery was still moving. The general said it was too late to recall the movement. I was so apprehensive that the battery would meet with a disaster there that I rode up to where the battery was. The marines were then sitting down in close column on the ground on the left of the battery. The battery was then getting into position and unlimbering. The fire zouaves were still in rear of the battery. The zouaves immediately commenced a movement, rose up and moved off in rear of the battery, a little to the right. I rode up then to the left of the battery, and there met Colonel Heintzelman. I saw some troops immediately in front of us, not over 75 or 100 yards off. I should say it was at least a regiment; we could see their heads and faces very plainly. I said to Colonel Heintzelman: “What troops are those in front of us?” He was looking off in another direction. I said: “Here, right in front of the battery.” I do not remember the reply he made, but I dropped my reins and took up my glasses to look at them, and just at that moment down came their pieces, rifles and muskets, and probably there never was such a destructive fire for a few minutes. It seemed as though every man and horse of that battery just laid right down and died right off. It was half a minute—it seemed longer—before I could get my horse down out of the fire. I then went to the marines and halloed to them to hurry on. Their officers were standing behind them keeping them in ranks; but the destruction of the battery was so complete that the marines and zouaves seemed to be struck with such astonishment, such consternation, that they could not do anything. There were probably 100 muskets fired from the zouaves and marines—not over that; and they, of course, fired too high. They were below the battery, and where the battery was we could not see more than half of the bodies of the rebels, and what they did fire was ineffective. They began to break and run down the hill, and nothing could stop them, and then the enemy rushed right over there like a lowering cloud—right over the hill.

Question. Why did not the batteries open upon those men in front?

Answer. I do not know from actual operation why they did not. The battery was unlimbered, and the men were standing at the guns. In going down the hill, after the general wreck, I saw an officer galloping along a little in front of me. I recognized Major Barry, and cried out, “Halloo, Barry, is that you?” He said, “Yes,” Said I, “Where is Griffin?” He said, “I am afraid he is killed.” I said, “That battery is lost; I am afraid we are gone up,” or some remark to that effect. Barry then said: “I am to blame for the loss of that battery. I put Griffin there myself.” Well, the 14th, by this time, had reached the woods on the right, The 38th New York, which led the column on the left, which we intended to support when they got there, had reached this little cross-road, and the 14th and 38th held on very well—indeed, splendidly. The enemy came right over the brow of the hill, and their fire was very deadly. They made a rush over the top of the hill, and their cavalry made their appearance at the same time; this 14th and 38th hung on for fifteen minutes there, while all the officers about there tried to collect these scattered troops and get them back to that position to the assistance of the 14th and 38th, and appealed to them in every way that possibly could be done. But it was of no avail. What there was left of the battery, a few limbers and caissons that had live horses to drag them, came galloping down the hill, right through this mass of running troops, and occasionally a horse would fall, and the whole thing would get all tangled up.

Question. Was or not that the beginning of the panic?

Answer. That was the turning point of the affair, right there.

Question. Did you not look upon that as the turning point upon the field?

Answer. Yes, sir; oh! yes, sir. We had eight regiments marching towards that hill then.

Question. Were those batteries properly supported when they moved up the hill?

Answer. No, sir; that is shown from the fact that they were taken.

Question. If they had been properly supported they would not have been taken?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Could they have been properly supported?

Answer. Yes, sir; the troops were there to do it.

Question. Then it was a mistake to order those batteries forward without a proper support—a mistake on the part of some one?

Answer. It must have been so.

Question. Do you know why Captain Griffin did not open fire upon the regiment in front of them?

Answer. It was generally understood that these troops were mistaken.

Question. By whom was the mistake made?

Answer. It was understood that these troops were mistaken for our own, and Captain Griffin was ordered not to fire. My impression is that it was the chief of artillery on the field who made the mistake.

Question. Who was the chief of artillery?

Answer. Major Barry.

Question. General Franklin’s brigade came on after that, did they?

Answer. Well, sir, they were partially on the field then. I do not know exactly what troops composed his brigade. He was there himself. Then Sykes’s battalion moved across and occupied this hill in the middle ground, and held it. Our troops then scattered all over the battle-field, their backs turned towards the enemy, and all going to the rear.

Question. The capture of that battery, and the rapid retreat of the horses and men in the vicinity of the battery, tended to create confusion among all those in the rear?

Answer. Yes, sir; that taken in connexion with the exhaustion of the men. There was no water for the men to drink about there, except in the rear, and a great many were dying of thirst. Everybody wanted water. Well, sir, it was a pretty hot day; and it was probably a little unfortunate for us that the water was in the rear of the field of battle. We then came back to our first position on the field of battle. If we had had a fresh division there, or a fresh brigade there, we could have made a stand. Johnston’s forces—that is, I have been told since they were Johnston’s forces—made their appearance on the field at that time.

Question. Just at the time of the loss of the batteries?

Answer. Yes, sir. They deployed in several lines on our extreme right, and with the rapidity, apparently, of fresh troops. The moral effect of that deployment had a great deal to do with the panic among our troops.

Question. That happening at the same time with the loss of the batteries?

Answer. Yes, sir. If we had not lost the batteries, and had had a fresh brigade there, we could have made a stand there, because our troops formed very well back on our first position. The 27th New York formed first, and stood steady (though the men were very much exhausted) for nearly half an hour, while the other fragments of regiments gathered in their places about them, the enemy’s artillery throwing projectiles right through us all the while. We had no artillery to reply to them, only a section of the battery of Captain Arnold. We had no artillery, no fresh troops, and could not make a stand, but were forced to retire.

Question. Then you attribute the disasters of the day to the loss of Griffin’s and Ricketts’ batteries, the great exhaustion of the men from the want of water, and the fact that Johnston’s troops came on the field fresh just at the tune of the loss of the batteries?

Answer. Yes, sir. Those three causes alone would have been sufficient to have defeated us. But there were many other minor causes that had their effect. There was a want of discipline in our troops.

Question. The troops were not familiar with their officers?

Answer. Yes, sir; that was one thing. That they could have stood was shown in the way that Sykes’s battalion stood, because they were disciplined, and came off the field in regular order.





JCCW – Gen. Andrew Porter

2 08 2009

Testimony of Gen. Andrew Porter

Report on the Conduct of the War, Vol. 2, pp. 210-213

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1862.

General ANDREW PORTER sworn and examined.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. What is your position and rank in the army?

Answer. I am a brigadier general of volunteers, and at present provost marshal.

Question. Were you at the battle of Bull Run?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What position did you hold there?

Answer. I commanded the first brigade of the second division.

Question. General Hunter’s division?

Answer. Yes, sir; General Hunter was cut down almost at the first fire, and I then commanded the division.

Question. Hunter’s division was on the extreme right that day?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Will you go on and give as briefly as may be the action which that division took on the day of that battle?

Answer. I would rather refer you to my report, which was made up immediately afterwards from my notes, which I have not since read. It contains accurate details, and if I attempt to state it now I would perhaps not recollect everything.

Question. Was it in your division that the rout commenced?

Answer. I cannot tell.

Question. Were Ricketts’ and Griffin’s batteries in your division?

Answer. Griffin’s battery was in my division. Ricketts’ battery came up afterwards. I do not now recollect whose division he was in.

Question. Were you near Griffin’s battery at the time it was captured?

Answer. I was within a couple of hundred yards, I suppose. I recollect very distinctly the volley that was fired from the woods. I was far enough off to see that that part of the game was played out after that fire.

Question. You were there when that regiment from the woods opened fire?

Answer. Yes, sir; but some little way off—200 or 300 yards.

Question. Had you seen any confusion or symptoms of a rout previous to that volley?

Answer. Yes, sir. The volunteer regiments were constantly breaking. They would break, and then we would rally two or three regiments and bring them up again. The New York 14th (Brooklyn) that behaved so well was broken nearly all to pieces at the first fire. But they rallied again and went up with Griffin’s battery, and stood their ground remarkably well.

Question. Do you consider that Griffin’s battery had sufficient support at that time?

Answer. The troops were not at all reliable. If they had been reliable, and could have been kept up to their work, I should think there was sufficient support.

Question. Was the position of that battery a good position with the support it had?

Answer. That is a mere matter of opinion. I would not like to criticise the act of others. I did not put it there.

Question. You stationed it some thousand yards further in the rear, I believe?

Answer. Not a thousand yards. But I put it in a position where it did most murderous execution.

Question. And where you considered it safe?

Answer. Yes, sir; because the enemy could not have got over to it without passing over a thousand yards of ground. I know the fuses were cut for a thousand yards, and they were pretty accurate.

Question. Had these batteries been retained in an effective position and properly supported, do you think it would have made any difference in the result of the day?

Answer. That would be a mere matter of opinion.

Question. We ask your opinion as a military man.

Answer. My experience of military life is not sufficient to warrant me in setting up any opinion against officers senior to me.

Question. You had hardly any seniors upon that field, had you? All the generals in command were brigadiers, were they not?

Answer. The only brigadier there was General McDowell. I was only a colonel. General Hunter was a general officer, but he was cut down almost at the first fire.

Question. Was it the understanding among the officers of the army that General Patterson was to hold Johnston in the valley of Winchester, so that he should not take part in that battle?

Answer. I cannot say; I knew nothing of that at the time, and I do not think that the officers generally had any idea of it one way or another.

Question. Up to the day of the fight?

Answer. Yes, sir; I know that some person told me that Patterson had been ordered down, but that was a mere matter of conversation from some irresponsible person who came out from Washington. I said nothing about it to anybody, for I supposed it was a state secret.

Question. Had Patterson detained Johnston in the valley of Winchester, so that no re-enforcements would have been brought down from Johnston to Beauregard, what in your opinion would have been the result of that battle?

Answer. Well, it might have ended one way or the other. Our troops could not stand the attacking of the enemy; they were played out quite early. The men were exhausted—somehow or other they seemed to have no heart in the matter. The officers were more to blame than the men. We had the enemy whipped up to 3 o’clock. Then their re-enforcements came up. Whether our men would, without that, have retained their success I do not know. The enemy had Manassas to fall back upon. They had skilful generals in command. I think we should have prevented the rout at all events.

Question. You would have prevented the rout but for the last re-enforcements that came down?

Answer. I think so.

Question. Was it not the understanding among the officers of the army that re-enforcements from Johnston had arrived during Friday or Saturday night, or prior to the battle on Sunday?

Answer. That I do not recollect. I have an impression that such was the case, but I do not recollect it distinctly. It would have been mere supposition on our part any how, for we gained no information from spies or in any other way in regard to their forces.

Question. Only from the whistling of the locomotives and the movement of die trains?

Answer. I did not hear anything of that. There were two or three hills intervening between my position and that.

Question. Was there any detention Sunday morning in your march?

Answer. Yes, sir. Our orders were to get under way at 2 or half past 2 o’clock in the morning. We got out into the road and were delayed a great while there. We were formed on the road in front of my camp. I had the reserve brigade in the rear. After some delay we then moved on some distance and halted again; and we kept pottering along, pottering along in that way, instead of being fairly on the road. It was intended that we should turn their position at daylight, as we could have done very easily but for the delay. There was a great deal of delay—very vexatious delay. I do not know what was the cause of it. The whole affair was extremely disagreeable to me. I was disgusted with the whole thing, and I asked no questions, and I did not want to know who was to blame.

Question. Suppose you had been on that road by daylight, as you say you might have easily been, and had reached your position and turned their left as early as was intended, what effect do you think it would have had?

Answer. I think it would have had a very beneficial effect.

Question. And all the time you were delayed the enemy were changing their order of battle?

Answer. No, sir; I do not think they knew where we were going to attack them. When we got to Bull Run we were left on a high point, and we could see in the distance two different columns of dust. Captain Griffin and my staff were with me. I remarked upon it. We saw it coming, but did not know whether it was General Heintzelman coming in from above, or whether it was the enemy. We rather thought it was Heintzelman, as we expected him there if he was successful. The enemy came closer while we were staying there three-quarters of an hour, probably more. We could see their guns, and could see some blue pantaloons. We could distinguish this, when Major Woodbury came to me and said we had got now to Bull Run, and suppose we go down and have a consultation. I mentioned what I had seen to them. They had not observed it before. General Hunter moved the column and started them at once forward, threw out skirmishers, but before the skirmishers on the left were deployed they were at work. The enemy had just got there then, for we saw them coming two or three miles off at first. If we had got around there first we probably would have had the position in open ground to fight them. As it was we went right out from the woods. If we had got there a little earlier we could have chosen our position there to meet them.

Question. In that case you would have flanked them?

Answer. Yes, sir; we would have got between them and their re-enforcements. The plan of the battle was admirable; it could not have been better. Every thing was as well looked to and taken care of as could be.

Question. The only fault was this delay?

Answer. It may not have been a fault.

Question. Accident, then.

Answer. The fact existed. If we had gotten off in time, as we might, we would have got in around them.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. Were not Griffin’s and Ricketts’ batteries moved too far forward to be supported by infantry?

Answer. Not with good infantry.

By Mr. Gooch :

Question. Was the battery properly supported with infantry?

Answer. As well as could be. There were one or two regiments that did as well or better than any other volunteer regiments. As I said, the Brooklyn 14th behaved remarkably well.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. Were you in a position to see the enemy that were mistaken for our troops at the time they opened on the batteries?

Answer. I saw that regiment going by in the distance. I was 200 or 300 yards off.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What number of infantry supported those two batteries?

Answer. I cannot tell. The marines were intended for the support of Griffin’s battery in the first place. The Brooklyn 14th rallied on the battery in its first position. There was another regiment there; I do not now remember distinctly which it was. There was enough to support it if the troops had been steady. If we had had the same number of such troops as we have now they could have supported it. I know one regiment of the old regulars would have held it.

Question. How many guns were in those two batteries?

Answer. There were twelve. There were four rifled guns and two howitzers in Griffin’s battery. I do not recollect exactly about Ricketts’ battery, as it was not under my command.








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