Preview: McCarthy – “Confederate Waterloo”

26 03 2017

Confederate_WaterlooI recently received a copy of Confederate Waterloo: The Battle of Five Forks, April 1, 1865, and the Controversy that Brought Down a General, by Michael J. McCarthy. This appears to be the latest in a series of books from Savas Beatie that take a new look at controversial figures and incidents (or rehash long-settled arguments, depending on your point of view). In this case, the author recounts the fight at Five Forks in the closing days of the war in Virginia, the relief of Army of the Potomac Fifth Corps commander Gouverneur K. Warren by U. S. Grant lieutenant Phil Sheridan, and the efforts of Warren to restore his “good name.” The literature accompanying the book states that it is a “fully researched and unbiased” account. I don’t know that there’s any way to prove that last part of that, and its accuracy will doubtless depend on whether or not the reader agrees with the author’s conclusions.

What you get:

  • A foreword by Bryce Suderow
  • An eight page introduction
  • 103 pp covering the battle
  • 150 pp on Warren’s quest for vindication
  • Nine pages on “The Continuing Quest to Influence Public Memory”
  • Orders of Battle
  • A twelve page bibliography, including seventeen newspapers and periodicals, one unpublished dissertation and one unpublished thesis, and three manuscript collections
  • Index
  • Nine George Skoch maps
  • Illustrations are portrait photographs, no period or modern images of the points of interest
  • Footnotes at page bottom

It should be fun to read reactions to – and predictions about – the book (read or unread) on the web. Feel free to share them here, if you like.





Preview: Clemens (ed.) – “The Maryland Campaign, Vol. III”

23 03 2017

MarylandCampaignIIIAfter a long, long slog, friend Dr. Thomas G. Clemens has completed his Maryland Campaign campaign with volume III of his edition of the work of Ezra Carman in The Maryland Campaign of September, 1862, Vol. III: Sheperdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. There, I used the word Campaign four times in one sentence.

I’m assuming my readers’ familiarity with the scope and importance of campaign veteran Ezra Carman’s work with the establishment of the Antietam National Battlefield and the chronicling, through massive solicitation of primary accounts, of the campaign. For the rest of you, think of Carman as the Bachelder of Antietam – or, more apporpriately, think of John Bachelder as the Carman of Gettysburg.

This last installment gives us the five closing chapters of Carman’s opus: Boteler’s Ford; The Results of the Maryland Campaign; Lincoln and McClellan; Lincoln, Halleck and McClellan; and Resume of the Maryland Campaign of September, 1862. Then we have three appendices: one each on the errata of Vol. I and Vol. II; and a wonderful Biographical Dictionary. These are followed up with a surprisingly brief five-page bibliography (keep in mind that this is an edition of a manuscript based primarily on Carman’s own papers), and finally an index (to this volume only). Footnotes are provided at the bottom of the applicable pages.

Dr. Clemens has produced an unparalleled reference work for the Maryland Campaign that will stand a long, long time. Research, write about, or argue online the Maryland Campaign of 1862 without first reading all three volumes at your own peril and eventual embarrassment. Thank you, Tom, and the folks at Savas Beatie for providing this invaluable resource.





Pvt. Rufus H. Peck, Co. C, Botetourt Dragoons, Attached to 30th Virginia Cavalry*, On the Battle

12 03 2017

We remained at Fairfax C. H. until the 17th of July, and I was sent with fourteen other men, commanded by Serg. Garret, three miles below Fairfax C H. on the Falls Church road to stand picket, and at 9 o’clock a. m. we found that McDowell was moving on Manassas Junction by three roads, viz.: Falls Church road, Little River turnpike, and Flint Hill road. Serg. Garret returned to notify the General of McDowell’s movement, but the Gen. had already learned from other pickets, of his advance, so he ordered the army to retreat immediately. As Serg. Garret did not return to us, Corporal McCue sent me back 3 miles to Fairfax C. H., and when I arrived our Adjt. told me of the retreat and from there I could see Col. Kershaw’s regiment already engaged with the enemy, so I had to return to notify the other pickets to join the command, which we could only do by a flank movement and came very near being cut off entirely by the enemy. When I returned I found that two of our pickets on the Flint Hill road, John Mays and William Mailer had been captured. We continued our retreat to Centerville and remained there until night. Gen. Beauregard’s plan was to throw sky rockets to let us know when to retreat further towards Manassas Junction, and when we called in the last pickets, we were, fired upon by the enemy and two of our horses were killed from under their riders, Edward Hayth and WilHam Walton.

During the night we marched across Bull Run at Mitchel’s Ford and laid down for the remainder of the night in front of the guns at Manassas Junction. We were awakened next morning by the fireing of one of the enemy’s guns called ”Long Tom.” As this was the first big gun I had seen fired, I remember well the appearance of that shell to me. It looked more like a gate-post flying through the air than any thing else I could compare it to. After hissing through the air about a mile it exploded and I told the boys I knew it had blown Manassas Junction to “kingdom come” and she would need no more protection. It wasn’t many days after this though, until we became more accustomed to the big guns, so we didn’t jump at such hasty conclusions and the fireing wasn’t so exciting or terrifying. I hadn’t seen much of the infantry until that day and when they began double quicking and crossing Bull’s Run at Mitchel’s Ford in order to meet the enemy, I imagined we had men enough to whip the North right there.

At 9 o’clock on the 18th, the two armies met and for two hours a raging battle followed and when the Southerners made a charge ‘all along the line, they drove the enemy back with considerable slaughter, into the timber back of the lowlands, where the battle was fought, and they remained there until Sunday, with ”Long Tom” occasionally saluting us. Our line of battle extended from Blackburn’s Ford up nearly to Stone Bridge, a distance of 10 miles.

Sunday morning at about 8 o’clock Long Tom began fireing and we all thought the enemy meant to renew the attack, but about 9 o’clock we heard fireing at Stone Bridge about six miles above Manassas Junction.

The cavalry was immediately ordered to make a force march to Stone Bridge and when we got their we found that the 8th Georgia Regiment, commanded by Col. Huntington, in trying to hold the ford had lost nearly all their men and their commander. The 2nd Va. Regiment arrived to go to their rescue, but failed on account of the thick pines. About this time Jackson came in and with Gen. Bee and others, turned defeat into victory. Gen. Bee rushed to Jackson and said ‘General they are beating us back,” and Jackson said “we will give them the bayonet.” Gen. Bee encouraged by Jackson’s response shouted to his men: “Look! there is Jackson and his men standing like a stone wall.” He was ever afterward called “Stonewall Jackson.”

Gen. Bee was killed in a few minutes after making the remark to his men. The enemy, under McDowell’s command, was driven back with dreadful slaughter to Washington.

As we of the 2nd Va. regiment were unable to get to Stone Bridge to aid in the battle there and were in a dangerous position, being between the fires of both armies. Gen. Beauregaurd ordered us to the rear. Just at that time Gen. Jos. E. Johnson, coming in from the valley, rode up to Beauregaurd’s head-quarters and took command, he being a senior officer. He immediately sent a courier to Col. Radford to halt the 2nd Va Cavalry. Col. Radford told the courier to go to the D – – that he was acting under Beauregaurd’s orders. We were not aware of Johnston being near, but as soon as Johnston saw we didn’t halt he galloped down and shouted : “In the name of Jos. E. Johnston I command you to halt.” Of course, it wasn’t any trouble for Col. Radford or his men to halt, then.

He commanded us to cross Bull Run and go toward Cub Run Bridge to intersect the enemy’s line as it passed on retreat, and to shoot all the horses drawing the artillery and wagons. There being 1,000 of us. we held the road for nearly a mile, coming on their right flank and being so near before they knew jt that we succeeded in capturing 24 pieces of artillery and the men commanding same. The road was lined with dead horses for nearly a mile, a sight no one would want to witness again, but we were only carrying out orders

Our captain ordered the fences to be pulled down and 3 other men and I dismounted and tore them down on both sides. When we mounted we happened to look to our left and saw a house with a crowd of men standing around a well. I proposed to these three comrades that we could go up and fill our canteens as it was such a hot day. When we arrived, there were 60 or 70 of the finest looking men I ever saw. about middle-aged and finely dressed. More gold-headed canes, gold glasses and gold teeth than I had ever seen before on that number of men. We asked them to fill our canteens, which they did and just as they filled the last canteen, one of the men said to us that our command was retreating and I road around the house to where I could see our line and it had passed nearly out of sight. Just then two guns that we hadn’t captured with the other 24 pieces of artillery, and a regiment of infantry also, opened fire on our regiment, and Capt. Radford of 2nd Va. regiment and Serg. Ervin were killed and several others wounded

Just as we four men arrived to recross the road, a cannister of grape shot passed down the road striking two of our horses. We rode on about a half mile under a heavy fire, but they were over shooting us, just stripping the leaves from the trees, when one of the horses fell dead from his wound and the other one was still running on three legs. I took the saddle from the dead horse and carried it on my horse that was called the “Flying Artillery” and wouldn’t carry two men, and another comrade took the rider of the horse that was killed.

We overtook our regiment just as they were ready to recross Bull Run, and were held in readiness the remainder of the day, but no order for action was given and near night fall marched back to our camp ground of the proceeding night.

Just after dark a heavy rain began and continued all night and about half the next day, so we were thoroughly drenched by this time. Shortly after day break we started toward Centerville and our skirmish line captured several prisoners on the way. We moved very cautiously through the woods in the downpour of rain, thinking the enemy was at Centerville. But instead of the enemy being at Centerville, we found the homes deserted. Tables were set with the most delicious victuals, fine drinks, etc , having been prepared for a general jubilee after the supposed victory. Some of the houses were locked, but the majority were so that we could easily enter and some of the owners soon returned, so we enjoyed a bountiful repast that was intended for the northern soldiers. After the victory at Stone Bridge and the capture of the artillery at Cub Run Bridge, as they were retreating, the enemy rushed on to Washington panic-stricken. Had we realized the condition of the enemy then, as we afterward knew it to be, we could have pursued them and easily captured them, but we didn’t know the conditions.

Reminiscences of a Confederate Soldier of Co. C, 2nd VA. Cavalry, by R. H. Peck

*The 2nd Virginia Cavalry, while formed in May of 1861, was known as the 30th Regiment Virginia Volunteers until the end of October, 1861.

R. H. Peck at Fold3

R. H. Peck at Ancestry.com 





Preview: Shultz – “Double Canister at Ten Yards”

5 03 2017

51gaj1jk6pl-_sy445_ql70_Double Canister at Ten Yards”: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge, by David L. Shultz, was originally published back in 1995, and has been updated by Savas Beatie this year. The title is self-explanatory, so let’s get to the meat and the differences between the two editions.

You get: 86 pages of text (1995 – 67 pp, but fonts, maps, and illustrations have changed significantly); a foreword by Charles Hathaway (who wrote the same for the 1995 edition); an introduction that was included in the 1995 edition’s page total; 13 short chapters and a postscript (1995 – no chapters); order of battle; end notes; a full index (1995 – no index); six large, clear Phil Laino maps (1995 – five busier, darker Shultz maps); and lastly, this new edition includes more photographs.

The author bio says Mr. Shultz is working on a “comprehensive tactical study of the artillery at Gettysburg,” while the 1995 edition noted that he was “preparing a more comprehensive book for future publication on the Union artillery during the entire Battle of Gettysburg.”

 





Notes on “Early Morning of War” – Part 3

21 02 2017

51gm8atoyol-_sx329_bo1204203200_To recap, here’s how this works: as I read Edward Longacre’s study of the First Battle of Bull Run, The Early Morning of War, I put little Post-Its where I saw something with which I agreed or disagreed, or which I didn’t know, or which I did know and was really glad to see; essentially, anything that made me say “hmm…” So I’ll go through the book and cover in these updates where I put the Post-It and why. Some of these will be nit-picky for sure. Some of them will be issues that can’t have a right or wrong position. Some of them are, I think, cut and dry. So, here we go:

Chapter 2: The Fretful Virginian and the Hesitant Irishman

I see the actions in the Shenandoah Valley at this time as much less important to the story of First Bull Run than does pretty much everyone else, primarily because it figured so little in Federal planning, and even in the failure of that planning (more on that later, but I’ve written about it often). Needless to say, Mr. Longacre is not of the same opinion, and provides substantial coverage of that area of operations. I didn’t skip over this when reading the book, so I won’t skip over it here.

P. 45 – I was unaware that Joseph Johnston resigned from the army in 1837, to take a civilian position with the Topographical Bureau in Washington. This is similar to a tact taken by George Meade, who, like Johnston, was assigned to the artillery upon graduation from West Point and who, like Johnston, felt he was stagnating there, and who, like Johnston, moved to a civilian position in the Topographical Bureau, and who, like Johnston, used this as a backdoor later to return to the army in the more prestigious  Topographical Engineers. I did not know that about Johnston (Longacre does not make the Meade connection, which is neither here nor there).

P. 61 – On this page, Longacre becomes the first author other than Russel Beatie to emphasize, in foreshadow, the influence that the character of Fitz John Porter may have had on his superior officer in the Shenandoah Valley, Robert Patterson.

P. 62 – The plan of how to move recruits to secure Washington in May of 1861 was devised by Patterson.

Chapter 3: Awaiting the Invader

P. 71 – A nice description of the geography around Bull Run, noting the convergence of major roads at Centreville, the Centreville Ridge, the thin population and poor soil.

P. 73 – The author points out the significance of the railroad junction at Manassas to both armies, and discussed the concerns of Robert E. Lee, who as Virginia’s head military honcho played a major role in the development of defenses in the area.

Pp. 74-75 – A nice description of the less than attractive personality of Beauregard’s predecessor in command Milledge Luke Bonham. At the end of the campaign, every member of his staff transferred elsewhere.

P. 79 – The author points out several times the importance of interior lines in the planning and disposition of Confederate forces, in the thinking of folks like Lee and Beauregard.

P. 81 – The author notes that, while Beauregard’s failure to form any organization larger than a brigade was an “unwieldy decentralization of authority,” at the same time it kept “things simple and avoid[ed] extra levels of command. Then too, ‘Old Bory’ was not sufficiently acquainted with his subordinates to pronounce them deserving of leading more than a brigade.”

P. 89 – On much maligned Confederate Commissary General Lucious B. Northrup: “A dispassionate evaluation of the evidence, however, must conclude that while he made mistakes, they were mainly due to inexperience rather than obstinacy and that too many of the problems that beset him and, to a lesser degree, Lieutenant Colonel Myers – especially the slow and erratic shipment of rations and equipment by overburdened railroads – were beyond their ability to solve.”

Part 1

Part 2

Part 4

Part 5

 





Preview: Quint – Determined to Stand and Fight

21 02 2017

51onibqprjl-_sy344_bo1204203200_If you’ve been reading Bull Runnings for a while, you know that I’ve previewed all of the titles in Savas Beatie’s Emerging Civil War series. And you also know how these books work. Concise histories, lots of maps and illustrations, tough paperbacks, suitable for the field. The really interesting parts, to me anyway, are the appendices. So, for this newest publication, I’m going to give you the bare minimum, and flesh out those appendices for you.

Determined to Stand and Fight: The Battle of Monocacy, July 9, 1864, Ryan T. Quint.

  • Foreword by Ted Alexander
  • Narrative 114 pages, 12 chapters.
  • Seven Hal Jesperson Maps
  • Appendix A: The Civilians’ Experience at the Battle of Monocacy – Quint
  • Appendix B: The Ransom of Frederick – Quint
  • Appendix C: Medical Care and the Battle of Monocacy – Jake Wynn
  • Appendix D: The Johnson-Gilmor Raid – Philip S. Greenwalt
  • Appendix E: McCausland’s Raid and the Burning of Chambersburg – Avery C. Lentz
  • Appendix F: The Literary Legacy of Lew Wallace – Quint
  • Touring the Battlefield (10 pages)
  • Order of Battle

No footnotes, bibliography, or index in this volume. Footnotes are available online.

Ryan Quint is a seasonal ranger at Fredericksburg & Spotsylvania National Military Park.





Previews: New from Savas Beatie

10 02 2017

Bear with me – I’m spinning my wheels as fast as I can. I have two new, well, maybe newish, releases from Savas Beatie to which I must hip you all.

nosucharmy_lrgFirst is a new edition of Mark A. Smith’s and Wade Sokolosky’s “No Such Army Since the Days of Julius Caesar:” Sherman’s Carolinas Campaign from Fayetteville to Averasboro, March 1865. This one was originally published by Ironclad back in 2005, not too long after I had the pleasure of touring the area with the authors. Important differences between the new edition and the old, in addition to the move from paperback to hardcover: nineteen all new Hal Jesperson maps (replacing the thirteen by Mark Smith); new soldier photographs, some reproduced for the first time; and inclusion of a letter detailing the damage done to the Fayetteville Arsenal.

Also new is a booklet by David Hirsch and Dan Van Haften, 51k6hsdbopl-_sy348_bo1204203200_authors of Abraham Lincoln and the Structure of Reason, who concentrate in a nice, brief presentation the construction of the 16th President’s most famous speech in The Ultimate Guide to the Gettysburg Address. Using geographic diagrams the authors “deconstruct the speech into its basic elements and demonstrate how the scientific method is basic to the structure of the Gettysburg Address.”