#81 – Gen. Joseph E. Johnston

18 01 2008

 

Reports of General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding Confederate Armies of the Shenandoah and of the Potomac, of operations from May 23 to July 22, with order of battle

O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 2 [S# 2] — CHAPTER IX, pp 470-480 

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Fairfax Court. House, October 14, 1861

SIR: I have the honor to submit to the honorable Secretary of War a report of the operations of the troops under my command, which terminated in the battle of Manassas.

I assumed command at Harper’s Ferry on the 23d of May. The force at that point then consisted of nine regiments and two battalions of infantry, four companies of artillery, with sixteen pieces without caissons, harness, or horses, and about three hundred cavalry. They were, of course, undisciplined, several regiments without accouterments, and with an entirely inadequate supply of ammunition.

I lost no time in making a complete reconnaissance of the place and its environs, in which the chief engineer, Major (now Brigadier-General) Whiting, ably assisted. The result confirmed my preconceived ideas. The position is untenable by any force not strong enough to take the field against an invading army and to hold both sides of the Potomac. It is a triangle, two sides being formed by the Potomac and the Shenandoah, and the third by Furnace Ridge. The plateau thus inclosed, and the end of Furnace Ridge itself, the only defensible position, which, however, required for its adequate occupation double our numbers, was exposed to enfilade and reverse fires of artillery from heights on the Maryland side of the river. Within that line the ground-was more favorable to an attacking than to a defending force. The Potomac can be easily crossed at many points above and below, so that it is easily turned. It is twenty miles from the great route into the valley of Virginia from Pennsylvania and Maryland, by which General Patterson’s approach was expected. Its garrison was thus out of position to defend that valley or to prevent General McClellan’s junction with General Patterson. These were the obvious and important objects to be kept in view. Besides being in position for them, it was necessary to be able on emergency to join General Beauregard.

The occupation of Harper’s Ferry by our Army perfectly suited the enemy’s views. We were bound to a fixed point; his movements were unrestricted. These views were submitted to the military authorities. The continued occupation of the place was, however, deemed by them indispensable. I determined to hold it until the great objects of the Government required its abandonment. The practicable roads from the West and Northwest, as well as from Manassas, meet the route from Pennsylvania and Maryland at Winchester. That point was, therefore, in my opinion, our best position. The distinguished commander of the Army of the Potomac was convinced, like myself, of our dependence upon each other, and promised to co-operate with me in case of need. To guard against surprise and to impose upon the enemy, Major Whiting was directed to mount a few heavy guns upon Furnace Ridge and otherwise strengthen the position.

I was employed until the 13th of June in continuing what had been begun by my predecessor, Colonel (now Major-General) Jackson–the organization, instruction, and equipment of the troops, and providing means of transportation and artillery horses. The river was observed from the Point of Rocks to the western part of the county of Berkeley, the most distant portions by the indefatigable Stuart with his cavalry. General Patterson’s troops were within a few hours of Williamsport, and General McClellan’s in Western Virginia were supposed to be approaching to effect a junction with Patterson, whose force was reported by well-informed persons to be eighteen thousand men.

On the morning of the 13th of June information was received from Winchester that Romney was occupied by two thousand Federal troops, supposed to be the vanguard of McClellan’s army. Col. A. P. Hill, with his own (Thirteenth) and Colonel Gibbons’ (Tenth) Virginia Regiments, was dispatched by railway to Winchester. He was directed to move thence towards Romney, to take the best position and best measures to check the advance of the enemy. He was to add to his command the Third Tennessee Regiment, which had just arrived at Winchester. During that day and the next the heavy baggage and remaining public property were sent to Winchester by the railway, and the bridges on the Potomac destroyed.

On the morning of the 15th the Army left Harper’s Ferry for Winchester–the force had been increased by three regiments since the 1st of June—and bivouacked four miles beyond Charlestown.

On the morning of the 16th intelligence was received that General Patterson’s army had crossed the Potomac at Williamsport; also, that the United States force at Romney had fallen back. A courier from Richmond brought a dispatch authorizing me to evacuate Harper’s Ferry at my discretion. The Army was ordered to gain the Martinsburg turnpike by a flank movement to Bunker Hill, in order to place itself between Winchester and the expected advance of Patterson. On hearing of this, the enemy recrossed the river precipitately.

Resuming my first direction and plan, I proceeded to Winchester. There the Army was in position to oppose either McClellan from the west or Patterson from the northeast, and to form a junction with General Beauregard when necessary. Lieut. Col. George H. Steuart, with his Maryland battalion, was sent to Harper’s Ferry to bring off some public property said to have been left. As McClellan was moving southwest-ward from Grafton Colonel Hill’s command was withdrawn from Romney. The defense of that region of country was intrusted to Colonel McDonald’s regiment of cavalry.

Intelligence from Maryland indicating another movement by Patterson, Colonel Jackson, with his brigade, was sent to the neighborhood of Martinsburg to support Colonel Stuart. The latter officer had been placed in observation on the line of the Potomac with his cavalry, his increasing vigilance and activity relied on to repress small incursions of the enemy, to give intelligence of invasion by them, and to watch, harass, and circumscribe their every movement. Colonel Jackson was instructed to destroy such of the rolling stock of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as could not be brought off, and to have so much of it as could be made available to our service brought to Winchester.

Major Whiting was ordered to plan defensive works, and to have some heavy guns and navy carriages mounted. About twenty-five hundred militia, under Brigadier-General Carson, were called out from Frederick and the neighboring counties to man them.

On the 2d of July General Patterson again crossed the Potomac. Colonel Jackson, pursuant to instructions, fell back before him. In retiring he gave him a severe lesson in the affair at Falling Waters. With a battalion of the Fifth Virginia Regiment (Harper’s) and Pendleton’s battery of field artillery he engaged the enemy’s advance. Skillfully taking a position where the smallness of his force was concealed, he engaged them for a considerable time, inflicted a heavy loss, and retired when about to be outflanked, scarcely losing a man, but bringing off forty-five prisoners.

Upon this intelligence the Army, strengthened by the arrival of General Bee and Colonel Elzey and the Ninth Georgia Regiment, was ordered forward to the support of Jackson. It met him at Darkesville, six miles from Martinsburg, where it took up a position for action, as General Patterson, it was supposed, was closely following Colonel Jackson. We waited for him in this position four days, hoping to be attacked by an adversary at least double our numbers, but unwilling to attack him in a town so defensible as Martinsburg, with its solid buildings and inclosures of masonry. Convinced at length that he would not approach us I returned to Winchester, much to the disappointment of our troops, who were eager for battle with the invaders. Colonel Stuart, with his cavalry as usual, remained near the enemy.

Before the 15th of July the enemy’s force, according to the best intelligence to be obtained, amounted to about thirty-two thousand. Ours had been increased by eight Southern regiments. On the 15th of July Colonel Stuart reported the advance of General Patterson from Martinsburg. He halted, however, at Bunker Hill, nine miles from Winchester, where he remained on the 16th. On the 17th he moved to his left to Smithfield. This created the impression that he intended to attack us on the south, or was merely holding us in check while General Beauregard should be attacked at Manassas by General Scott. About I o’clock on the morning of July 18 I received from the Government a telegraphic dispatch informing me that the Northern Army was advancing upon Manassas, then held by General Beauregard, and directing me, if practicable, to go to that officer’s assistance, after(*) sending my sick to Culpeper Court-House. In the exercise of the discretion conferred by the terms of the order, I at once determined to march to join General Beauregard. The best service which the Army of the Shenandoah could render was to prevent the defeat of that of the Potomac. To be able to do this it was necessary, in the first instance, to defeat General Patterson or to elude him. The latter course was the most speedy and certain, and was therefore adopted. Our sick, nearly seventeen hundred in number, were provided for in Winchester. For the defense of that place the militia of Generals Carson and Meem seemed ample, for I thought it certain that General Patterson would follow my movement as soon as he discovered it. Evading him by the dispositions made of the advance-guard, under Colonel Stuart, the Army moved through Ashby’s Gap to Piedmont, a station of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Hence the infantry were to be transported by the railway, while the cavalry and artillery were ordered to continue their march.

I reached Manassas about noon on the 20th, preceded by the Seventh and Eighth Georgia Regiments and by Jackson’s brigade, consisting of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-seventh, and Thirty-third Virginia Regiments. I was accompanied by General Bee, with the Fourth Alabama, the Second, and two companies of the Eleventh Mississippi. The president of the railroad company had assured me that the remaining troops should arrive during the day. I found General Beauregard’s position too extensive, and the ground too densely wooded and intricate, to be learned in the brief time at my disposal, and therefore determined to rely upon his knowledge of it and of the enemy’s positions. This I did readily from full confidence in his capacity.

His troops were divided into eight brigades, occupying the defensive line of Bull Run. Brigadier-General Ewell’s was posted at the Union Mills Ford; Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones’ at McLean’s Ford; Brigadier-General Longstreet’s at Blackburn’s Ford; Brigadier-General Bonham’s at Mitchell’s Ford; Colonel Cocke’s at Ball’s Ford, some three miles above; and Colonel Evans, with a regiment and battalion, formed the extreme left at the stone bridge. The brigades of Brigadier-General Holmes and Colonel Early were in reserve in rear of the right. I regarded the arrival of the remainder of the Army of the Shenandoah during the night as certain, and Patterson’s junction with the Grand Army on the 22d as probable.

During the evening it was determined, instead of remaining in the defensive positions then occupied, to assume the offensive and attack the enemy before such a junction. General Beauregard proposed a plan of battle, which I approved without hesitation. He drew up the necessary order during the night, which was approved formally by me at 4.30 o’clock on the morning of the 21st. The early movements of the enemy on that morning and the non-arrival of the expected troops prevented its execution. General Beauregard afterwards proposed a modification of the abandoned plan, to attack with our right while the left stood on the defensive. This, too, became impracticable, and a battle ensued different in place and circumstances from any previous plan on our side.

Soon after sunrise on the morning of the 21st a light cannonade was opened upon Colonel Evans’ position. A similar demonstration was made against the center soon after, and strong forces were observed in front of it and of the right. About 8 o’clock General Beauregard and I placed ourselves on a commanding hill in rear of General Bonham’s left. Near 9 o’clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander, reported that a large body of troops was crossing the valley of Bull Run some two miles above the bridge. General Bee, who had been placed near Colonel Cocke’s position, Colonel Hampton, with his Legion, and Colonel Jackson, from a point near General Bonham’s left, were ordered to hasten to the left flank. The signal officer soon called our attention to a heavy cloud of dust to the northwest and about ten miles off, such as the march of an army would raise. This excited apprehensions of General Patterson’s approach.

The enemy, under cover of a strong demonstration on our right, made a long detour through the woods on his right, crossed Bull Run two miles above our left, and threw himself upon the flank and rear of our position. This movement was fortunately discovered by us in time to check its progress, and ultimately to form a new line of battle nearly at right angles with the defensive line of Bull Run.

On discovering that the enemy had crossed the stream above him, Colonel Evans moved to his left with eleven companies and two field-pieces to oppose his advance, and disposed his little force under cover of the wood near the intersection of the Warrenton turnpike and the Sudley road. Here he was attacked by the enemy in immensely superior numbers, against which he maintained himself with skill and unshrinking courage. General Bee moving towards the enemy, guided by the firing, had with a soldier’s eye selected the position near the Henry house, and formed his troops upon it. They were the Seventh and Eighth Georgia, Fourth Alabama, Second Mississippi, and two companies of the Eleventh Mississippi, with Imboden’s battery. Being compelled, however, to sustain Colonel Evans, he crossed the valley and formed on the right and somewhat in advance of his position. Here the joint force, little exceeding five regiments, with six field pieces, held the ground against about fifteen thousand United States troops for an hour, until, finding themselves outflanked by the continually arriving troops of the enemy, they fell back to General Bee’s first position, upon the line of which Jackson, just arriving, formed his brigade and Stanard’s battery. Colonel Hampton, who had by this time advanced with his Legion as far as the turnpike, rendered efficient service in maintaining the orderly character of the retreat from that point; and here fell the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, his second in command.

In the mean time I waited with General Beauregard near the center the full development of the enemy’s designs. About 11 o’clock the violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, and the march of a large body of troops from the enemy’s center towards the conflict was shown by clouds of dust. I was thus convinced that his great effort was to be made with his right. I stated that conviction to General Beauregard, and the absolute necessity of immediately strengthening our left as much as possible. Orders were accordingly at once sent to General Holmes and Colonel Early to move with all speed to the sound of the firing, and to General Bonham to send up two of his regiments and a battery. General Beauregard and I then hurried at a rapid gallop to the scene of action, about four miles off. On the way I directed my chief of artillery, Colonel Pendleton, to follow with his own and Alburtis’ batteries.

We came not a moment too soon. The long contest against fivefold odds and heavy losses, especially of field officers, had greatly discouraged the troops of General Bee and Colonel Evans. Our presence with them under fire and some example had the happiest effect on  the spirit of the troops. Order was soon restored and the battle re-established, to which the firmness of Jackson’s brigade greatly contributed. Then, in a brief and rapid conference, General Beauregard was assigned to the command of the left, which, as the younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field. The aspect of affairs was critical, but I had full confidence in the skill and indomitable courage of General Beauregard, the high soldierly qualities of Generals Bee and Jackson and Colonel Evans, and the devoted patriotism of their troops.

Orders were first dispatched to hasten the march of General Holmes’, Colonel Early’s, and General Bonham’s regiments. General Ewell was also directed to follow with all speed. Many of the broken troops, fragments of companies, and individual stragglers were reformed and brought into action with the aid of my staff and a portion of General Beauregard’s. Colonel (late Governor) Smith with his battalion and Colonel Hunton with his regiment were ordered up to re-enforce the right. I have since learned that General Beauregard had previously ordered them into the battle. They belonged to his corps. Colonel Smith’s cheerful courage had a fine influence, not only upon the spirit of his own men, but upon the stragglers of the troops engaged. The largest body of these, equal about four companies, having no competent field officer, I placed under the command of one of my staff, Col. F. J. Thomas, who fell while gallantly leading it against the enemy. These re-enforcements were all sent to the right to re-establish more perfectly that part of our line. Having attended to these pressing duties at the immediate scene of conflict, my eye was next directed to Colonel Cocke’s brigade, the nearest at hand. Hastening to his position, I desired him to lead his troops into action. He informed me, however, that a large body of the enemy’s troops beyond the stream and below the bridge threatened us from that quarter. He was therefore left in his position.

My headquarters were now established near the Lewis house. From this commanding elevation my view embraced the position of the enemy beyond the stream and the approaches to the stone bridge, a point of especial importance. I could also see the advances of our troops far down the valley in the direction of Manassas, and observe the progress of the action and the maneuvers of the enemy.

We had now sixteen guns and two hundred and sixty cavalry and a little above nine regiments of the Army of the Shenandoah and six guns, and less than the strength of three regiments of that of the Potomac, engaged with about thirty-five thousand United States troops, among whom were full three thousand of the old Regular Army. Yet this admirable artillery and brave infantry and cavalry lost no foot of ground. For nearly three hours they maintained their position, repelling five successive assaults by the heavy masses of the enemy, whose numbers enabled him continually to bring up fresh troops as their preceding columns were driven back. Colonel Stuart contributed to one of these repulses by a well-timed and vigorous charge on the enemy’s right flank with two companies of his cavalry.

The efficiency of our infantry and cavalry might have been expected from a patriotic people accustomed like ours to the management of arms and horses, but that of the artillery was little less than wonderful. They were opposed to batteries far superior in the number, range, and equipment of their guns, with educated officers and thoroughly instructed soldiers: We had but one educated artillerist, Colonel Pendleton, that model of a Christian soldier, yet they exhibited as much superiority to the enemy in skill as in courage. Their fire was superior both in rapidity and precision.

About 2 o’clock an officer of General Beauregard’s adjutant-general’s office galloped from Manassas to report to me that a United States army had reached the line of Manassas Gap Railroad, was marching towards us, and then but three or four miles from our left flank. The expected re-enforcements appeared soon after. Colonel Cocke was then desired to lead his brigade into action to support the right of the troops engaged, which he did with alacrity and effect. Within a half hour the two regiments of General Bonham’s brigade (Cash’s and Kershaw’s) came up, and were directed against the enemy’s right, which he seemed to be strengthening. Fisher’s North Carolina regiment was soon after sent in the same direction. About 3 o’clock, while the enemy seemed to be striving to outflank and drive back our left, and thus separate us from Manassas, General E. K. Smith arrived with three regiments of Elzey’s brigade. He was instructed to attack the right flank of the enemy, now exposed to us. Before the movement was completed he fell, severely wounded. Colonel Elzey, at once taking command, executed it with great promptitude and vigor. General Beauregard rapidly seized the opportunity thus afforded him, and threw forward his whole line. The enemy was driven back from the long-contested hill, and victory was no longer doubtful.

He made yet another attempt to retrieve the day. He again extended his right with a still wider sweep to turn our left. Just as he reformed to renew the battle Colonel Early’s three regiments came upon the field. The enemy’s new formation exposed his right flank more even than the previous one. Colonel Early was therefore ordered to throw himself directly upon it, supported by Colonel Stuart’s Cavalry and Beckham’s battery. He executed this attack bravely and well, while a simultaneous charge was made by General Beauregard in front. The enemy was broken by this combined attack. He lost all the artillery which he had advanced to the scene of the conflict. He had no more fresh troops to rally on, and a general rout ensued.

Instructions were instantly sent to General Bonham to march by the quickest route to the turnpike to intercept the fugitives, and to General Longstreet to follow as closely as possible upon the right. Their progress was checked by the enemy’s reserve and by night at Centreville. Schenck’s brigade made a slight demonstration towards Lewis’ Ford, which was quickly checked by Holmes’ brigade, which had just arrived from the right. His artillery, under Captain Walker, was used with great skill. Colonel Stuart pressed the pursuit on the enemy’s principal line of retreat, the Sudley road. Four companies of cavalry, under Colonel Radford and Lieutenant-Colonel Munford, which I had held in reserve, were ordered to cross the stream at Ball’s Ford to reach the turnpike, the line of retreat of the enemy’s left. Our cavalry found the roads encumbered with dead and wounded (many of whom seemed to have been thrown from wagons), arms, accouterments, and clothing.  A report came to me from the right that a strong body of U.S. troops was advancing upon Manassas. General Holmes, who had just reached the field, and General Ewell, on his way to it, were ordered to meet this unexpected attack. They found no foe, however.

Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be. An adequate force of cavalry would have made it decisive. It is due, under Almighty God, to the skill and resolution of General Beauregard, the admirable conduct of Generals Bee, E. K. Smith, and Jackson, and of Colonels (commanding brigades) Evans, Cocke, Early, and Elzey, and the courage and unyielding firmness of our patriotic volunteers. The admirable character of our troops is incontestably proved by the result of this battle, especially when it is remembered that little more than six thousand men of the Army of the Shenandoah with sixteen guns, and less than two thousand of that of the Potomac with six guns, for full five hours successfully resisted thirty-five thousand U.S. troops with a powerful artillery and a superior force of regular cavalry. Our forces engaged, gradually increasing during the remainder of the contest, amounted to but — men at the close of the battle. The brunt of this hard-fought engagement fell upon the troops who held their ground so long with such heroic resolution. The unfading honor which they won was dearly bought with the blood of many of our best and bravest. Their loss was far heavier in proportion than that of the troops coming later into action.

Every regiment and battery engaged performed its part well. The commanders of brigades have been already mentioned. I refer you to General Beauregard’s report for the names of the officers of the Army of the Potomac who distinguished themselves most. I cannot enumerate all of the Army of the Shenandoah who deserve distinction, and will confine myself to those of high rank: Colonels Bartow and Fisher (killed); Jones (mortally wounded); Harper, J. F. Preston, Cummings, Falkner, Gartrell, and Vaughn; J. E. B. Stuart, of the cavalry, and Pendleton, of the artillery; Lieutenant-Colonels Echols, Lightfoot, Lackland, G. H. Steuart, and Gardner. The last-named gallant officer was severely wounded.

The loss of the Army of the Potomac was 108 killed, 510 wounded, and 12 missing. That of the Army of the Shenandoah was 270 killed, 979 wounded, and 18 missing. Total killed, 378; wounded, 1,489; missing, 30. That of the enemy could not be ascertained. It must have been four or five thousand. Twenty-eight pieces of artillery, about five thousand muskets, and nearly five hundred thousand cartridges, a garrison flag, and ten colors were captured on the field or in the pursuit. Besides these we captured sixty-four artillery horses, with their harness, twenty-six wagons, and much camp equipage, clothing, and other property abandoned in their flight.

The officers of my staff deserve high commendation for their efficient and gallant services during the day and the campaign, and I beg leave to call the attention of the Government to their merits. Maj. W. H. C. Whiting, chief engineer, was invaluable to me for his signal ability in his profession and for his indefatigable activity before and in the battle. Major McLean, chief quartermaster, and Major Kearsley, chief commissary, conducted their respective departments with skill and energy. Major Rhett, assistant adjutant-general, who joined me only the day before, was of great service. I left him at Manassas, and to his experience and energy I intrusted the care of ordering my troops to the field of battle as they should arrive, and forwarding ammunition for the artillery during the action. Capts. C. M. Fauntleroy, C. S. Navy, T. L. Preston, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. J. B. Washington, aide-de-camp, conveyed my orders bravely and well on this their first field, as did several gallant gentlemen who volunteered their services–Colonel Cole, of Florida; Major Dens, of Alabama; Colonel Duncan, of Kentucky. Lieut. Beverly Randolph, C. S. Army, aided Col. F. J. Thomas in the command of the body of troops he led into action and fought with gallantry. With these was my gallant friend Capt. Barlow Mason, who was mortally wounded. I have already mentioned the brave death of my ordnance officer, Col. F. J. Thomas. I was much indebted also to Cols. J. S. Preston, Manning, Miles, and Chisolm, and Captain Stevens, of the Engineer Corps, members of General Beauregard’s staff, who kindly proffered their services and rendered efficient and valuable aid at different times during the day. Col. G. W. Lay, of General Bonham’s staff, delivered the instructions to the troops sent in pursuit and to intercept the enemy, with much intelligence and courage.

It will be remarked that the three brigadier-generals of the Army of the Shenandoah were all wounded. I have already mentioned the wound of General Smith. General Jackson, though painfully wounded early in the day, commanded his brigade until the close of the action. General Bee, after great exposure at the commencement of the engagement, was mortally wounded just as our re-enforcements were coming up.

The apparent firmness of the U.S. troops at Centreville, who had not been engaged, which checked our pursuit; the strong forces occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington, and Alexandria; the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his army of thirty thousand men sooner than we could, and the condition and inadequate means of the Army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capital. It is certain that the fresh troops within the works were in number quite sufficient for their defense. If not, General Patterson’s army would certainly re-enforce them soon enough.

This report will be presented to you by my aide-de-camp, Lieut. J. B. Washington, by whom, and by General Beauregard’s aide, Lieutenant Ferguson, the captured colors are transmitted to the War Department.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON, General

*This word erased from some official copies of the report.  See Mr. Davis’ indorsement p. 478

The ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL, C.S.. Army

[Indorsement]

The telegram referred to by General Johnston in this report as received by him “about 1 o’clock on the morning of the 18th July” is inaccurately reported. The following is a copy:

RICHMOND, July 17, 1861

General J. E. JOHNSTON, Winchester, Va.:

General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court-House either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements exercise your discretion.

S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector General

The word “after” is not found in the dispatch before the words “sending your sick,” as is stated in the report; so that the argument based on it requires no comment. The order to move “if practicable” had reference to General Johnston’s letters of 12th and 15th July, representing the relative strength and positions of the enemy under Patterson and of his own forces to be such as to make it doubtful whether General Johnston had the power to effect the movement.

JEFFERSON DAVIS

—–

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

Centreville, February 3, 1862

SIR: My attention has been called to the fact that in the enumeration of the officers who distinguished themselves in the battle of Manassas the name of Col. S. B. Gibbons, commanding the Tenth Virginia Regiment, was omitted. This omission was due to unaccountable carelessness, and is a matter of regret and mortification to me. I beg that it may be corrected in my report on file in your office, and the correction published. Colonel Gibbons and his gallant regiment played an important part at a critical time, and injustice to them, even accidentally, is unpardonable. Colonel Elzey, to whose brigade Colonel Gibbons belongs, made honorable mention of him in his report.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON,

General

General S. COOPER ADJUTANT

Inspector General

—–

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. —

HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 20, 1861

The following order is published for the information of division and brigade commanders:

I. Brigadier-General Ewell’s brigade, supported by General Holmes’ brigade, will march via Union Mills Ford and place itself in position of attack upon the enemy. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack upon Centreville or to move in the direction of Sangster’s Cross-Roads, according to circumstances.

The order to advance will be given by the commander-in-chief.

II. Brigadier-General Jones’ brigade, supported by Colonel Early’s brigade, will march via McLean’s Ford to place itself in position of attack upon the enemy on or about the Union Mills and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack upon Centreville or to move in the direction of Fairfax Station, according to circumstances, with its right flank towards the left of Ewell’s command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and attack.

The order to advance will be given by the commander-in-chief.

III. Brigadier-General Longstreet’s brigade, supported by Brigadier-General Jackson’s brigade, will march via McLean’s Ford to place itself in position of attack upon the enemy on or about the Union Mills and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack on Centreville or to move in the direction of Fairfax Court-House, according to circumstances, with its right flank towards the left of Jones’ command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country.

The order to advance will be given by the commander-in-chief.

IV. Brigadier-General Bonham’s brigade, supported by Colonel Bartow’s brigade, will march via Mitchell’s Ford to the attack of Centreville, the right wing to the left of the Third Division, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack.

The order to advance will be given by the commander-in-chief.

V. Colonel Cocke’s brigade, supported by Colonel Elzey’s brigade, will march via stone bridge and the fords on the right thereof to the attack of Centreville, the right wing to the left of the Fourth Division, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack.

The order to advance will be given by the commander-in-chief.

VI. Brigadier-General Bee’s brigade, supported by Colonel Wilcox’s brigade, Colonel Stuart’s regiment of cavalry, and the whole of Walton’s battery, will form the reserve, and will march via Mitchell’s Ford, to be used according to circumstances.

VII. The light batteries will be distributed as follows:

1. To Brigadier-General Ewell’s command, Captain Walker’s six pieces.

2. To Brigadier-General Jones’, Captains Alburtis’ and Standard’s batteries, eight pieces.

3. To Brigadier-General Longstreet’s, Colonel Pendleton’s and Captain Imboden’s batteries, eight pieces.

4. To Brigadier-General Bonham’s, Captains Kemper’s and Shields’ batteries, eight pieces.

5. To Colonel Cocke’s, Colonel Hunton’s and Captains Latham’s and Beckham’s batteries, twelve pieces.

VIII. Colonel Radford, commanding cavalry, will detail, to report immediately, as follows:

To Brigadier-General Ewell, two companies of cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Jones, two companies of cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Longstreet, two companies of cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Bonham, three companies of cavalry.

To Colonel Cocke, the remaining companies of cavalry, except those in special service.

IX. The Fourth and Fifth Divisions, after the fall of Centreville, will advance to the attack of Fairfax Court-House via the Braddock and turnpike roads, to the north of the latter.

The First, Second, and Third Divisions will, if necessary, support the Fourth and Fifth Divisions.

X. In this movement the First, Second, and Third Divisions will form the command of Brigadier-General Holmes; the Fourth and Fifth Divisions that of the second in command. The reserve will move upon the plains between Mitchell’s Ford and stone bridge, and, together with the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, will be under the immediate direction of General Beauregard.

By command of General Beauregard:

THOMAS JORDAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General

—–

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. —

HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 21, 1861–4.30 a.m.

The plan of attack given by Brigadier-General Beauregard in the above order is approved, and will be executed accordingly.

J. E. JOHNSTON,

General, C. S. Army





#25 – Col. William T. Sherman

3 10 2007

 

Report of Col. William T. Sherman, Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, Commanding Third Brigade, First Division

O.R. — SERIES I–VOLUME 2 [S# 2] — CHAPTER IX, pp 368 – 371

HDQRS. THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,

Fort Corcoran, July 25, 1861

SIR: I have the honor to submit this my report of the operations of my brigade during the action of the 21st instant. The brigade is composed of the Thirteenth New York Volunteers, Colonel Quinby; Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Corcoran; Seventy-ninth New York, Colonel Cameron; Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, and Company E, Third Artillery, under command of Capt. R. B. Ayres, Fifth Artillery. We left our camp near Centreville, pursuant to orders, at 2.30 a.m., taking place in your column next to the brigade of General Schenck, and proceeded as far as the halt before the enemy’s position near the stone bridge at Bull Run. Here the brigade was deployed in line along the skirt of timber, and remained quietly in position till after 10 a.m. The enemy remained very quiet, but about that time we saw a regiment leave its cover in our front and proceed in double-quick time on the road toward Sudley Springs, by which we knew the columns of Colonels Hunter and Heintzelman were approaching. About the same time we observed in motion a large force of the enemy below the stone bridge. I directed Captain Ayres to take position with his battery near our right and open fire on this mass, but you had previously detached the two rifled guns belonging to this battery, and finding the smoothbore guns did not reach the enemy’s position we ceased firing, and I sent a request that you should send to me the 30-pounder rifled gun attached to Captain Carlisle’s battery. At the same time I shifted the New York Sixty-ninth to the extreme right of the brigade.

Thus we remained till we heard the musketry fire across Bull Run, showing that the head of Colonel Hunter’s column was engaged. This firing was brisk, and showed that Hunter was driving before him the enemy till about noon, when it became certain the enemy had come to a stand, and that our forces on the other side of Bull Run were all engaged—-artillery and infantry. Here you sent me the order to cross over with the whole brigade to the assistance of Colonel Hunter. Early in the day, when reconnoitering the ground, I had seen a horseman descend from a bluff in our front, cross the stream, and show himself in the open field, and, inferring we could cross over at the same point, I sent for ward a company as skirmishers, and followed with the whole brigade, the New York Sixty-ninth leading. We found no difficulty in crossing over, and met no opposition in ascending the steep bluff opposite with our infantry, but it was impassable to the artillery, and I sent word back to Captain Ayres to follow if possible, otherwise to use his discretion. Captain Ayres did not cross Bull Run, but remained with the remainder of your division. His report, herewith, [No. 27], describes his operations during the remainder of the day.

Advancing slowly and cautiously with the head of the column, to give time for the regiments in succession to close up their ranks, we first encountered a party of the enemy retreating along a cluster of pines. Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty, of the Sixty-ninth, without orders, rode out and endeavored to intercept their retreat. One of the enemy, in full view, at short range, shot Haggerty, and he fell dead from his horse. The Sixty-ninth opened fire upon this party, which was returned; but, determined to effect our junction with Hunter’s division, I ordered this fire to cease, and we proceeded with caution toward the field, where we then plainly saw our forces engaged. Displaying our colors conspicuously at the head of our column, we succeeded in attracting the attention of our friends, and soon formed the brigade in rear of Colonel Porter’s. Here I learned that Colonel Hunter was disabled by a severe wound, and that General McDowell was on the field. I sought him out, and received his orders to join in the pursuit of the enemy, who was falling back to the left of the road by which the Army had approached from Sudley Springs. Placing Colonel Quinby’s regiment of rifles in front, in column by divisions, I directed the other regiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of the Wisconsin Second, New York Seventy-ninth, and New York Sixty-ninth.

Quinby’s regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge, from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another stand on ground very favorable to him, and the regiment continued advancing as the enemy gave way, till the head of the column reached the point near which Ricketts’ battery was so severely cut up. The other regiments descended the hill in line of battle under a severe cannonade; and the ground affording comparative shelter against the enemy’s artillery, they changed direction by the right flank and followed the road before mentioned. At the point where this road crossed the ridge to our left front, the ground was swept by a most severe fire of artillery, rifles, and musketry, and we saw in succession several regiments driven from it, among them the zouaves and battalion of marines.

Before reaching the crest of this hill the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell’s staff, I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank, and to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced delivering its fire. This regiment is uniformed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fell into confusion and retreated toward the road there was an universal cry that they were being fired on by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, but was again repulsed in disorder.

By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and in like manner it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of this ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing columns, and the ground was very irregular, with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth, headed by its colonel (Cameron), charged across the hill, and for a short time the contest was severe. They rallied several times under fire, but finally broke and gained the cover of the hill.

This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Colonel Corcoran, who in his turn led his regiment over the crest, and had in full open view the ground so severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the roar of cannon, muskets, and rifles incessant. It was manifest the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at that point. The Sixty-ninth held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder.

All this time Quinby’s regiment occupied another ridge to our left, overlooking the same field of action and similarly engaged.

Here, about 3.30 p.m. began the scene of confusion and disorder that characterized the remainder of the day. Up to that time all had kept their places, and seemed perfectly cool and used to the shells and shot that fell comparatively harmless all around us; but the short exposure to an intense fire of small-arms at close range had killed many, wounded more, and had produced disorder in all the battalions that had attempted to destroy it. Men fell away talking and in great confusion. Colonel Cameron had been mortally wounded, carried to an ambulance, and reported dying. Many other officers were reported dead or missing, and many of the wounded were making their way, with more or less assistance, to the buildings used as hospitals.

On the ridge to the west we succeeded in partially reforming the regiments, but it was manifest they would not stand, and I directed Colonel Corcoran to move along the ridge to the rear, near the position where we had first formed the brigade. General McDowell was there in person, and used all possible efforts to reassure the men. By the active exertions of Colonel Corcoran we formed an irregular square against the cavalry, which were then seen to issue from the position from which we had been driven, and we began our retreat towards that ford of Bull Run by which we had approached the field of battle. There was no positive order to retreat, although for an hour it had been going on by the operation of the men themselves. The ranks were thin and irregular, and we found a stream of people strung from the hospital, across Bull Run and far towards Centreville. After putting in motion the irregular square, I pushed forward to find Captain Ayres’ battery. Crossing Bull Run, I sought it at its last position before the brigade crossed over, but it was not there; then, passing through the woods where in the morning we had first formed line, we approached the blacksmith-shop, but there found a detachment of the secession cavalry, and thence made a circuit, avoiding Cub Run Bridge, into Centreville, where I found General McDowell. From him I understood it was his purpose to rally the forces, and make a stand at Centreville. But, about 9 o’clock at night, I received, from General Tyler in person the order to continue the retreat to the Potomac. This retreat was by night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men of different regiments mingled together, and some reached the river at Arlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part returned to their former camps at or near Fort Corcoran. I reached this point at noon the next day, and found a miscellaneous crowd crossing over the Aqueduct and ferries.

Conceiving this to be demoralizing, I at once commanded the guard to be increased, and all persons attempting to pass over to be stopped.

This soon produced its effect; men sought their proper companies and regiments, comparative order was restored, and all were posted to the best advantage.

I herewith inclose the official report of Captain Kelly, the commanding officer of the Sixty-ninth New York; also full lists of the killed, wounded, and missing. Our loss was heavy, and occurred chiefly at the point near where Ricketts’ battery was destroyed. Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty was killed about noon, before we effected a junction with Colonel Hunters division. Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded leading his regiment in the charge, and Colonel Corcoran has been missing since the cavalry charge near the building used as a hospital.

Lieutenants Piper and McQuesten, of my personal staff, were under fire all day, and carried orders to and fro with as much coolness as on parade. Lieutenant Bagley, of the Sixty-ninth New York, a volunteer aide, asked leave to serve with his company during the action, and is among those reported missing. I have intelligence that he is a prisoner and slightly wounded. Colonel Coon, of Wisconsin, a volunteer aide, also rendered good service during the day.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Colonel, Commanding Brigade

Capt. A. BAIRD,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division





#16 – Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler

3 10 2007

 

Reports of Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler, Connecticut Militia, Commanding First Division

O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 2 [S# 2] — CHAPTER IX, pp 348 – 352

HDQRS. 1ST DIV. DEP’T NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA:

Washington City, July 27, 1861

GENERAL: In obedience to Orders, No. 22, dated Centreville, July 20, Sherman’s, Schenck’s, and Keyes’ brigades of this division–Richardson’s brigade having been left in front of Blackburn’s Ford–moved at 2.30 a.m. on the 21st instant to threaten the passage of the Warrenton turnpike bridge on Bull Run. I arrived in front of the bridge with Schenck’s and Sherman’s brigades and Ayres’ and Carlisle’s batteries about 6 a.m., Keyes’ brigade having been halted by your order to watch the road coming up from Manassas, and about two miles from the run. After examining the position, and posting Sherman’s and Schenck’s brigades and the artillery, I fired the first gun at 6.30 a.m., as agreed upon, to show that we were in position.

As my orders were to threaten the passage of the bridge, I caused Schenck’s brigade to be formed into line, its left resting in the direction of the bridge and the battery which the enemy had established to sweep the bridge and its approach, so as to threaten both. Sherman’s brigade was posted to the right of the Warrenton turnpike, so as to be in position to sustain Schenck or to move across Bull Run in the direction of Hunter’s column. The 30-pounder gun attached to Carlisle’s battery was posted on the Warrenton turnpike: with Ayres’ battery considerably in its rear. Carlisle’s battery was posted on the left of Sherman’s brigade. In this position we awaited the appearance of Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s columns, as ordered, until such time as the approach to the bridge should be carried: and the bridge rebuilt by Captain Alexander, of the Engineers, who had on the spot the necessary structure for that purpose.

Soon after getting into position we discovered that the enemy had a heavy battery, with infantry in support, commanding both the road and bridge approaches, on which both Ayres and Carlisle at different times tried the effect of their guns without success, and a careful examination of the banks of Bull Run satisfying me that they were impracticable for the purpose of artillery, these batteries had to remain comparatively useless until such time as Hunter’s column might clear the approach by a movement on the opposite bank. During this period of waiting the 30-pounder was occasionally used with considerable effect against bodies of infantry and cavalry, which could be seen from time to time moving in the direction of Hunter’s column and out of the range of ordinary guns. Using a high tree as an observatory, we could constantly see the operations of Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s column from the time they crossed Bull Run, and through one of my staff, Lieutenant O’Rorke, of the Engineers, I was promptly notified as to any change in the progress of their columns up to the time when it appeared that the heads of both were arrested, and the enemy seemed to be moving heavy re-enforcements to support their troops.

At this time I ordered Colonel Sherman, with his brigade, to cross Bull Run and to support the two columns already in action. Colonel Sherman, as appears by his report, crossed the run without opposition, and after encountering a party of the enemy flying before Hunter’s forces, found General McDowell, and received his orders to join in the pursuit. The subsequent operations of this brigade and its able commander having been under your own eye and direction, I shall not follow its movements any further, but refer you to Colonel Sherman’s report, which you will find herewith.

So soon as it was discovered that Hunter’s division had been arrested, I ordered up Keyes’ brigade, which arrived just as the left of Sherman’s was crossing the run, and having satisfied myself that the enemy had not the force nor the purpose to cross Bull Run, I ordered Keyes’ brigade to follow Sherman, accompanying the movement in person, as I saw it must necessarily place me on the left of our line and in the best possible position, when we should have driven the enemy off, to join Schenck’s brigade and the two batteries left on the opposite side.

I ordered Colonel Keyes to incline the head of his column a little to the right of the line of march taken by Sherman’s brigade, to avoid the fire of a battery which the enemy had opened. This movement sheltered the men to a considerable degree, and resulted in closing on the rear of Sherman’s brigade, and on reaching the high ground I ordered Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of Sherman’s brigade, which was done with great steadiness and regularity. After waiting a few moments the line was ordered to advance, and came into conflict on its right with the enemy’s cavalry and infantry, which, after some severe struggles, it drove back until the further march of the brigade was arrested by a severe fire of artillery and infantry, sheltered by some buildings standing on the heights above the road leading to Bull Run. The charge was here ordered, and the Second Maine and Third Connecticut Regiments, which were opposed to this part of the enemy’s line, pressed forward to the top of the hill until they reached the buildings which were held by the enemy, drove them out, and for a moment had them in possession. At this point, finding the brigade under the fire of a strong force behind breastworks, the order was given to march by the left flank across an open field until the whole line was sheltered by the right bank of Bull Run, along which the march was conducted, with a view to turn the battery which the enemy had placed on the hill below the point at which the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run. The march was conducted for a considerable distance below the stone bridge, causing the enemy to retire, and gave Captain Alexander an opportunity to pass the bridge, cut out the abatis which had been placed there, and prepared the way for Schenck’s brigade and the two batteries of artillery to pass over.

Before the contemplated movement could be made on the enemy’s battery it was removed, and placed in a position to threaten our line; but before the correct range could be obtained, Colonel Keyes carried his brigade by a flank movement around the base of the hill, and was on the point of ascending it in line to get at the battery, when I discovered that our troops were on the retreat, and that unless a rapid movement to the rear was made we should be cut off, and through my aide, Lieutenant Upton, Colonel Keyes was ordered to file to the right, and join the retreating column. The order was executed without the least confusion, and the brigade joined the retreating column in good order. When this junction was made I left Keyes’ brigade, and rode forward to ascertain the condition of Schenck’s brigade and the artillery left this side of Bull Run, and, on arriving there, found Ayres’ battery and Lieutenant Hains’ 30-pounder waiting orders. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Hains to limber up and move forward as soon as possible. This was promptly done, and the piece moved on towards Centreville. I then went into the wood where the ammunition wagon of this piece had been placed, out of reach of fire, and found that the driver had deserted and taken away part of the horses, which made it impossible to move it. I then returned to Ayres’ battery, which I found limbered up, and ordered it to move forward and cover the retreat, which was promptly done by its gallant officers, and when the cavalry charge was made, shortly afterward, they repulsed it promptly and effectively. I then collected a guard, mainly from the Second Maine Regiment, and put it under the command of Colonel Jameson, with orders to sustain Captain Ayres during the retreat, which was done gallantly and successfully until the battery reached Centreville.

Before ordering Colonel Jameson to cover Ayres’ battery, I passed to the rear to find General Schenck’s brigade, intending, as it was fresh, to have it cover the retreat. I did not find it in the position in which I had left it, and supposed it had moved forward and joined the retreating column. I did not see General Schenck again until near Cub Run, where he appeared active in rallying his own or some other regiments. General Schenck reports that the two Ohio regiments left Bull Run after the cavalry charge, and arrived at Centreville in good order.

In closing this report, it gives me great pleasure to express my admiration of the manner in which Colonel Keyes handled his brigade, completely covering it by every possible accident of the ground while changing his positions, and leading it bravely and skillfully to the attack at the right moment; to which the brigade responded in every instance in a manner highly creditable to itself and satisfactory to its commanding officers. At no time during the conflict was this brigade disorganized, and it was the last off the field, and in good order.

Colonel Keyes says: “The gallantry with which the Second Maine and Third Connecticut Regiments charged up the hill upon the enemy’s artillery and infantry was never, in my opinion, surpassed, and the conduct of Colonels Jameson and Chatfield, in this instance and throughout the day, merits the highest commendation. Colonel Terry rendered great assistance by his gallantry and excellent conduct. Lieutenant Hascall, acting assistant adjutant-general, Lieutenants Walter and Ely, rendered gallant and effective assistance.” It gives me pleasure to be able to confirm the above from personal observation, and to express my personal satisfaction with the conduct of this brigade. For further particulars as to gallant conduct of individuals, I beg leave to refer you to the reports of commanders of brigades, hereunto attached. Colonel Sherman speaks highly of Colonel Coon, of Wisconsin, and Lieutenants Piper and McQuesten, all on his personal staff.

From my own personal staff I received in every instance prompt and gallant assistance, and my thanks are due to Captains Baird and Merrill, Lieutenants Houston, Abbot, Upton, O’Rorke, and Audenried for gallant conduct and the prompt and valuable assistance they rendered me. Lieutenants Abbot and Upton were both wounded and each had a horse killed under him, as also had Lieutenant O’Rorke.

I inclose herewith a table of casualties, showing our losses at Bull Run.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

DANIEL TYLER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division

Brigadier-General McDOWELL,

Commanding Department of Northeastern Virginia

—–

HDQRS. 1ST DIV. DEP’T NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA,

Washington City, July 27, 1861

GENERAL: I closed my division report of the battle at Bull Run at the time we left for Centreville. It is due to me and to my division that its subsequent movements be noticed up to the time the different brigades reached a stopping place. On reaching Centreville, we found Richardson’s brigade in line, ready to support us or cover the retreat. This brigade returned in good order to Arlington. After the order was given to retreat, and each brigade was ordered “to proceed to the position from which it started and by the route by which it arrived,” I communicated this order to the commander of each brigade, and with Keyes’ brigade proceeded at once to Falls Church, intending to secure the camp equipage of the four regiments left standing there, which I knew, if we fell back on the fortifications in front of Washington, the enemy would at once seize.

Colonel Keyes, with the three Connecticut regiments, arrived at Falls Church about 5 a.m. on the 22d instant, and proceeded at once to strike their tents and those of the Maine regiment, and sent them to Fort Corcoran. This work, without rations, was continued throughout the entire day, the men being exposed to a severe storm of rain. By night the entire camp equipage was safely removed. Colonel Keyes then fell back to the camp of Schenck’s brigade, which had been entirely deserted, and after using those tents for the night struck them the next morning, and sent the entire Government property to Fort Corcoran and Alexandria, and at 7 p.m. on Tuesday I saw the three Connecticut regiments, with 2,000 bayonets, march under the guns of Fort Corcoran in good order, after having saved us not only a large amount of public property, but the mortification of having our standing camps fall into the hands of the enemy. I know, general, that you will appreciate this service on the part of a portion of my division and give credit to whom credit is due. All the brigades, except Schenck’s, obeyed the order to retire to their original positions. By some misunderstanding, which has not been satisfactorily explained, this brigade proceeded directly to Washington, one regiment, as I understand, passing through the camp they left on the 16th instant.

With very great respect, your very obedient servant,

DANIEL TYLER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division

Brigadier-General McDOWELL,

Commanding Department of Northeastern Virginia

—–

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION,

Washington, August 3, 1861

GENERAL: I inclose herewith the originals of Carlisle’s and Ayres’ reports of the operations of their respective batteries on the 21st instant [Nos. 20 and 27]. As these reports are full, you will see whether they do not require more consideration than they have received in my report. All the officers attached to these batteries, so far as their conduct fell under my personal observation until 12 o’clock, behaved like gallant gentlemen, and it was, in my opinion, the effect of their fire that held the enemy in front of the bridge in check and interfered seriously with the movements of his column in the direction of Colonel Hunter’s attack. The loss of Captain Carlisle’s battery is to be attributed to the want of that infantry support which he had a right to expect, or to his halting too long before he moved forward towards Centreville.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

DANIEL TYLER,

Brigadier-General

Brigadier-General McDOWELL,

Commanding Department Northeastern Virginia

Table – Return of casualties in the First Division (Union) of Northeastern Virginia, at the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861





#7 – Maj. John G. Barnard

3 10 2007

Report of Maj. John G. Barnard, U.S. Corps of Engineers

O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 2 [S# 2] — CHAPTER IX, pp.328-333

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1861

SIR: On the 18th of July, at about 9 a.m., I joined the commanding general about two miles beyond Fairfax Court-House, on the road to Centreville. He was then about going to Sangster’s, and invited me to attend him. Not understanding his journey to have the character of a reconnaissance, but as simply to communicate with the division of Colonel Heintzelman, I preferred accompanying the division of General Tyler to Centreville.

Proceeding to Centreville, I joined Captain Alexander, Engineers, a short distance out on the road leading to Blackburn’s Ford. He was at this time preparing to encamp his pioneer party, and it was my intention, as soon as the troops should be fixed in their positions, to propose to General Tyler to make a reconnaissance of the enemy’s position at Blackburn’s Ford.

It should be borne in mind that the plan of the campaign had been to turn the position of Manassas by the left; that is to say, that from Fairfax Courts-House and Centreville we were to make a flank movement towards Sangster’s and Fairfax Station, and thence to Wolf Run Shoals, or in that direction. In my interview with the commanding general, just referred to, he said nothing to indicate any change of plan, but, on the contrary, his remarks carried the impression that he was more than ever confirmed in his plan, and spoke of the advance on Centreville as a “demonstration.” In proposing, therefore, to reconnoiter the enemy’s position at Blackburn’s Ford, it was not with the slightest idea that this point would be attacked. But a reconnaissance would be but the carrying out of a demonstration.

While I was awaiting Captain Alexander, I encountered Mathias C. Mitchell, who was afterwards secured as a guide, representing himself as a Union man, and a resident of that vicinity. I was engaged questioning him, when intelligence was received that General Tyler had sent back for artillery and infantry, and that the enemy was in sight before him. Riding to the front, I joined General Tyler and Colonel Richardson. Proceeding with them a short distance farther, we emerged from the woods, and found ourselves at the point at which the road commences its descent to Blackburn’s Ford. The run makes here a curve or bow towards us, which the road bisects. The slopes from us towards it were gentle and mostly open. On the other side the banks of the run rise more abruptly, and are wooded down to the very edge of the run. Higher up a cleared spot could be seen here and there, and still higher–higher than our own point of view, and only visible from its sloping gently towards us–the elevated plateau (comparatively open) in which Manassas Junction is situated.

Although, owing to the thickness of the wood, little could be seen along the edge of the run, it was quite evident from such glimpses as we could obtain that the enemy was in force behind it. I represented to General Tyler that this point was the enemy’s strong position on the direct road to Manassas Junction; that it was no part of the plan to assail it. I did, not, however, object to a demonstration, believing that it would favor what I supposed still to be the commanding general’s plan of campaign. The two 20-pounders Parrotts had been ordered up; they were opened upon the enemy’s position, firing in various directions, without our being able to perceive the degree of effect they produced. We had fired perhaps a half dozen rounds, when we were answered by a rapid discharge from a battery apparently close down to the run and at the crossing of the road. The 20-pounders continued their firing, directing at this battery, and Ayres battery was brought up and stationed on the left. The enemy’s batteries soon ceased answering. After ours had continued playing for about half an hour I thought it a useless expenditure of ammunition, and so stated to you (who arrived on the spot shortly before this), and presume that General Tyler concurred in this opinion, as the firing soon ceased. I supposed that this would be the end of the affair; but, perceiving the troops filing down towards the run, I thought it necessary to impress General Tyler with the fact that it was no part of the commanding general’s plan to bring on a serious engagement. I directed Captain Alexander, Engineers, to state this fact to him, which he did in writing (having stated the same verbally before). At the same time I directed Lieutenant Houston to accompany the troops, and make such observations of the enemy’s position as he could. I remained on the heights, observing as well as I could the movements of the enemy’s forces. The affair becoming more serious than I expected, I was about to go down to the front when our troops retired, and I returned to Centreville with yourself to report to General McDowell.

It is proper to observe that before our artillery practice commenced movements of troops were observed on the road leading from Manassas to Blackburn’s Ford. As the road presented itself to the eye, those not very familiar with the locality might well feel some doubt, judging merely by the eve, whether these troops were advancing to or retiring from the position at Blackburn’s Ford. The impression seemed to be quite common among us that they were retiring. I was perfectly sure that they were columns moving up to meet us from Manassas.

At my interview with the commanding general that evening, he informed me that he had convinced himself that the nature of the country to the left or southward of Manassas was unfit for the operations of a large army; that he had determined to move by the right, turning the enemy’s left; that the provision trains were just coming in, and that the troops would require the next day to cook their provisions for another march. I told him I would endeavor the next day to obtain such information as would enable him to decide on his future movement.

The next most prominent crossing of Bull Run above Blackburn’s Ford is the stone bridge of the Warrenton turnpike. Such a point could scarcely be neglected by the enemy. Information from various quarters gave good cause for believing that it was guarded by several thousand men; that at least four cannon were stationed to lay upon it and the ford not far below, and, moreover, that the bridge was mined, and that extensive abatis obstructed the road on the opposite shore.

Two or three miles above the Warrenton Bridge is a ford, laid down on our maps as “Sudley Spring.” Reliable information justified the belief that the ford was good; that it was unfortified; that it was watched by only one or two companies, and, moreover, that the run above it was almost everywhere passable for wheeled vehicles. Midway between the stone bridge and Sudley Spring our maps indicated another ford, which was said to be good.

Notwithstanding our conviction of the practicability of these fords no known road communicated with them from any of the main roads on our side of Bull Run. We had information that a road branched from the Warrenton turnpike a short distance beyond Cub Run, by which, opening gates and passing through private grounds, we might reach the fords. It was desirable to assure ourselves that this route was entirely practicable. In company with Captain Woodbury, Engineers, and Governor Sprague, and escorted by a company of cavalry, I on the 19th followed up the valley of Cub Run until we reached a point west 10o north, and about four miles in an air-line from Centreville, near which we struck a road which we believed to lead to the fords. Following it for a short distance, we encountered the enemy patrols. As we were most anxious to avoid attracting the enemy’s attention to our designs in this quarter, we did not care to pursue the reconnaissance farther. We had seen enough to be convinced of the perfect practicability of the route. To make more certain of the fords, however, Captain Woodbury proposed to return at night, and, with a few Michigan woodsmen from Colonel Sherman’s brigade, to endeavor to find them.

On returning to camp it was determined to send Captain Wright and Lieutenant Snyder, Engineers, with Captain Woodbury. At the same time the commanding general directed Captain Whipple, Topographical Engineers, and Lieutenant Prime, Engineers, to make a night reconnaissance of the run between Warrenton Bridge and Blackburn’s Ford. Both these night expeditions failed. It was found the enemy occupied the woods too strongly on our side of the run to permit the reconnaissances to be accomplished. It was not our policy to drive in his pickets until we were in motion to attack. On laying before you the information obtained, the commanding general believed himself justified in adopting the following plan of attack, which was decided upon on the 20th:

1. A false attack to be made by Richardson’s brigade (temporarily attached to Miles’ division) on Blackburn’s Ford; the rest of that division remaining in reserve at Centreville.

2. Tyler’s division to move from its camp at 3 a.m. (the 21st) towards the stone bridge of the Warrenton turnpike, to feign the main attack upon this point.

3. The divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman (in the order named) to leave their camps at 2.30 a.m. (they were encamped about two or three miles behind Tyler), and, following his movement, to diverge from the Warrenton turnpike at the by-road beyond Cub Run, and take the road for Sudley Springs; or, rather, it was provided (if I mistake not) that Hunter’s division should proceed to Sudley Springs, and Heintzelman to take the lower ford; these matters, however, to be regulated by circumstances.

It was intended that the head of Hunter’s division should be at the turn-off at early daylight or about 4 a.m., and that it should reach Sudley by 6 or 7.

You are aware of the unexpected delay. The two leading brigades of Tyler had not cleared the road for Hunter to this point until 5.30, and our guide, alleging that a nearer route to the ford would bring our columns in sight of the enemy’s batteries, led them by so circuitous a way that Hunter did not reach Sudley until 9.30, or thereabouts. Accompanying the commanding general; we, as you are aware, after waiting two or three hours at the turn-off, rode on to overtake the front of Hunter’s division. When we emerged from the woods (nearly northeast of Sudley) into the open country, from whence the course of the run and the slopes of the opposite shore could be seen, we could perceive the enemy’s columns in motion to meet us. The loss of time here in great measure thwarted our plan. We had hoped to pass the ford and reach the rear of the enemy’s defenses at Warrenton stone bridge before he could assemble a sufficient force to cope with us.

It now became necessary to have Tyler’s division force the passage of the bridge. It had always been intended that this division should pass at or near the bridge; but it was hoped, by taking its defenses in rear, it could be passed without force. The commanding general promptly sent orders to Tyler to press his attack with all vigor. I had yet much confidence that, though we had been anticipated (owing to the delays mentioned), the enemy was not yet assembled to oppose us in great force (a confidence which I think the facts justified); that We might successfully attack him in front, while the division of Tyler should fall upon his flank and rear.

When we reached the front of Hunter’s column, the battle was just commencing. The events of the battle-field will be described in the reports you will receive from other quarters. I was near the commanding general until some time after the arrival of Sherman’s brigade on our left. Being accidentally separated, I saw yourself on the right, and, joining you, we observed for some time the action on the heights, where the enemy made his final and successful stand. As we were observing, the zouave regiment of Heintzelman was driven back, leaving Ricketts’ battery, upon which we observed the enemy charge.

You left me here, and I remained a few minutes longer, an anxious spectator, and for the first time beginning to anticipate a possible defeat. Two brigades of Tyler’s division had passed over the run, and I supposed (and believe the commanding general supposed) that the entire division was over. If so, the stone bridge was unguarded, and if we were defeated, our retreating columns might be cut off from Centreville by the detachments of the enemy crossing this bridge. I became so anxious on this point, that I sought you again and found you at some distance in the rear. After some consultation, you, on my assuming the responsibility, sent an order to Colonel Miles to move up two of his brigades to the stone bridge, and to telegraph the Secretary of War to send up all the troops that could be spared from Washington. While I was returning towards the front, intending to rejoin the commanding general, I saw our front give way, and it soon became evident that we were defeated.

I have stated that it was a part of the plan of the battle that Tyler’s division should pass at or near the stone bridge. Two of his brigades actually did pass, but not at the bridge (they finding fords a half mile higher up), and connected themselves with our left. In anticipation that the stone bridge would be blown up, Captain Alexander had been instructed to prepare a trestle bridge to replace it. This he had on the spot, but there appear to have been no mines prepared under the bridge. Captain Alexander passed over his pioneers one by one, and set them to cutting away the abatis, 200 yards in extent, obstructing the road. This task was accomplished, and the way was opened for Schenck’s brigade to fall on the enemy’s right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front.

It will be seen from the above that the combination: though thwarted by adverse circumstances, was actually successful in uniting three entire divisions, excepting the brigade of Schenck, which had just opened its way to fall on the enemy’s right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front, upon the decisive point.

A fault, perhaps, it was that it did not provide earlier for bringing the two brigades of Miles (in reserve at Centreville) into action. One of his brigades (Richardson’s) actually did participate, though not on the battle-field, and in its affair at Blackburn’s Ford probably neutralized at least an equal number of the enemy.

On retiring to Centreville, my opinion was asked as to maintaining our position, and I gave it in favor of a prompt retreat, for I believed the enemy was far superior in numbers, and that, elated by his victory, he would pursue, and I believed that a defeated army actually driven back on Washington before a pursuing enemy would endanger the safety of the capital.

The Engineer officers under my Command and attached to the different divisions were as follows:

Capt. D. P. Woodbury and Second Lieut. Chas. E. Cross, to the Second Division, under Colonel Hunter.

Capt. H. G. Wright and First Lieut. G. W. Snyder, to the Third Division, under Colonel Heintzelman.

Capt. B. S. Alexander and First Lieut. L. C. Houston, to the First Division, under General Tyler.

First Lieut. F. E. Prime, to the Fifth Division, under Colonel Miles.

They have all been most active and zealous in the discharge of the duties devolving Upon them.

A report from Capt. D. P. Woodbury is herewith. Reports from Captains Wright and Alexander and Lieutenant Prime will be furnished when received.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient,

J. G. BARNARD,

Major of Engineers

Capt. J. B. Fry,

Assistant Adjutant-General





#6 – Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell

3 10 2007

 

Reports of Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, Commanding Federal Forces

O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 2 [S# 2] — CHAPTER IX, pp 316-328

CENTREVILLE, July 21, 1861–5.45 p.m.

We passed Bull Run. Engaged the enemy, who, it seems, had just been re-enforced by General Johnston. We drove them for several hours, and finally routed them.

They rallied and repulsed us, but only to give us again the victory, which seemed complete. But our men, exhausted with fatigue and thirst and confused by firing into each other, were attacked by the enemy’s reserves, and driven from the position we had gained, overlooking Manassas. After this the men could not be rallied, but slowly left the field. In the mean time the enemy outflanked Richardson at Blackburn’s Ford, and we have now to hold Centreville till our men can get behind it. Miles’ division is holding the town. It is reported Colonel Cameron is killed, Hunter and Heintzelman wounded, neither dangerously.

IRVIN McDOWELL,

Brigadier General, Commanding

Lieutenant-Colonel TOWNSEND

***

FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, July 21, 1861:

The men having thrown away their haversacks in the battle and left them behind, they are without food; have eaten nothing since breakfast. We are without artillery ammunition. The larger part of the men are a confused mob, entirely demoralized. It was the opinion of all the commanders that no stand could be made this side of the Potomac. We will, however, make the attempt at Fairfax Court-House. From a prisoner we learn that 20,000 from Johnston joined last night, and they march on us to-night.

IRVIN McDOWELL

Colonel TOWNSEND

***

FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, [July] 22, 1861

Many of the volunteers did not wait for authority to proceed to the Potomac, but left on their own decision. They are now pouring through this place in a state of utter disorganization. They could not be prepared for action by to-morrow morning even were they willing. I learn from prisoners that we are to be pressed here to-night and to-morrow morning, as the enemy’s force is very large and they are elated. I think we heard cannon on our rear guard. I think now, as all of my commanders thought at Centreville, there is no alternative but to fall back to the Potomac, and I shall proceed to do so with as much regularity as possible.

IRVIN McDOWELL

Colonel TOWNSEND

***

ARLINGTON, July 22, 1861

I avail myself of the re-establishing of telegraph to report my arrival. When I left the forks of the Little River turnpike and Columbia turnpike, where I had been for a couple of hours turning stragglers and parties of regiments upon this place and Alexandria, I received intelligence that the rear guard, under Colonel Richardson, had left Fairfax Court-House and was getting along well. Had not been attacked. I am now trying to get matters a little organized over here.

IRVIN McDOWELL,

Brigadier-General

E. D. TOWNSEND

***

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA,

Arlington, Va., August 4, 1861

Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of the 21st of July, near Manassas, Va. It has been delayed till this time from the inability of the subordinate commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.

In my communication to you of the 20th ultimo, I stated it as my intention to move that afternoon and drive the enemy from the east side of Bull Run, so as to enable the engineers to make a sufficiently accurate reconnaissance to justify our future movements. Later in the day they had obtained enough information of the passages across the stream to dispense with this reconnaissance, and it was decided to move without further delay.

It had been my intention to move the several columns out on the road a few miles on the evening of the 20th, so that they would have a shorter march in the morning; but I deferred to those who had the greatest distance to go, and who preferred starting early in the morning and making but one move.

On the evening of the 20th ultimo my command was mostly at or near Centreville. The enemy was at or near Manassas, distant from Centreville about seven miles to the southwest. Centreville is a village of a few houses, mostly on the west side of a ridge running nearly north and south. The road from Centreville to Manassas Junction runs along this ridge, and crosses Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The Warrenton turnpike, which runs nearly east and west, goes over this ridge through the village, and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course between the crossings from northwest to southeast.

The First Division (Tyler’s) was stationed as follows: One brigade on the north side of the Warrenton turnpike and on the eastern slope of the Centreville ridge; two brigades on the same road and a mile and a half in advance to the west of the ridge; and one brigade on the road from Centreville to Manassas where it crosses Bull Run at Blackburn’s Ford, where General Tyler had the engagement of the 18th ultimo.

The Second Division (Hunter’s) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile east of Centreville.

The Third Division (Heintzelman’s) was on a road known as the old Braddock road, which comes into Centreville from the southeast about a mile and a half from the village.

The Fifth Division (Miles’) was on the same road with the Third Division, and between it and Centreville.

A map, which is herewith, marked A,(*) will show these positions better than I describe them.Friday night a train of subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its contents were ordered to be issued to the command, and the men required to have three days’ rations in their haversacks. (See appendix herewith, marked B.)

Saturday orders (copy herewith, marked c) were issued for the available force to march.

As reported to you in my letter of the 19th ultimo, my personal reconnaissance of the roads to the south had shown that it was not practicable to carry out the original plan of turning the enemy’s position on their right. The affair of the 18th at Blackburn’s Ford showed he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage there without great loss, and if we did, that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was not desired.

Our information was that the stone bridge over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull Run to the west of Centreville was mined, defended by a battery in position, and the road on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abatis. The alternative was, therefore, to turn the extreme left of his position.

Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three miles above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and, after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the enemy’s forces at Manassas and those in the Valley of Virginia before Winchester, which had been held in check by Major-General Patterson.

Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on the Warrenton road, and commence cannonading the enemy’s batteries, while Hunter’s division, moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub Run, turn to the right and north, and move by a wood road around to the upper ford, and then turn south and get behind the enemy; Colonel Heintzelman’s division to follow Hunter’s as far as the turning-off place to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by Hunter’s division; the Fifth Division (Miles’) to be in reserve on the Centreville ridge.

I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn’s Ford to Centreville along this ridge, fearing that, whilst we should be in force to the front and endeavoring to turn the enemy’s position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road. For if he should once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to extemporize some field works to strengthen the position.

The Fourth Division (Runyon’s) had not been brought to the front farther than to guard our communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His advanced regiment was about seven miles in rear of Centreville.

The divisions were ordered to march at 2.30 o’clock a.m., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected at this season. There was delay in the First Division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions were, in consequence, between two and three hours behind the time appointed–a great misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road leading from the Warrenton turnpike to the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general direction of the stream being oblique to the road and we having the obtuse angle on our side.

General Tyler commenced with his artillery at 6.30 a.m., but the enemy did not reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn’s Ford. After firing several times, and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman’s brigades in reserve, in case we should have to send any troops back to re-enforce Miles’ division. The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general order.

On reaching the ford at Sudley Springs, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter’s division (Burnside’s) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column, and come for-ward separately as fast as possible.

Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman’s division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over.

The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley Springs south, and over which Burnside’s brigade marched, was, for about a mile from the ford, thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country was divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the ford the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly a mile farther large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle, through the valley of a small water-course, a tributary of Bull Run.

Shortly after the leading regiment of the First Brigade reached this open space, and whilst the others and the Second Brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery and following it up with infantry.

The leading brigade (Burnside’s) had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter’s brigade and a regiment detached from Heintzelman’s division to the left forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman’s and Keyes’ brigades of Tyler’s division to cross from their position on the Warrenton road.

These drove the right of the enemy (understood to have been commanded by Beauregard) from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it, up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on, Heintzelman’s division was moving down the field to the stream and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road down which our troops had marched from Sudley Springs, is a hill with a farm house on it. Behind this hill the enemy had early in the day some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge or table land. The hottest part of the contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it.

The force engaged here was Heintzelman’s division, Willcox’s and Howard’s brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter’s brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklin’s brigade of Heintzelman’s division, Sherman’s brigade of Tyler’s division in the center and up the road, whilst Keyes’ brigade of Tyler’s division was on the left, attacking the batteries near the stone bridge. The Rhode Island Battery of Burnside’s brigade also participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston.

Ricketts’ battery, which did such effective service and played so brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin’s battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded (our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it) in disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by different corps in succession and driven back, and the guns taken by hand (the horses being killed) and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a half, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession from the stone bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the removal of the abatis across the road to allow our re-enforcements (Schenck’s brigade and Ayres’ battery) to join us.

The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had then been fighting since 10.30 o’clock in the morning, and it was after 3 o’clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since 2 o’clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was not more than 9½ miles; and though they had three days’ provisions served out to them the day before, many, no doubt, either did not get them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks.

It was at this time that the enemy’s re-enforcements came to his aid from the railroad train (understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston’s army). They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hill-side. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy’s fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating groups, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.

Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day’s work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form a line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization and force.

They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter’s force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost.

Orders had been sent back to Miles’ division for a brigade to move forward and protect this retreat, and Colonel Blenker’s brigade was detached for this purpose, and was ordered to go as far forward as the point where the road to the right left the main road.

By referring to the general order it will be seen that while the operations were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn’s Ford by the brigade (Richardson’s) stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery, will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out (+). It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for considerable time and in keeping in check a part of his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive.

At the time of our retreat, seeing great activity in this direction, much firing, and columns of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or forced the whole stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed.

After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter’s and Blenker’s brigades, I repaired to Richardson’s, and found the whole force ordered to be stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas, by Blackburn’s Ford, to Centreville, on the march, under orders from the division commander, for Centreville. I immediately halted it, and ordered it to take up the best line of defense across the ridge that their then position admitted of; and subsequently, taking in person the command of this part of the Army, I caused such disposition of the forces, which had been added to by the First and Second New Jersey and the De Kalb Regiments, ordered up from Runyon’s reserve before going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy.

The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centreville to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub Run, and, owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there, for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances carrying the wounded.

By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the Army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted–division and brigade commanders and staff–to admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position at Blackburn’s Ford was then in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left.

On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing and hurrying them along.

At — o’clock the rear guard (Blenker’s brigade) moved, covering the retreat, which was effected during the night and next morning.(^) The troops at Fairfax Station, leaving by the cars, took with them the bulk of the supplies which had been sent there. My aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, staid at Fairfax Court-House till late in the morning, to see that the stragglers and weary and worn-out soldiers were not left behind.

I transmit herewith the reports of the several division and brigade commanders, to which I refer for the conduct of particular regiments and corps, and a consolidated return of the killed, wounded, and missing, marked D. From the latter it will be seen that our killed amounted to 19 officers and 462 non-commissioned officers and privates, and our wounded to 64 officers and 947 non-commissioned officers and privates. Many of the wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled from further service under 1,000.

The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing having fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington; many of the zouaves to New York. In one brigade the number originally reported at 616 was yesterday reduced to 174. These reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more correct return can be made.

Of course nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An officer of their forces, coming from them with a flag, admitted 1,800 killed and wounded, and other information shows this to be much under the true number.

The officer commanding the Eleventh New York (Zouaves) and Colonel Heintzelman say that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many there reported among the casualties have absented themselves since their return, and have gone to New York.

Among the missing are reported many of our surgeons, who remained in attendance on our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners.

The issue of this hard-fought battle, in which certainly our troops lost no credit in their conflict on the field with an enemy ably commanded, superior in numbers, who had but a short distance to march, and who acted on his own ground on the defensive, and always under cover, whilst our men were of necessity out on the open fields, should not prevent full credit being given to those officers and corps whose services merited success if they did not attain it.

To avoid repetition I will only mention here the names of those not embraced in the reports of division and brigade commanders. I beg to refer to their reports for the names of those serving under their immediate orders, desiring that on this subject of persons, &c., they be considered as part of my own.

I claim credit for the officers of my staff and for those acting as such during the day. They did everything in their power, exposing themselves freely when required, and doing all that men could do, communicating orders, guiding the columns, exhorting the troops, rallying them when broken, and providing for them the best the circumstances admitted.

They are as follows:

First Lieut. H. W. Kingsbury, Fifth Artillery, A, D.C.

Maj. Clarence S. Brown, New York Militia, volunteer A.D.C.

Maj. James S. Wadsworth, New York Militia, volunteer A.D.C.

The latter (who does me the honor to be on my personal staff) had a horse shot under him in the hottest of the fight.

Capt. James B. Fry, assistant adjutant-general.

Capt. O. H. Tillinghast, assistant quartermaster, who discharged alone the important and burdensome duties of his department with the Army, and who was mortally wounded whilst acting with the artillery, to which he formerly belonged, and in which he was deeply interested.

Capt. H. F. Clarke, Subsistence Department, chief of subsistence department.

Major Myer, Signal Officer, and Maj. Malcolm McDowell, who acted as aides.

Surg. W. S. King and Assistant Surgeon Magruder, Medical Department.

Maj. J. G. Barnard, Engineer, and senior of his department with the Army, who gave me most important aid.

First Lieut. Fred. E. Prime, Engineer.

Capt. A. W. Whipple, First Lieut. H. L. Abbot, and Second Lieut. H. S. Putnam, Topographical Engineers.

Maj. W. F. Barry, Fifth Artillery, chief of artillery.

Lieut. Geo. C. Strong, ordnance officer.

Maj. W. H. Wood, Seventeenth Infantry, acting inspector-general.

Second Lieut. Guy V. Henry, who joined me on the field, and was of service as an aide-de-camp.

The following officers commanded divisions and brigades, and in the several places their duty called them did most effective service and behaved in the most gallant manner:

Brigadier-General Tyler, Connecticut Volunteers.

Col. David Hunter, Third Cavalry, severely wounded at the head of his division.

Col. S. P. Heintzelman, Seventeenth Infantry, wounded in the arm while leading his division into action on the hill.

Brigadier-General Schenck, Ohio Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, First Division.

Col. E. D. Keyes, Eleventh Infantry, commanding First Brigade, First Division.

Col. W. B. Franklin, Twelfth Infantry, First Brigade, Third Division.

Col. W. T. Sherman, Thirteenth Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, First Division.

Col. Andrew Porter, Sixteenth Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

Col. A. E. Burnside, Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division.

Col. O. B. Willcox, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division, who was wounded and taken prisoner whilst on the hill in the hottest of the fight.

Col. O. O. Howard, Maine Volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division.

Col. I. B. Richardson, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Fourth Brigade, First Division.

Colonel Blenker, New York Volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Fifth Division.

Colonel Davies, New York Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Fifth Division.

As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for, some explanation of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be considered out of place if I refer, in a few words, to the immediate antecedents of the battle.

When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July (Monday). (#)

Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my ever seeing them and without having been together before in a brigade.

The sending re-enforcements to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move.

I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out on the 16th I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me.

The trains thus hurriedly gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day’s delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday.

I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court-House beyond Germantown to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march farther. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and one-half miles farther to Centreville, in all a march of twelve and one-half miles; but the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the lead of “light marching order.”

We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the Fifth Division (Miles’) and Richardson’s brigade on the left at Blackburn’s Ford and Centreville, and Schenck’s brigade of Tyler’s division on the left of the road near the stone bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he could which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th, and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had.

It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas I engaged not to have to do with the enemy’s forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by Major General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major-General Butler, and I knew every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it should be because he would be driven in and followed by General Patterson. But, from causes not necessary for me to refer to, even if I knew them all, this was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling-stock and his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court-House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond and other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to I cannot say; certainly much more than we attacked them with.

I could not, as I have said, move earlier or push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and the best part, so considered, of my forces were three-months volunteers, whose terms of service were about expiring, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition.

On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment of Volunteers and the battery of Volunteer Artillery of the Eighth New York Militia, whose term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment as pressing a request as I could pen, and the honorable Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days, but in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted; and the next morning, when the Army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy’s cannon.

In the next few days, day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the Army. In other words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker. In conclusion, I desire to say in reference to the events of the 21st ultimo, that the general order for the battle to which I have referred was, with slight modifications, literally conformed to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put into action as before arranged, and that, up to late in the afternoon, every movement ordered was carrying us successfully to the object we had proposed before starting–that of getting to the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on it far enough to break up and destroy the communication, and interpose between the forces under Beauregard and those under Johnston; and could we have fought a day–yes, a few hours–sooner, there is everything to show that we should have continued successful, even against the odds with which we contended.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

IRVIN McDOWELL,

Brigadier-General, Commanding

*To appear in Atlas

+See McDowell’s report of August 12, 1861, p. 328

^ See McDowell’s report of August 12, 1861, p. 328

#See McDowell to Townsend, June 24, 1861, “Correspndence, etc.,” post.

—–

B.

CIRCULAR.]

HDQRS. DEP’T NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA,

Centreville, July 20, 1861.

The commanders of divisions will give the necessary orders, that an equal distribution of the subsistence stores on hand may be made immediately to the different companies in their respective commands, so that they shall be provided for the same number of days, and that the same be cooked and put in the haversacks of the men. The subsistence stores now in the possession of each division, with the fresh beef that can be drawn from the chief commissary, must last to include the 23d instant.

By command of Brigadier-General McDowell:

 JAMES B. FRY,

Assistant Adjutant-General

TO COMMANDERS OF DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES

—–

C.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 22 I HDQRS. DEP’T NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA,

Centreville, July 20, 1861

The enemy has planted a battery on the Warrenton turnpike to defend the passage of Bull Run, has mined the stone bridge, and made a heavy abatis on the right bank to oppose our advance in that direction. The ford above the bridge is also guarded, whether with artillery or not is not positively known, but every indication favors the belief that he purposes defending the passage of the stream.

It is intended to turn the position, force the enemy from the road, that it may be reopened, and, if possible, destroy the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, where the enemy has a large force. As this may be resisted by all the force of the enemy, the troops will be disposed of as follows:

The First Division (General Tyler’s), with the exception of Richardson’s brigade, will move at 2.30 a.m. precisely, on the Warrenton turnpike, to threaten the passage of the bridge, but will not open fire until full daybreak.

The Second Division Hunter’s will move from its camp at 2 a.m. precisely, and, led by Captain Woodbury, of the Engineers, will, after passing Cub Run, turn to the right and pass the Bull Run stream above the lower ford at Sudley Springs, and then, turning down to the left descend the stream and clear away the enemy who may be guarding the lower ford and bridge. It will then bear off to the right, to make room for the succeeding division.

The Third Division (Heintzelman’s) will march at 2.30 a.m. and follow the road taken by the Second Division (Hunter’s), but will cross at the lower ford after it has been turned as above, and then, going to the left, take place between the stream and Second Division.

The Fifth Division (Miles’) will take position on the Centreville heights. (Richardson’s brigade will for the time form part of his division, and will continue in its present position.) One brigade will be in the village and one near the present station of Richardson’s brigade. This division will threaten Blackburn’s Ford and remain in reserve at Centreville.

The commander will open fire with artillery only, and will bear in mind that it is a demonstration only he is to make. He will cause such defensive works, abatis, earthworks, &c., to be thrown up as will strengthen his position. Lieutenant Prime, of the Engineers, will be charged with this duty.

These movements may lead to the gravest results, and commanders of divisions and brigades should bear in mind the immense consequences involved. There must be no failure, and every effort must be made to prevent straggling. No one must be allowed to leave the ranks without special authority. After completing the movements ordered the troops must be held in order of battle, as they may be attacked at any moment.

By command of Brigadier-General McDowell:

 JAMES B. FRY,

Assistant Adjutant-General

—–

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA,

Arlington, August 12, 1861

COLONEL: My attention has been called by those interested to two omissions in my report of the battle of the 21st ultimo near Manassas, and I ask leave to make the following corrections, wishing that they be made part of my original report:

1. In speaking of the retreat, I mentioned that it was covered by Colonel Blenker’s brigade. I should have said Colonel Richardson’s and Colonel Blenker’s brigades. The former was on the left of the Centreville ridge, and the latter in front of it, on the Warrenton road. Each covered the retreat of those on the respective roads to the common point–Centreville; from there to the rear Colonel Richardson was behind, and covered the main body.

2. In speaking of the action on the left at Blackburn’s Ford, I mentioned Colonel Richardson’s and Major Hunt’s reports as giving the account of what transpired in that direction. In this connection I omitted to mention Col. T. A. Davies’ report, and now beg to refer to it as necessary to a full account of this part of the battle. He was engaged to the left of Richardson, and repulsed an attempt of the enemy to turn our left.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

IRVIN McDOWELL,

Brigadier-General, Commanding

Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army

Table – [USA] Casualties at the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861

Table – Statement of [USA] artillery lost at the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861





Good Blogs with Good Stuff

30 09 2007

 

Brian Downey at Behind Antietam on the Web has a great post on Antietam personality John Moulder Wilson.  The post features an 1862 Gardner Gibson (thanks Brian) photo that is part of my round table program.  At First Bull Run, Wilson was a lieutenant in Capt. Carlisle’s Battery E, 2nd US, which was attached to Schenck’s brigade of Tyler’s division.  At least, I think he was.  Brian’s post is a good illustration of why we must be careful to nail these IDs down and not take or make them at face value.  He does some great detective work, and I don’t say that just because he points out some shoddy scholarship by – and a resulting faulty conclusion of – a notorious chronicler of the Battle of Antietam.

Jennie Jenny Goellnitz of Draw the Sword weighed in on my post on History as Narrative.  She has some interesting thoughts on the subject which are worth a look.  However, I should clarify that my point was not so much that the narrative form is deficient in its ability to convey what it was like to be present at a historical event, but rather that the form itself creates an orderly story which may be, and is quite likely, very different from what really happened.  That can be, and is quite likely, true even when the narrative is of the highest quality.





Official Reports – USA

4 04 2007

Blackburn’s Ford

#1 – Brigadier General Irvin McDowell

Table – Abstract from the returns of the Department of Northeastern Virginia, commanded by Brigadier-General McDowell, for July 16 and 17, 1861 [USA Troop Strengths]

#2 – Colonel Orlando B. Willcox

#3 – Brigadier General Daniel Tyler

#4 – Colonel Israel B. Richardson

Table – [USA] Casualties at Blackburn’s Ford [July 18, 1861]

#4a – Colonel Thomas A. Davies

Battle of First Bull Run

#6 – Brigadier General Irvin McDowell

Table – [USA] Casualties at the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861

Table –  [USA] Casualties at the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861 – Regimental

Table – Statement of [USA] artillery lost at the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861

#7 – Major John G. Barnard 

#8 – Captain Daniel P. Woodbury

#9 – Lieutenant Frederick E. Prime

#10 – Captain Henry F. Clarke

#11 – Lieutenant George Bell

#12 – Lieutenant James Curtis

#13 – Lieutenant John P. Hawkins

#14 – Surgeon William S. King

#15 – Major William F. Barry

#16 – Brigadier General Daniel Tyler

Table – Return of casualties in the First Division (Union) of Northeastern Virginia, at the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861

#17 – Colonel Erasmus D. Keyes

#18 – Colonel Charles D. Jameson

#18a – Colonel John L. Chatfield

#18b – Col. George S. Burnham

#19 – Brigadier General Robert C. Schenck

#20 – Captain J. H. Carlisle

#21 – Lieutenant John M. Wilson

#22 – Lieutenant Stephen C. Lyford

#23 – Lieutenant Edward B. Hill

#24 – Lieutenant William D. Fuller

#25 – Colonel William T. Sherman 

#26 – Captain James Kelly

#27 – Captain Romeyn B. Ayres

#28 – Colonel Israel B. Richardson 

#29 – Brevet Major Henry J. Hunt

#30 – Lieutenant John Edwards

#31 – Colonel David Hunter 

#32 – Colonel Andrew Porter 

Table – Return of casualties in the Second Division (Union) of Northeastern Virginia, at the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861

#33 – Colonel George Lyons 

#33a – Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Fowler

#34 – Major J. J. Bartlett 

#35 – Major George Sykes 

#36 – Major John G.Reynolds 

#37 – Major Innis N. Palmer 

#38 – Captain Charles Griffin 

#39 – Colonel Ambrose E. Burnside 

#40 – Major Joseph P. Balch 

#41 – Lieutenant Colonel Frank Wheaton

#41a – Colonel Henry P. Martin

#42 – Lieutenant Colonel Frank S. Fiske

#43 – Colonel Samuel P. Heintzelman

Table – Return of casualties in the Third Division (Union) of Northeastern Virginia, at the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861

#44 – Colonel William B. Franklin

#44a – Colonel Willis A. Gorman

#45 – Lieutenant Edmund Kirby

#46 – Colonel Orlando B. Willcox 

#47 – Colonel J. H. Hobart Ward 

#48 – Major Alonzo F. Bidwell 

#49 – Lieutenant Colonel Addison Farnsworth 

#50 – Captain Richard Arnold 

#51 – Colonel Oliver O. Howard 

#52 – Major Henry G. Staples 

#53 – Colonel Hiram G. Berry 

#54 – Colonel Mark H. Dunnell 

#55 – Colonel Henry Whiting 

#56 – Colonel Dixon S. Miles 

Table – Return of casualties in the Fifth Division (Union) of Northeastern Virginia, at the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861

#57 – Colonel Louis Blenker 

#58 – Colonel Thomas A. Davies 

#59 – Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Marsh 

#60 – Colonel Calvin E. Pratt 

#61 – Lieutenant Oliver D. Greene 

#62 – Colonel William R. Montgomery





Order of Battle – USA

5 01 2007

FIRST BULL RUN CAMPAIGN

ORDER OF BATTLE

Union

B = Biographical Sketch, D = Diary, I = Image, M = Memoir, MH = Medical History, MOH = Medal of Honor, News = Newspaper Account, OC = Official Correspondence, OR = Official Report, PC = Private Correspondence, T = JCCW Testimony

Bvt. Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, General-in-Chief (News, T)

McDowell’s Army (aka Army of Northeastern Virginia)

Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell (B, OC, OR1, OR2, T1, T2)

Acting Assistant Adjutant General (AAAG)

  • Capt. James B. Fry (M)

Acting Assistant Quartermaster (AAQ)

  • Capt. O. H. Tillinghast (MW)

Commissary

  • Capt. H. F. Clarke, Chief of Subsistence Department (OR)
  • Lieut. George Bell, Acting Commissary Subsistence (OR)
  • Lieut. James Curtis(s), Acting Commissary Subsistence (OR)
  • Lieut. John P. Hawkins, Acting Commissary of Subsistence (OR)

Signal Officers

  • Maj. Albert Myer
  • Maj. Malcolm McDowell (Ass’t)

Engineers

  • Maj. J. G. Barnard, Chief (B, OR, T)
  • Capt. A. W. Whipple, Topographical Engineer
  • 2nd Lt. H. S. Putnam, Topographical Engineer

Medical

  • Surgeon W. S. King (OR)
  • Assist Surgeon Magruder

Artillery

  • Maj. W. F. Barry, 5th Artillery (OR, T)

Ordnance

  • Lt. Geo. C. Strong

Acting Inspector General (AIG)

  • Maj. W. H. Wood, (17th US Inf)

Aides-de-camp (ADC)

  • 1st Lt. H. W. Kingsbury, Fifth Artillery (B)
  • 2nd Lt. Guy V. Henry
  • Maj. Clarence S. Brown, New York Militia
  • Maj. James S. Wadsworth, New York Militia (T)

First Division

Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler (B, OR1, OR2, T1, T2)

  • Capt. A. Baird, AAAG
  • Capt. Merrill, AAQ
  • Capt. B. S. Alexander, Chief Engineer
  • 1st Lt. H. L. Abbot, Topographical Engineer/ADC
  • Lt. J. C. Audenried, ADC
  • Lt. D. C. Houston, ADC
  • Lt. P. H. O’Rorke, ADC (PC)
  • Lt. E. Upton, ADC

First Brigade

Col. Erasmus D. Keyes (OR, T)

  • Lt. H. A. Hascall, AAAG
  • Lt. (H. C.?) Hodge(s?), AAQ
  • Lt. Ely, Commissary
  • Lt. Gordon, ADC
  • Lt. Walter, ADC
  • Dr. P. W. Ellsworth, Surgeon of CT Brigade (PC)

2nd MEVI

  • Col. Charles D. Jameson (OR)
    • “Stephen” (PC)
      • Co. A – Lt. Rinaldo B. Wiggin (PC)
      • Co. D – Cpl. Benjamin F. Smart (PC, I)
      • Co. H – Sgt. William P. Holden (PC)

1st CTVI

  • Col. G. S. Burnham (OR)
    • Lt. Col. Speidel
      • Co. H – Capt. Richard Fitzgibbon (PC)
      • Co. E – Pvt. David Sloane (PC)

2nd CTVI

  • Col. A. H. Terry
    • “G.” (PC)
    • Co. A
      • Pvt. John T. Phillips. (PC1PC2)
      • Pvt. James F. Wilkinson
    • Co. F – 2nd Lt. Charles E. Palmer (PC)

3rd CTVI

  • Col. J. L. Chatfield (B, OR)
    • Major Alexander Warner  (PC)
      • Surgeon John McGregor (I)
      • Chaplain Junius M. Willey (PC)
        • Co. A – Lt. Lucius L. Bolles (PC)
        • Co. C – G. W. B. (PC)
        • Co. D – Capt. Frederick Frye (PC)
        • Co. I – Pvt. Augusts E. Bronson (PC)

Second Brigade

Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck (OR)

2nd NYSM (Later 82nd NYVI)

  • Col. G. W. B. Tompkins
    • Unknown Captain (PC)
    • Unknown (PC)

1st OHVI (3 Month)

  • Col. Alexander McD. McCook

2nd OHVI (3 Month) – Lt. Col. R. Mason (Col. Lewis Wilson)

  • Col. Lewis Wilson
    • Lt. Col. R. Mason
      • Co. A – Pvt. Oliver S. Glenn (PC)

Battery E, 2nd US Artillery (6 Guns)

  • Capt. J. H. Carlisle (OR)
    • Lt. John M. Wilson (OR)
    • Lt. Stephen C. Lyford (OR)
    • Lt. Edward B. Hill (OR)
    • Lt. William B. D. Fuller (OR)

Battery G, 1st US Artillery (1 Gun)

  • Lt. Peter C. Hains

Third Brigade

Col. W. T. Sherman (B, News, OR, PC1, PC2PC3, PC4PC5, PC6)

  • Lt. A. Piper, AAAG
  • Lt. J. F. McQuesten, AAQ
  • Col. Coon, (WI), ADC
  • Lt. Bagley, ADC

13th NYVI

  • Col. Isaac F. Quinby
    • Co.B
      • Sgt. Mark J. Bunnell (PC1, PC2)
      • Corp. George M. Morris (PC)
      • Pvt. Clarence D. Hess (Band) (PC)
      • Pvt Miles O. Wright (PC)
    • Co. K – Lt. Eugene P. Fuller (PC)

69th NYSM

  • Col. Michael Corcoran (W&C) (PC)
    • Capt. J. Kelly (OR)
      • Co. A
        • Pvt. Alexander Carolin (PC)
        • Thomas D. Norris (PC)
      • Co. D, P. J. R. (PC)
      • Co. E
        • M. Crosbie (PC)
        • John Stacom (PC)
      • Co. G – Pvt. James Rorty (PC)
      • Co. K – “R” (PC)
79th NYVI
  • Col. J. Cameron (K)
    • Unknown (PC)
    • Co. F – Pvt. Alexander Campbell (PC)
    • Co. K
      • Sgt. John Kane (T)
      • Sgt. Charles McFadden (PC)

2nd WIVI

  • Col. Park S. Coon
    • Lt. Col. H. W.Peck
      • “C.” (PC)
        • Co. B – Pvt John E. Donovan (PC, MH)
        • Co. D
          • W. H. Foote (PC)
          • Pvt. Leonard Powell (PC)
          • Sgt. George F. Saunders (PC)
        • Co. E – Lt. Herman B. Jackson (M)
          • Sgt. Lyman H. Smith (PC)
        • Co. I – Capt. Thomas S. Allen (M)

Battery E, 3rd US Artillery (Sherman’s Battery) (6 Guns) (News)

  • Capt. R. B. Ayres (B, OR)

Fourth Brigade

Col. Israel B. Richardson (OR1, OR2, T)

  • Lt. R. L. Eastman, AAAG
  • Lt. C. H. Brightly, AAQ
  • 1st Lt. Frederick E. Prime, Engineer
  • Cadet J. T. Meigs, ADC

1st MAVI

  • Col. R. Cowdin
    • Co. H – Pvt. J. W. Day (PC)

12th NYVI

  • Col. Ezra L. Walrath (PC1, PC2)
    • Co. G – Pvt. Franklin E. Gates (PC)
    • Co. I – Pvt. William Ray Wells (PC1, PC2)

2nd MIVI

  • Maj. Adolphus W. Williams
  • Ass’t. Surgeon Henry F. Lyster (M)
    • Co. A – 1st Lt. John Valentine Ruehle (PC)
      • 2nd Lt. Gustav Kast (PC)

3rd MIVI

  • Col. D. McConnell (I)
    • Lt. Col. Stevens
    • Maj. Stephen G.Champlin (T)

Battery M, 2nd US Artillery (4 Guns)

  • Capt. H. J. Hunt (OR)

Battery G., 1st US Artillery (2 Guns)

  • Lt. J. Edwards (OR)

Second Division

Col. David Hunter (W) (OR); Col. Andrew Porter (OR)

  • Lt. S. W. Stockton, ADC
  • Capt. W.D. Whipple, AAAG
  • Capt. D. P. Woodbury, Engineer
  • Hon. J. W. Arnold, ADC
  • Lt. Cross, ADC
  • Lt. D. W. Flagler, ADC

First Brigade

Col. Andrew Porter (OR, T)

  • Lt. W. W. Averell, AAAG (T)
  • Lt. J. B. Howard, AAQ
  • Lt. Bache, ADC
  • Lt. Trowbridge, ADC

8th NYSM

  • Col. G. Lyons (OR)

14th NYSM (News)

  • Col. A. M. Wood (W)
    • Lt. Col. E. B. Fowler (OR)
    • Surgeon J. M. Homiston (T)
    • Asst. Surgeon William F. Swalm (T)
      • Co. D – Pvt. John C. Brown (B, PC)
      • Co. E – Pvt. George Plaskett (PC)
      • Co. H – Pvt Caleb H. Beal (PC)
      • Co. I – Pvt. Lewis Francis (MH, T)

27th NYVI

  • Col. H. W. Slocum (W) (T)
    • Maj. J. J. Bartlett (OR)
      • H. Seymour Hall (M)
        • Co. C – Pvt. Worcester Burrows (PC)
        • Co. D – Sgt Albert G. Northrup (PC)
          • Pvt. Charles N. Elliott (PC)
          • Pvt. Frederick Fowler (PC)
          • Pvt. Benjamin Franklin Spencer (PC)
          • Pvt. Charles Winters (PC)
        • Co. G – Pvt William H. McMahon (PC)
        • Co. I – Lt. Samuel M. Harmon (IPC)
        • Co. K – “C” (PC)

US Infantry Battalion (8 Cos: C, G, 2nd US; B, D, G, H, K, 3rd US; G, 8th US)

  • Maj. G. Sykes (OR)
    • Lt. James P. Drouillard (PC, I)
    • Lt. Dangerfield Parker (M)

US Marine Corps Battalion

  • Maj. J. G. Reynolds (OR)
    • 2nd Lt. Robert Hitchcock (B, PC)
    • Observer (PC)

US Cavalry Battalion (7 Cos: A, E, 1st US; B, E, G, I, 2nd US; K, 2nd US Dragoons)

  • Maj. I. N. Palmer (OR)
    • Surgeon Charles Carroll Gray (D)

Company D, 5th US Artillery (6 Guns)

  • Capt. C. Griffin (OR, T)
    • Lt. Charles E. Hazlett (T)
    • Lt. Horatio B. Reed (T)

Second Brigade

Col. Ambrose E. Burnside (OR)

  • Lt. Merriman, AAAG
  • Capt. Anson, AAQ
  • Capt. Goohue, Commissary
  • Lt. Beaumont, ADC
  • Capt. Woodbury, ADC
  • Gov. Sprague, ADC

2nd NHVI

  • Col. Gilman Marston (W, I)
    • Lt. Col. Francis S. Fiske (OR, I)
    • Maj. Josiah Stevens, Jr (PC, I)
    • Surgeon George H. Hubbard (PC, I)
    • Chaplain Henry E. Parker
    •  “Corporal Trim” (PC)
      • Co. B – Capt. Simon Goodell Griffin (M, PC, I)
        • Pvt. John W. Odlin (PC)
        • C. A. M. (PC)
      • Co. E – Cpl. Joseph S. Sweatt (PC1, PC2, I)
      • Co. F – Capt. Thomas Snow (PC, I)
        • 2nd Lt. Harrison D. F. Young (PC, I)
          • Sgt. Hugh R. Richardson (PC, I)
          • Sgt. Charles W. Fletcher (PC)
      • Co. G – Capt. Ephraim Weston (I)
      • Co. H – Lt. Joab N. Patterson (PC, I)

1st RIVI

  • Maj. J. P. Balch (OR)
    • “DeW” (PC1, PC2, PC3)
    • Unknown (PC)
      • Co. C
        • Lt. Luther C. Warner (PC)
        • Unknown Officer (PC1, PC2)
        • “H” (PC)
        • Unknown (PC1)
      • Co. D – Pvt Albert Penno (PC)
      • Co. F – Pvt. Theodore W. King (PC)

2nd RIVI

  • Col. J. S. Slocum (K)
    • Lt. Col. F. Wheaton (OR)
      • Maj. Sullivan Ballou (K) (PC)
      • “Canonicus” (PC1)
      • “Tockwotton” (PC1, PC2, PC3, PC4, PC5)
      • Co. C, Pvt. William J. Crossley (D)
      • Co. D, Corp. Samuel J. English (PC, I)
      • Co. F, Lt. John P. Shaw (PC)
        • Sgt. George Kidder (I)
          • Corp. David Douglass (I)
          • Corp. Theodore Jenks (I)
          • Corp. George Wood (I)
          • Corp. Francis Ronien (I)
            • Pvt. (Joseph or Lewis) Barnes (I)
            • Pvt. Jonathan Davidson (I)
            • Pvt. William Frazier (I)
            • Pvt. Charles Godfrey (I)
            • Pvt. Benjamin Hughes (I)
            • Pvt, Robert Johnstone (I)
            • Pvt. John Manning (I)
            • Pvt. James Newell (I)
            • Pvt. John Newell (I)
            • Pvt. Samuel Newman (I)
            • Pvt. Francis Osgood (I)
            • Pvt. Thomas Potter (I)
            • Pvt. Robert Robertson (I)
            • Pvt. Smith Salisbury (I)
            • Pvt. Albert L. Smith (I)
            • Pvt. Peter Taylor (I)
            • Pvt. William Worger (I)
      • Co. K, Leonard Belding (PC)
      • Battery A, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery (Reynolds’ Battery) of 6 13 lb. James Rifles
        • “Juvenis” (PC)
          • Pvt. Theodore Reichardt (D)
          • “Sergeant” (PC)
          • Unknown (1) (PC)

71st NYSM (D, PC)

  • Col. H. P. Martin (OR)
    • John Ellis (PC)
    • Unknown (PC)
    • Co. H. – J. H. G. (PC1, PC2)
      • 2 Boat Howitzers

Third Division

Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman (W) (OR, T)

  • Capt. Chauncey McKeever, AAAG
  • Capt. Horatio Wright, Chief Engineer
  • Lt. Fairbanks, ADC
  • Lt. F. U. Farquhar, ADC
  • Lt. George W. Snyder, ADC
  • Lt. Sweet, ADC

First Brigade

Col. William B. Franklin (OR, T)

  • Capt. Walworth Jenkins, AAG
  • Lt. Charles H. Gibson, AAG
  • Lt. Baker, ADC
  • Lt. Hartranft, ADC

5th MAVI

  • Col. S. C. Lawrence (W)
    • “R” (PC)
    • Unknown (PC)
    • Co. F – Capt. David Kilburn Wardwell
    • Co. G – Capt. George L. Prescott
      • Pvt. Edward F. Phelps (PC)
    • Co. I – Unknown (PC)

11th MAVI

  • Col. George Clark, Jr.
    • Surgeon Luther V. Bell (PC)
    • Co. B, Pvt. Thomas Green (PC, B)

1st MNVI

  • Col. W. A. Gorman (OR)
    • Chaplain Rev. Edward D. Neill (PC)
    • Asst. Surgeon Charles W. Le Boutillier (PC)
    • Unknown Officer (PC)
      • Co. A – Capt. Alexander Wilkin (PC)
        • Pvt. William Nixon (PC)
      • Co. C – Pvt. George L. Smith (PC)
      • Co. F – Cpl. James A. Wright (M1, M2, M3, M4)
      • Co. G
        • Pvt Edward H. Bassett (PC1, PC2)
        • Pvt. Mortimer Stimpson (PC)
4th PAVI
  • Col. John Frederick Hartranft (MOH) (This regiment refused to advance on July 21, claiming its enlistments had expired.  Col. Hartranft joined the brigade staff.)

Company I, 1st US Artillery (6 Guns)

  • Capt. J. B. Ricketts (W&C) (PC, T1, T2)
    • Lieut. Edmund Kirby (OR)

Second Brigade

Col. Orlando B. Willcox (W&C) (OR1, OR2PC); Col. John Henry Hobart Ward (OR)

  • Lt. Woodruff, AAAG
  • Lt. J. R. Edie, ADC
  • Lt. Francis H. Parker, ADC

11th NYVI (Fire Zouaves)

  • Col. Noah Lane Farnham (MW)
    • J. A. S. (PC)
    • Co. A – Lt. Edward Burgin Knox (PC)
    • Co. E – Pvt. Lewis H. Metcalfe (M)
    • Co. G – Pvt. Harry Lazarus (PC)

38th NYVI

  • Col. John Henry Hobart Ward
    • Lt. Col. A. Farnsworth (OR)
      • Officers’ Clerk George L. Russell (PC)
        • Co. H – Capt. William H. Baird (PC)
          • Pvt. John H. Morrison (PC)
        • Co. I – Capt. Calvin S. DeWitt (PC)

1st MIVI

  • Maj. Alonzo F. Bidwell (OR)

4th MIVI (not engaged – at Fairfax CH)

  • Col. Dwight A. Woodbury

Company D, 2nd US Artillery (4 Guns)

  • Capt. Richard Arnold (OR)
    • Lt. Barriger
    • Lt. Throckmorton

Third Brigade

Col. Oliver O. Howard (OR)

  • Capt. Burt, AAAG
  • Lt. Burt, AAQ
  • Lt. D. H. Buel, ADC
  • Lt. A. Mordecai, Jr., ADC
  • Pvt. Charles H. Howard (IPC)

3rd MEVI

  • Maj. Henry G. Staples (OR)

4th MEVI

  • Col. Hiram G. Berry (OR, PC)

5th MEVI

  • Col. Mark H. Dunnell (OR)
    • H. J. E. (PC)
    • Q (PC)
    • Unknown (PC)
      • Co. E – Sgt. Frank L. Lemont (PC)
      • Co. G – Pvt. Joseph Leavitt (PC1, PC2)

2nd VTVI

  • Col. Henry Whiting (OR)
    • Lt. Col. George J. Stannard
      • Maj. Charles. H. Joyce (PC)
      • W (PC1, PC2)
        • Co. D – Sgt. Eldon A. Tilden (PC)
        • Co. F – Pvt George W. Doty (PC)
        • Co. K – Unknown (PC)

Fourth Division (Not Engaged)

Brig. Gen. Theodore Runyon

1st NJSM

  • Col. A. J. Johnson

2nd NJSM

  • Col. H. M. Baker

3rd NJSM

  • Col. W. Napton

4th NJSM

  • Col. M. Miller

1st NJVI

  • Col. W. R. Montgomery (OR)

2nd NJVI

  • Col. G. W. McLean

3rd NJVI

  • Col. G. W. Taylor

41st NYVI

  • Col. L. von Gilsa

Fifth Division

Col. Dixon S. Miles (OR)

  • Capt. T. M. Vincent, AAAG
  • Lt. John P. Hawkins, AAQ
  • 1st Lt. Frederick E. Prime, Engineer
  • Maj. Ritchie, ADC
  • Lt. A. H. Cushing, ADC
  • Lt. George H. Mendell, ADC
  • Lt. McMillan, ADC

First Brigade (Held in reserve at Centreville – covered retreat)

Col. Louis Blenker (OR, T)

8th NYVI

  • Lt. Col. J. Stahel

29th NYVI

  • Col. A. von Steinwehr

39th NYVI

  • Col. F. G. D’Utassy

27th PAVI

  • Col. M. Einstein

Company A, 2nd US Artillery (4 Guns)

  • Capt. J. C. Tidball

Brookwood’s (Varian’s) New York Battery (6 Guns of the 8th NYSM, manned by men from the 8th & 29th NYVI)

  • Capt. C. Brookwood

2nd Brigade

Col. Thomas A. Davies (OR1, OR2, T)

  • Lt. Cowdrey, AAAG
  • Lt. Hopkins, AAQ
  • Lt. Thomas C. Bradford, Commissary
  • Lt. Howland, ADC

16th NYVI

  • Lt. Col. S. Marsh (OR)
  •  Maj. Buel Palmer (PC)
    • J. A. V. (PC)
    • Co. G – 1st Sgt. John Henry Austin (I)
      • 2nd Sgt. Edwin O. Betts (I)
      • 3rd Sgt. Luther Lee Partridge (I)
      • 4th Sgt. Andrew Christie Bayne (I)

18th NYVI

  • Col. W. A. Jackson

31st NYVI

  • Col. C. E. Pratt (OR)
    • Surgeon Frank Hamilton (PC)

32nd NYVI

  • Col. R. Matheson
    • Unknown (PC)
    • Co. A – Capt. Jerome Rowe (PC)
    • Co. I – Lieut. Prentice B. Wager (PC)

Company G., 2nd US Artillery (4 Guns)

  • Lt. O. D. Greene (OR)