In my continuing quest to show that Civil War art doesn’t have to suck, I ran acorss these here. N. C. Wyeth was a pupil of Howard Pyle. Here are a few of Pyle’s CW illustrations – click on the thumbnails for large images:
Left to right: I Was Thinking of You When I Fell; It Was a Comrade From His Own Regiment; The Charge; The Midnight Court Matial; They Talked it Over – With Me On a Horse; General Lee on His Famous Charger “Traveller”; Lincoln’s Last Day.
The problem with the elliptical trainer is that over the course of 50-60 minutes my mind starts to wander. Yesterday I had my iPod on and was watching CNN’s close-captioned coverage of the Illinois governor’s closing statement at his impeachment hearing – no, you can’t comment on the proceedings here, I’ll delete it. Afterwards, two CNN talking heads were discussing what was going on, when one said to the other that the reason the Governor chose to boycott all but this portion of the trial was that he could not be challenged in his closing statement. The other head said yes, that was exactly the reason. Now, it might very well be the reason, but unless someone can point me to some statement by the Governor that such was his reasoning, this was nothing more than a guess. This kind of stuff happens all the time in Civil War literature. Take for instance the opinion, long stated as fact, that McDowell’s advance on Manassas was slow due to a fear of masked batteries. Or that Oliver Otis Howard deliberately tried to sabotage the reputation of Abner Doubleday at Gettysburg (I wrote about it on Dmitri’s blog here and here). An article by a “big shot” perpetuating that old saw compelled me to write a very long letter to the editor of a magazine criticizing the author-in-question’s practice of presenting opinion – in the case of Howard, completely unsupported opinion – as fact. And also in that case, citing as support another of his own works in which he presented the same unsupported opinion as fact.
Damn that elliptical machine.
I received the following comment on this post from my friend Sam Elliott. Sam is the author of a fine biography of A. P. Stewart, Soldier of Tennessee.
Harry, Montgomery Clift was also the descendant of Col. William Clift, a famous (or notorious, depending on which way you shot) Southeast Tennessee Unionist who had sons serving on both sides. A. P. Stewart, who, as an old man lived in Chattanooga in accordance with his duties relative to Chickamauga Chattanooga NMP, lived with one of Clift’s sons after his wife died.
Pretty cool! I’ve always felt a little sorry for Clift, such a tragic figure, physically broken and internally conflicted. But all this time I thought his only claim to fame other than the movies was on The Clash album London Calling. The song is The Right Profile.
A couple weeks ago my son received an invite to tour the White House, so on the spur of the moment we headed on down that way (see here). We didn’t have any time to visit with any friends, but we did manage to squeeze in some sightseeing. Click smaller images for great big giant ones. First up was the Blair House, across Pennsylvania Ave from the White House:
This was the home of publisher Francis Preston Blair, Sr., adviser to Presidents back to Andrew Jackson, and father of Montgomery (Lincoln’s Postmaster General) and Frank Jr. (Union Major General who commanded a corps under Sherman during the March to the Sea and Beyond). Frank Sr. was also the great-great-great grandfather of actor Montgomery Clift, who served in the Union Army in Raintree County:
The Clift-Blair relationship is murky – Clift’s mother claimed to be the illegitimate child of Montgomery’s son Woodbury, but it was never proven beyond a shadow. Photos show a strong resemblance between an older, beat-up Clift and Great-Grandpa Montgomery Blair. At least, I think so:
It was here in the Blair House that Colonel Robert E. Lee, prior to his resignation from the United States Army, was “felt out” for command of a Union army (not “the” army, as is commonly said, but as Lee himself said, the army that was to take the field – probably either Patterson’s or McDowell’s army) by Frank Sr.
Today, the complex of houses (four, I think) makes up the President’s guest house, used by visiting heads of state.
After that we took a walk around the White House…
…via the Treasury Building, behind which is this monument to Uncle Billy:
We took a long walk to the Mall and the Lincoln Memorial, which was the one place other than the White House my son wanted to see (there’s a good boy):
I’m always better for visiting the memorial. This time I had a nice conversation with the ranger on duty, while my wife and son were in the gift shop.
We returned to the White House via 17th St., and stopped briefly at F to take a picture of The Winder Building. Today the building serves as the headquarters of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). When it was built in 1848, at five stories it was the city’s first skyscraper. In 1854, it was purchased by the Federal government, and during the war served as the headquarters of Winfield Scott, Henry Halleck, the Quartermaster General, the Army Ordnance Department, and the Bureau of Military Justice. This is where the President lamented that “the bottom is out of the tub”, and where JAG Holt conducted the investigation into Lincoln’s assassination.
The Winder building plays a prominent role in the often used account of First Bull Run written fifty years after the battle by Peter Conover Hains, whose 30 pdr Parrott opened the fight. At the beginning of the Cosmopolitan Magazine article Hains recounted that his June, 1861 West Point class mustered into Federal service “in the old Wilder [sic] Building, opposite the war department” on June 25th, 1861. He wrote that there President Lincoln shook hands with each member of the class. I’ve been annotating the article – very, very slowly – and have found a number of problems with it, including this otherwise innoccuous episode. More on that later, but keep in mind that Cosmo published much of the writings of one Sally “LaSalle” Pickett. The army also had its central signal station on the roof of the building:
I’m hoping to get down to Washington in the spring or summer, and hope to have a few days to spend sightseeing and visiting friends and e-quaintances. So much to see, so little time.
To Pleasant Williams Kittrell
Headquarters 4th Brigade, Centreville
August 2nd 1861
Dear Uncle Pleas,
I wrote hurriedly to Mother soon after the battle, knowing that she would be very solicitous and anxious to hear of my safety.
Having intended for some time to write to you, I take this opportunity to do so. You all at home no doubt think that I do not write often enough and I confess that I do not; but if you only knew how very difficult it has been here to procure writing material, you would very readily excuse me. Since, however, I have become a member of Genl Longstreet’s Staff I can no longer have such an excuse, and will consequently try to do better in the future. You can have no idea how very anxious I am to hear from home, never having received one line from any of you since I have been here. I console myself, however, with the thought that you have written but the letters have miscarried.
You have long since heard of the great “Battle of Manassas,” and the great victory achieved by our brave soldiers. To you at a distance who do not know the full particulars, it does seem like a great victory, and so it was. But to others (myself among the rest) it really does not seem so – we can not enjoy it so much for the simple reason that we know it was not complete. There is no good reason why our army should not now be encamped on Arlington Heights or in Washington City as here around the battleground. My descriptive powers are not very good, but still I will try to give you an account of the occurrences from the time we evacuated Fairfax Court House until the rout of the enemy.
Genl Bonham of SC – (a man whom I think is totally unfit for a military leader) had command at Farifax Court House. It had always been the intention of Genl Beauregard to evacuate Fairfax on the approach of the enemy. Early on the morning of the 17th ult. we heard the firing of our pickets, and very soon afterwards they came in. Soon the enemy came in sight about 2 miles distant. Their approach was from two sides, and when I saw them it almost seemed as if there were 500,000 of them. It was then we commenced striking our tents and loading our wagons, which ought to have been done long before, as it was well known on the 16th that they had commenced their forward movement. The consequence was that everything was done very hurriedly, and a considerable amount of property was left behind – consisting of provisions, forage, tents, some guns and ammunition. By the time our wagons had left, the enemy was in about a mile of the town, moving down on it very slowly. Gen. Bonham all the time appeared very much flurried. After moving his troops around and making some demonstrations as if for a fight, he ordered a retreat, which ought to have been done before the enemy was so close. From the number of canteens, knapsacks, blankets, &c. which our men threw away on the road, our retreat no doubt appeared more like a rout than a retreat in good order. By the time we had reached this place, a distance of eight miles, our men were almost broken down. After resting here a few hours, the most of our troops were sent on back across Bull Run, Genl Bonham remaining with one regiment to make a demonstration here. He did not do so, however, for about midnight on the 17th we again commenced our retreat and took position on the other side of the Run.
The enemy came in early next morning and occupied this place. By this time they were in fine spirits: they had come to the conclusion that they would have no fighting to do, and would march direct to Richmond. They did not tarry long here, but Gen. Tyler with his division of 15,000 moved direct on towards Manassas, or rather Blackburn’s and Mitchell’s Ford on Bull Run. Gen. Longstreet guarding the former and Bonham the latter. Capt. Kemper with his battery had been sent in advance of our forces, and when the enemy made his appearance, the Captain turned loose his guns upon them with considerable effect. After firing several times, he withdrew to his position across the Run.
In the meantime the enemy had opened his batteries upon Capt. Kemper and Genl Bonham, and everything seemed to indicate that he would attempt a crossing at Mitchells Ford on the direct road to Manassas. But whilst his batteries were playing upon Bonham, Tyler moved seven regiments of infantry down against Longstreet at Blackburn’s Ford. Genl Longstreet had in his brigade which extended up and down the river, the 1st, 11th, and 17th Va. Regiments. The 7th Va. was held in reserve. The attack was made against the points where the 17th was stationed, and 2 companies of the 1st – the whole not amounting to more than 1200 men. While that of the enemy to at least 6000. Our troops had no embankments to fight behind, as has been represented, but fought from the bank of the creek or run. The enemy were just above on a high bluff on the other side of the run. Until it was necessary to use the bayonet, the enemy had by far the advantage in position. They made the attack with great vigor and confidence, and it was with great difficulty that our men were persuaded to stand. Some of them started to fall back two or three times, but Genl Longstreet, in a perfect shower of balls, rode amongst them, with his cigar in his mouth, rallying them, encouraging, and inspiring confidence among them. For several minutes there was one continuous roar of musketry. Three times were the enemy repulsed, and three times did they come back to the attack; finally, Genl Longstreet gave the order for our boys to charge. Only two companies, however, succeeded in crossing the run but these were sufficient to cause the Hessians to flee precipitately. These two companies with their bayonets ran them out of the woods they were in, and made them go in every direction. Then it was that the 7 pieces of our artillery in our rear opened upon them and did terrible execution. Prisoners taken say that our artillery swept their ranks from one end to the other, besides disabling some pieces of their artillery. It was about 2 o’clock when our artillery opened upon their retreating forces. Theirs at the same time opened upon us, and there was a constant fire from both sides until 4 P.M. when the enemy retreated to Centreville – 3 miles. Our battery threw amongst them more than 300 shot and shell. Our loss was 15 killed and about 50 wounded. Theirs is estimated at from 500 to 2000 killed and wounded. Some of the prisoners have told me that it was about 2000. I know that they left many of their dead on the field, although they had 2 hours under cover of their guns to carry off the dead and wounded.
This fight of the 18th went a great way towards winning the victory of the 21st. For it gave our troops confidence in themselves, and convinced the enemy that we would fight. The disparity in numbers on the 18th was greater than on the 21st. I have given a fuller account of this fight than I would otherwise have done, had I not seen in the papers the credit for it given to Genl Bonham, when his command did not fire a gun. Genl Longstreet alone deserves all the credit. Had he not rode amongst his troops and himself rallied them when they started to fall back, had he not exhibited the coolness and courage that he did, the result of the whole affair might have been very different.
At one time Genl L. was himself exposed to fire from both the enemy and our own troops. He had ordered up his reserve, the 7th Va. Regt. (and fearing that they in their excitement might fire before he was ready for them) he placed himself immediately in front of them. No sooner than they were in position and while the Genl was before them, they commenced firing and the Genl only saved himself by throwing himself off his horse and lying flat on the ground.
The battle of the 21st I cannot describe so particularly as I was farther from it. Before day on Sunday morning we were aroused by the rattling of the enemy’s artillery wagons. By sunup they had placed three batteries in about 1 mile of Blackburn’s Ford – so as to play on that point – on Genl. Bonham who was just above at Mitchell’s Ford – and Genl Jones just below at McLane’s Ford.
Genls. Beauregard & Johnston were so certain from all the indications that the attack would again be made at Blackburn’s Ford (it also being the weakest point) that they had stationed nearly all the reserve force near that point. The enemy opened their three batteries upon Genls. Bonham, Longstreet and Jones about sunrise and from that time until 4 o’clock they poured the shell and grape in upon us.
This demonstration against us turned out to be only a feint [two words illegible] real point of attack was to be made at another point. About 6 O’clock A.M., Col. Frank Terry, who was also acting as Aide to Genl Longstreet, solicited and obtained permission from him to make a reconnaissance. Crossing the run, he ascended a high hill and climbing a tree had a full view. He was the first to discover and gave the information that the enemy was making the attempt to turn our left flank.
When he made his report, Genl Beauregard immediately ordered the reserve up near the Stone Bridge across Bull Run, a distance of 4 or 5 miles. It was never suspected that the enemy would cross the rear above Stone Bridge, and we were not prepared for it. They, however, crossed more than a mile above without being seen, and attacked our left flank.
Then the battle commenced in earnest, from 9 o’clock A.M. until about 4 P.M. it continued. The roar of the artillery for a few moments would be terrific – then it would be hushed and for several minutes we could hear one continuous volley of musketry. During all of that time we below were in an agony of suspense. But whilst all this was going on, and early in the day, Genl Longstreet solicited and obtained orders from Genl Beauregard to assume the offensive against the force which was keeping us in check.
The plan was, and the orders were, for Genl Ewell, who occupied the extreme right, to move forward to Centreville and attack their rear. Genl Jones at the same time was to commence an attack on their right flank. And when they opened the fight Genl Longstreet was to come forward and attack them in front.
In compliance with these orders, Genl Longstreet’s Brigade was moved across the run, placed in position and awaited for 2 hours for Genl Ewell to commence the attack. All the time we were exposed to a heavy firing from the batteries on the hill (and I am sorry to say that a portion of the 5th North Carolina Regiment in our Brigade made a pretty fast retrograde movement, but the most of them soon rallied and returned. 2 captains, however, declared that they couldn’t stand it and left the field.)
The messenger who was to convey the order to Genl Ewell became frightened and did not carry it. So the movement proposed was abandoned for the time. In the evening, however, the order was again given us to make the movement, and this time all received it. But while we were waiting for Ewell and Jones to attack, another order came, countermanding the former order. Genl Longstreet refused to resume his former position without another positive order. Soon it came from Johnston & Beauregard and stated, too, that a large column was moving down from the railroad, which they supposed was Patterson, and that we must not move, but hold ourselves in readiness to cover the retreat of our army.
The same order was given to Genl Jones; but before he received it, he had moved forward and commenced the attack with the 1st S. C. Regiment and 2 Mississippi Regiment.
The enemy poured a heavy fire into him of shell & grape, his troops became confused and the Mississippians retreated in considerable disorder.
The next order received was that the enemy were completely routed and for Genl Bonham & Longstreet to start in pursuit, it having fortunately turned out that the column which Johnston feared feared was Patterson was the brigade of Genl Smith, who had stopped the cars above on the R. R. and marched over direct to the scene of action and who coming up attacked the enemy’s flank and commenced the rout.
Our boys, when they received the order to start in pusuit, made the welkin ring with their shouts. I never saw a more jubilant set of troops.
The order was for Genl Bonham (who ranks Genl Longstreet) to take a road leading to the left across the country so as to attack the enemy on the road leading from Stone Bridge to Centreville and about half way between the two points, while Genl Longstreet was to march directly here and attack them. But Genl Bonham instead of taking the crossroad, comes over into our road and orders us to go through the wood to the right which it was impossible for us to do. So we had to fall in just behind his brigade. To have seen Genl Bonham, with his sword drawn and colors, you would have thought he would hardly stop short of New York.
But he had not proceeded far before some scouts (Messrs. Terry & Lubbock whom Genl L. had sent ahead) came in sight of a battery which the enemy had turned to cover the retreat. When they came in sight, it fired 2 rounds of grape at them without effect.
When Genl Bonham hear this firing he turned his Brigade and came back in quick time until he met Genl Longstreet. About this time Messrs. Terry and Lubbock came back and reported to them what they saw.
Genl Bonham said “we must go back, that a glory victory might (not) be turned into a terrible disaster.”
Genl Longstreet and others insisted that we be permitted to proceed. He told him that he would capture that battery without the loss of a man and that we would at Centreville cut off the rear of their army and follow straight into Washington City. But it was of no avail. He ordered us back, and we sullenly retraced our steps to our old position.
Genl Bonham could not realize that the enemy was so completely routed and disorganized, as they were, and he was fearful that they might rally in force and cut us to pieces. But if you can possibly conceive of how great the rout was, how utterly demoralized the enemy were, you can readily perceive how easy it would have been for 5000 fresh men to [several words illegible] (with a full clear moon) and follow them to Arlington Heights or even into Washington.
I have seen intelligent gentlemen from Washington who said that at any time on Monday, the 22nd, one regiment could have taken Washington without difficulty. Genl Longstreet, knowing from experience how utterly impossible it was to rally a demoralized army, was the more anxious to pursue. Genl Bonham (being a civilian andpolitician) could not understand it. For these reasons I think I am justified in saying the victory was not completed. I heard the next day Genl Beauregard express his regrets to Genl Longstreet that he (Genl Longstreet) was so situated as not to have his own way about the pursuit. I thought on our return that Genl Bonham could well be compared to the great French general who marched up the hill, and then marched down again. It is against military law to complain of the conduct of our superior officers – but this is only to you at home, who I feel anxious should fully understand everything.
I wish Uncle Pleas that you could have ridden along the road (the morning after the battle) between Stone Bridge and Centreville. The first thing that captured my attention when I came into the road was the quantity of muskets scattered on the roadsides. Many were in the road and the wagons had run over and broken and bent them in nearly every shape. The next thing were two dead yankees on the roadside. Then at a creek where there was a bad crossing, were wagons in almost a perfect jam, some broken to pieces, some overset, and some fastened against others. The most of them loaded, some with bridge timbers, others with ammunition, one with handcuffs, andothers still with a variety of things. Then came cannon abandoned, some because a horse had been killed, some because wheels were broken, and other because they were too heavy to proceed fast with. Every few hundred yards along the road a cannon was left. And all along were dead men – dead horses – muskets, canteens, knapsacks, blankets &c &c. There were also a fine lot of hospital stores – surgical instruments – also ambulances of the best description.
The Yankees say the Southerners do not fight like men – but devils. We were several times very nearly whipped, and nothing but the bulldog pertinacity of our men saved us. Several times some of our regiments, and even companies, were disorganized and scattered; but they would fall in with other regiments and companies and fight on.
Some of the enemy’s batteries were taken and retaken several times during the day. You could easily tell where a fight had occurred over a battery from the great number of dead men and horses. There is one place on the field where in an area of 8 or 10 acres there are more than 100 dead horses and I suppose at least double the number of men. The enemy must have fought well. Ellsworth’s Zouaves were nearly all killed and wounded. On our side the Hampton Legion suffered severely, also Gen. Bartow’s Brigade [and] also a Louisiana Regiment. But none suffered worse than the 4th Alabama. It and a Louisiana Regiment for nearly one hour bore the whole brunt of the battle with the enemy firing on them from three sides. The loss of the 4th Alabama was about 200 in killed & wounded. The proportion, though, of killed was small. They went onto battle with 600 men.
Judge Porter King’s Company lost 15 killed & wounded. I am happy to state that Cousin David Scott behaved very gallantly and passed through without a scratch. No one from Perry [County] that I knew was killed. I saw Dave for a few moments yesterday, the first time I knew certainly he was here. I never could until yesterday find the 4th Alabama, although I had diligently hunted for it.
Dave does not look very well. He has just gotten well of the measles. I did not see Capt. King as he had gone off. Sel Evans is a lieutenant in the company. He is a good looking young man. I shall go over and spend a day with them soon. They belong to Johnston’s army and I to Beauregard’s. Our field officers all acted very gallantly. Genl Beauregard was in the very thickest of the fight, and at one time led the Hampton Legion for 15 minutes. Genl Johnston also seized a flag and marched at the head of a brigade.
Several amusing incidents are related of the fight and rout. An Episcopal minister had charge of one of our batteries. Whenever he got ready to fire, he would exclaim, “Oh, Lord, have mercy on their Souls, for I will have none on their bodies.” It is told of another preacher that he came in close quarters with a Yankee and that drawing his sword he nearly severed the Yankee’s head from his body. Then, flourishing his sword in the air, he exclaimed, “The sword of the Lord and of Gideon! On, boys, on!” On the 21st the Chaplain of the 5th N. C. Regt. – who is a Scotch Presbyterian – acted as Major of the Reg. (the Maj. being sick.) He rallied that portion of the Regiment which ran – In speaking of it afterwards he very penitently remarked to me that “‘he hoped the Lord would forgive him, but he had to swear once or twice at the boys to make them come back.” There was a boy about 16 in the battle, who received 3 slight wounds and had besides 2 other bullet holes through his clothes.
Many senators, congressmen & ladies were at this place to see the fight. Senator Foster of Connecticut is said to have gone from here to Fairfax C. H. on foot and bareheaded. Congressmen outran the soldiers. Lovejoy had hired a man with a 3-minute horse to drive him here. On the return, the man said he went back at full speed but every once and awhile Lovejoy would ask him why in the name of God didn’t he drive faster.
We had actually engaged int the fight about 20,000 men – The enemy had about 50,000. They selected their own ground, and had every advantage in position. We had no embankments or fortifications and not one masked battery. It was a fair field fight.
We had all told at that time 40 or 45,000 men. The enemy first made their advance with 55,000 men, but after the repulse of the 18th, they reinforced themselves with 15,000 men. Their total number was 70,000. Our loss in killed and wounded is not 2000. Theirs in killed, wounded, & missing according to the N.Y. Herald is 20,000, but I suppose 10,000 will probably cover it. We have a great many prisoners, many of their wounded. They did not pretend to send back to bury their dead. We had two of their surgeons here who we released on parole to attend their wounded – but they not only broke their parole, but left their wounded who are all anxious that they be caught & hung.
We have a very large force here now, say 50,000. What the next movement will be I cannot tell, but my opinion is that as soon as we can get transportation an advance will be made on Washington – Everything tends that way now. But I must close for you are no doubt tired, and so am I.
This letter is long enough for you all, and is so intended. All must answer it – My love to Grandma, Mother & all.
Your Nephew Affly.,
Thoms. J. Goree
I saw Hnl. Jacob Thompson yesterday and he sends his kindest regard to Grandma, Mother & Yourself.
Direct your letters to Capt. Thos. J. Goree
On Genl Longstreet’s Staff 4th Brigade
Manassas Junction Va.
[Cutrer, Whomas W., editor, Longstreet’s Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas J. Goree, pp. 24-32]
OK, a couple of things. For one, I have another very long letter from T. J. Goree saved in my drafts. Problem is, for some reason my visual editor is making a whole bunch of words run together every time I hit spell check or save. I sent WordPress an email, but they haven’t responded, and I want to leave it there so they can see what I’m talking about. Every time I have a problem it’s the first time they’ve seen it, despite the fact that there are millions of WordPress blogs.
Also, I’ve finished proofing a manuscript for an upcoming book on First Bull Run. It was quite a learning experience on several levels, and I’m thankful to the publisher and author for the opportunity to contribute to the project.
I’ve determined that my recent purchase of the new two volume Lincoln biography by Michael Burlingame will be my last Lincoln purchase for a long while, unless I find something I just can’t pass up. I’m creeping up on 200 AL books (if I haven’t topped it already), and that’s just inexcusable.
I’m still creeping along with the McDougall book Throes of Democracy. It’s pretty good, but there’s a lot of stuff in there so it’s taking me awhile (I’m around 275 pages in with 335 to go). After that, I think I’m going to do Vol. II of Freehling’s The Road to Disunion and then Burton’s The Age of Lincoln. I need a better understanding of antebellum America. I may throw some lighter reading in there as well. All work and no play make Jack a dull boy. I’m thinking of Heroes & Cowards – it may dovetail with a post I’m working on concerning Southern criticism of the character of Southern men.
My Six-Pack column for May’s America’s Civil War has been submitted, and I’ve seen a draft of the layout including the new graphics. Interesting.
There is a possibility that I may be doing a tour of the First Bull Run battlefield this summer. While I’ve participated in and even organized multi-day tours before, I’ve never actually conducted one. I have turned down requests to do them, but I think now it’s time to bite the bullet if I get the chance.
Oh yeah: I’m all done posting the Bull Run OR’s from the Supplement. Thanks again to Jonathan Soffe for sending those to me. I wonder how long I should wait before asking him if he can send me the correspondence?
To Sarah Williams Kittrell Goree
Bull Run – Near Manassas
July 20th 1861
My Dear Mother,
When I last wrote you it was from Fairfax C. H. I then intended to have written you again before this, but have not had the opportunity to do so, as I have been in very active service since that time – Have been in one skirmish and one battle. On the morning of the 17th inst. the enemy appeared in great force at Fairfax. The[y] probably numbered over 40,000. We had only 6 or 7000 there, and we thought that discretion was the better part of valor. So we retreated in rather hot haste to a stronger position. We left without firing a gun except 2 that a gentleman and myself who brought up the rear fired at a distance, with what effect I do not know. We placed ourselves in very strong position on a large creek called Bull Run, and will have today about 35 or 40,000 me ready for the fray. We got our position here on the night of the 17th. Our lines and fortifications extend 5 or 6 miles up and down the river [with] different Genl’s in command at different points: Genl Beauregard in general command until Genl Joe Johnston reaches here, which he probably did last night. The Brig. Genls. are Cocke, Bonham, Longstreet, Jones, Jackson, Ewell.
On the 18th a large body of the enemy made an attack, principally against Genl Longstreet’s command. And he repulsed them most gloriously. We had about 15 men killed and 50 or 60 wounded. The loss of the enemy from all accounts was very large. They have removed many of their dead. I was sent out yesterday by Genl Longstreet with a Company of Cavalry to make a reconnaissance, and found on the battlefield 12 of the enemy’s dead, and the whole country for some distance was covered with canteens, blankets and haversacks. I forgot first to say that Genl Longstreet has appointed me one of his aides and that I now rank as Captain.
Yesterday the enemy made some demonstrations, but no attack. We are expecting a big battle today, probably 35 or 40,000 men on each side. If we repulse them we will follow them, and try at once to take Washington City. If we do fight today, it will be one of the greatest battles on record. In the fight day before yesterday I was acting on Genl Bonham’s Staff. We had several rifle cannon balls to fall in a few yards of us. Times felt quite squally for a while. Cols. Terry & Lubbock have gone back. [One line illegible.]
Dr. Woodson is very sick and has gone to his uncle’s beyond Richmond. I am about the only Texan here. I have an excellent position and am well pleased. Genl Longstreet has me in his mess and is very kind. He is considered one of the best genls. in the army. I have been introduced to Genl Beauregard and most of the other genls. Beauregard is truly a great general.
I would not be surprised if David Scott is not here. He belongs to Genl Johnston’s division of the army, the greater part of which was expected here last night. I have met up with young Thos. Moorman a grandson of Aunt Lucy Kenner. He is a very nice young man, about 19 or 20. I have also seen Col. Simms, who owns old Uncle Bart. He says Bart is well and on the plantation in Arkansas. I would like to write more, but cannot now. Our headquarters are in the open air in a pine thicket. I write on my saddlebags, my seat on the ground, the Genl and balance of the Staff on the ground around.
I am very tired. Have been on my horse almost all the time since the commencement of the retreat from Fairfax.
Have not had a chance to wash my face for more than three days. You will probably have heard of the big fight before this reaches you. I may not survive it, but if I am killed, it will be in a glorious cause. I hope, though that I may survive it. Almost feel confident of it.
Do not feel uneasy. I will write you again soon.
Write me and direct to Manassas Junction, “Care of Brig. Genl Longstreet, 4th Brigade.” Get Uncle Pleas to direct it. I have not heard a word since I left, and you must know my anxiety to hear from you. Write often.
If the fight takes place today, we will not be in the first of it, as our brigade is held in reserve. The two armies, I think, are in about 2 miles of each other. We think the attack will probably be made against Genl Cocke, who has command of the bridge.
I must close. My very best love to all.
Your Son Aff’ly
Thos. J. Goree
P.S. During the fight a cannon ball passed through and knocked over Genl Beauregard’s dinner.
[Cutrer, Whomas W., editor, Longstreet’s Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas J. Goree, pp. 22-23]
I finally saw the new Michael Burlingame biography Abraham Lincoln: A Life in Border’s yesterday. It’s hefty, but was sealed in shrink-wrap. I know many folks would rip that plastic off the slipcase to get a look at the books, figuring if the store puts them on display they want you to look at them. I just couldn’t bring myself to do it. I have mine on order from Amazon – it lists for $125 and was discounted to $82.88 when I ordered it. Shipping was free, and I cashed in some credit card bonus points for a $50 Amazon gift card, so the whole 9.3 lb book cost me about $33. But it won’t ship until the second week of February at the earliest. Have any of you read or at least flipped through the book?
I’ve got to add that I’ve not seen the book in Barnes & Noble. I think that carrying this book in inventory at a retail outlet is probably not a good business decision, and perhaps explains why Borders is doing so poorly. But then, maybe they only had it because they got screwed on a special order.
Well, now I’ve done it. I sent my Six-Pack reviews (so far, that’s the title for the column formerly known as Pick Six) to my editor yesterday. We have a new rating system in keeping with the informal nature of the column. Two of the books were interesting to review, four were fun, and one was torture. For that one review, I’m sure I’m going to pay. I suppose I’ll have to get used to being called a South-bashing Yankee, ’cause with some people, yer either fer ’em or agin ’em.
While on the topic of reviews, I sent an email to Joseph Glatthaar (author of the book I discussed here and here) the other day, and he was kind enough to respond helpfully. He went above and beyond in providing answers to my questions, and also took time to read my blog posts about his book and to comment. In response to my comments regarding a claim in General Lee’s Army that the Confederates defeated a larger army at First Bull Run, he pointed out that in another part of the book he stated that such was not the case, and that the passage stating the opposite was an oversight. As I gain more experience with the book publishing process, I better understand how such things can happen. Thanks for the time and the interest, Dr. Glatthaar.
Supplemental Report
Report of States Rights Gist, R. A. Howard, and A. Vander Horst
SUPPLEMENT TO THE O.R. – VOL.1: REPORTS ADDENDUM TO SERIES I, VOL. 2, pp 191-193
General [Barnard Elliott] Bee was ordered to Camp Walker on Saturday, July 20, where he remained with his command until Sunday morning. About 5 o’clock a.m. Sunday, General Bee received orders from General [Pierre Gustave T.] Beauregard to advance his command to the left of General [Thomas Jonathan] Jackson’s Brigade and to support either General Jackson’s or [Philip St. George] Cocke’s commands near Stone Bridge.
Immediately he put his Brigade, consisting of the Second Mississippi, Colonel [William C.] Falkner; the Fourth Alabama, Colonel [Egbert J.] Jones; two companies of the Eleventh Mississippi under command of Lieutenant-Colonel [Philip F.] Liddell; and a battery of four 6-pounders under Captain [John D.] Imboden, in motion and advance in pursuance of his orders until he came up with General Jackson’s Brigade, when he formed his command in close column by Division on the left of Jackson and to the right of Cocke’s command.
General Bee, in a few minutes after taking his position, was informed that the enemy had [illegible] their turning our left flank; he instantly sent his Brigade in motion and advanced by the left flank in the direction of the enemy passing by General Cocke’scommand, after a conference with him.
After advancing about one mile, General Bee formed his line of battle by placing the battery of Captain Imboden in the right and near to a house on a small eminence; Colonel [William M.] Gardner’s Regiment to the left of the battery; Colonel Falkner’s Regiment to the right of the battery; and Colonel [Egbert J.] Jones’ Regiment to the right of Colonel Falkner. [He sent] forward the two companies of Lieutenant [Philip Frank] Liddell to support a battery attached to the command of General [Nathan George] Evans at the request of General Evans, who approached and conferred with General Bee at the moment of his formation of line of battle.
At this time, Evans’ Brigade was to the front and right of General Bee’s Brigade and about engaging the enemy. Evans requested General Bee to advance to his assistance as his force was small. General Bee instantly advanced the regiments of Colonel Falkner and Jones to his assistance.
A portion of Evans’ Brigade about this time engaged the advance guard of the enemy. General Bee advanced his regiments to the front and right about 400 yards, formed the Second Mississippi in line in rear of a piece of woods and the Fourth Alabama on a line of fence to the right about 150 yards in advance of the Second Mississippi Regiment and on the right of Evans’ line.
General Bee was just before this informed by Evans that a column of the enemy was advancing on his right and rear. General Bee ordered the Second Mississippi Regiment to advance through the woods and engage the enemy, the regiment of Evans, supposed to be the Fourth South Carolina Volunteers, having at this time retired from their position in front. He also ordered the Fourth Alabama regiment which was there under fire to advance and led them in person, under a most disastrous fire to the top of the hill in front of the former position of the regiment.
At this time the Second Mississippi, the Fourth Alabama, the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell and Imboden’s Battery were engaging the enemy with great vigor. General Bee retired his line after a close and severe engagement with an overpowering force of the enemy for on-half to three-quarters of an hour.
From this period to his fall from a mortal wound, General Bee led each regiment and seven companies of his command into the hottest fire. He displayed almost superhuman energy in rallying his forces and charging again and again. His staff are of the opinion that General Bee first retired his line in consequence of the information given him by Evans, that a column of the enemy were cutting him off by the rear and right, which information was an entire mistake, as the column proved to be friends. For the last action of the regiment, in the after part of the day, we would refer to the reports of the commanding officers.
General Bee fell whilst leading two companies of the Second Mississippi under Captain [Merritt B.] Miller and a portion of the Fourth Alabama regiment into the midst of the enemy’s fire. He was borne from the field by his staff and died the next day. He testified again and again to the bravery and gallantry of officers and privates of his command after he received his death wound.
His reputation is a rare one; his memory will live forever and we confidently entrust both to his successor in command of his Brigade and friend, General [William Henry Chase] Whiting.
S. R. Gist,
R. A. Howard,
A. Vander Horst
[National Archives]
Harry Smeltzer
Bull Runnings 
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