#86 – Brig. Gen. Milledge L. Bonham

31 01 2008

 

Report of Brig. Gen. M. L. Bonham, C. S. Army, Commanding First Brigade, First Corps

O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 2 [S# 2] — CHAPTER IX, pp 518-521

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG. FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Camp Gregg, August 1, 1861

GENERAL: I had ordered reports from my officers of the operations of the 21st of July previous to the 1st instant, though I had not until that day received instructions to do so. Between the 18th and 21st of July I placed on my extreme left Kershaw’s regiment with Kemper’s battery, both to give support to the left or center of your whole line, as circumstances might require, and to keep watch on the enemy’s movements, should he attempt to cross any part of his force by Cub Run Ford, between Colonel Cocke’s position at stone bridge and my own at Bull Run. Colonel Kirkland’s regiment was placed in my center, on the ground previously occupied by Colonel Kershaw. The enemy continued up to evening of the 20th to make some display of force in my front, but to what extent it was impossible to ascertain, as his force was under cover of the hills and woods. My command was kept on the alert, and my scouts and pickets kept careful watch on his movements, under the expectation that he was preparing to move directly on my position.

About 2.30 o’clock on the morning of the 21st Colonel Kirkland, field officer of the day for my command, a vigilant officer, came in from visiting his pickets beyond the run and informed me that he had heard the rumbling to my left front of artillery wagons. I directed him to renew his efforts to ascertain its character, and before daylight he confirmed his suspicions that it was the enemy in force, which I communicated to headquarters. I also sent across the run General McGowan, one of my volunteer aides, who brought me the same intelligence. I directed him to report to you in person, and crossing myself (it was now light) to the grove near Butler’s house, directly in my front, I perceived by my field-glass, dimly in the distance, the enemy in large force proceeding along the Warrenton turnpike towards the stone bridge, Colonel Cocke’s position. This fact I immediately communicated to headquarters, and directed my whole command to prepare for action, as I supposed the assault would be made early along our whole line.

Early in the morning the enemy’s fire was opened upon my position from the batteries in my front, throwing shot and shell from rifled cannon, and kept up until the afternoon, with occasional exchanges of small-arms between the advance troops. The distance was such that my own field pieces could do but little execution, and my fire was reserved for a closer encounter. My men occupied through the day the trenches under this pretty regular fire of shell and shot, exhibiting a coolness and steadiness worthy of veterans.

While standing a little after noon with General Johnston and yourself on Lookout Hill, in rear of my position, watching the progress of the engagement on my left, where the enemy’s chief force seemed to be concentrating, I received an order from yourself in person to detach to the support of our troops engaged on the left, two of my regiments, with one battery. I immediately sent forward Kershaw and Gash with Kemper’s battery.

Between 5 and 6 o’clock in the afternoon I received an order from General Johnston to move forward upon Centreville with most of my command and General Longstreet’s which order was at once obeyed. Before we had reached the position which the enemy had occupied in our front he abandoned his camp, with indications of a precipitate retreat. I continued the pursuit to near Centreville, when the enemy opened with his artillery upon the route of my column as indicated by the dust. Colonel Lay, with a small escort, having gone forward to make a reconnaissance, found his artillery and infantry drawn up on the hills between the run and Centreville, covering the approach to that place. I ordered my own infantry to deploy in the woods to the left of the road and General Longstreet’s to the right placing a battery of artillery in the road, and the cavalry in the rear, under cover.

By the time the deployment was completed it was dark. After the lapse of a half hour or more I moved the whole command to the run, to refresh themselves preparatory to executing such order as I might receive from you, reporting the fact to yourself at Manassas. During the night the enemy abandoned his position at Centreville. On the following morning I received an order to move forward with two regiments, some artillery and cavalry, to Centreville, where my command, during an incessant fall of rain, took possession of and collected together as far as practicable a large quantity of commissary supplies, tents, wagons, horses, with one piece of artillery, four caissons, and a large quantity of ammunition, and a number of prisoners, sending to Manassas all that could be forwarded that evening. The following day I was ordered to occupy Vienna.

I shall find it difficult to do justice to the fortitude, the patriotism, and the steady courage of the officers and men composing my command, through their hard labors of several weeks in the trenches at Fairfax Court-House; the falling back from that place to Bull Run, and their occupation of the trenches for four successive days through all changes of weather, much of the time without food, and entirely without covering, their readiness to meet the foe at any odds at Fairfax, and the willingness to encounter him at all times at Bull Run, command my highest admiration. To those gentlemen who belonged to my staff in South Carolina as the major-general of the South Carolina State troops, and who so promptly responded to the first call from the State of Virginia for assistance, at all times cheerfully rendering me every aid in their power in the organization of the troops which have been at different times under my command, coming with me to Manassas at the beginning of military operations in this quarter, and sustaining me under every trial and difficulty, I am much indebted. Col. W. C. Moragné, Maj. S. W. Nelson, and Maj. B. H. Whitner, of my regular staff, and Maj. E. Spann Hammond, of my volunteer staff, were called home by imperative duties previous to these operations. To Lieut. Col. W. D. Simpson, Lieut. Col. A. P. Aldrich, and Lieut. Col. James M. Lipscomb, of my regular staff, am I greatly indebted for most active and efficient services during the whole time of the operations of my command from the 17th to the 22d of July, inclusive, each executing every order delivered him with the utmost alacrity, and frequently under circumstances of peril. I am also indebted to Maj. Thomas J. Davies, of my regular staff’, and Maj. S. W. Melton, and Alfred Moss (the latter of Virginia), my volunteer aides, for similar active and efficient services; and to Major Melton I am further indebted for very valuable aid as military secretary. I am also much indebted to my volunteer aides, Majs. S. S. Tompkins, W. P. Butler; and M. B. Lipscomb, for valuable assistance in the performance of various duties connected with my command from the time they joined me at Centreville to the close of the operations. To General S. McGowan, volunteer aide, who also joined me at Centreville, I am under many obligations for his valuable assistance during the operations of my command from the 17th to the 21st, inclusive, under circumstances of peril and exposure.

I desire to mention in most favorable terms the valuable services of Col. George W. Lay, Virginia forces, who acted as my adjutant-general during the above-mentioned operations. To Capt. W. H. Stevens, of the Engineers, C. S. Army, am I greatly indebted for his indefatigable labors in putting Fairfax Court-House in a state of defense, and his constant attention to the execution of all Orders extended through him, both in camp and in the field. It is also proper to mention the valuable aid rendered Captain Stevens by General Johnson Hagood, of South Carolina; Professor Venable, of South Carolina College; and Mr. Nyllis, of the Eighth Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, as volunteer assistant engineer in the construction of the works at Fairfax Court-House. Of Captains Wickham, Ball, Powell, and Payne, and the officers and men of their commands, who have been with me from about the time of my arrival at Manassas early in May, I wish to make my acknowledgments for valuable and efficient services, at all times cheerfully rendered. I desire to make favorable mention also of Colonel Radford and his cavalry, who joined me at a late period, and who have ever promptly executed all my orders. Captain Kemper and the officers and men of his battery are deserving of my highest approbation. They were the first artillery to occupy Artillery Hill at Centreville under my orders. They have been kept steadily in the front, and have shown themselves worthy of the position and the great cause in which they are engaged. The distinguished parts performed by Colonels Kershaw and Cash and Captain Kemper, as also by Colonel Radford’s cavalry and the other troops of cavalry belonging to my command, was somewhat under your own observation on the 21st of July, and to their reports I respectfully refer. Col. J. L. Kemper, of the Seventh Regiment Virginia Volunteers, is entitled to my highest approbation, not only for his generous acceptance of the place of quartermaster with my advanced command, but also on account of his activity and efficiency as a member of my staff in carrying my orders on the 17th, as well as the 18th, at Bull Run. To Colonels Williams, Bacon, Kirkland, and Kelly, and Captain Shields, and the officers and men of their commands, I am also indebted for the promptness, cheerfulness, and energy with which they performed all the duties assigned to them; and I commend the entire command for the spirit and patriotism with which they performed all their duties. To Major Kennedy, commissary of my command, and Lieutenant Washington, assistant quartermaster, C. S. Army, am I also indebted for active and efficient services.

For more minute details of the operations of the different corps I respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of those corps.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. L. BONHAM,

Brig. Gen., Comdg. First Brigade, First Corps, Army Potomac

Brig. Gen. G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Commanding First Corps, Army Potomac





Walton’s Report

30 01 2008

 

wapolka.jpg The official report of Major J. B. Walton of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans presents a slight problem.  It seems Walton has no official status in the Confederate order of battle.  As the four companies of the battalion were distributed throughout Beauregard’s army, I’m thinking of adding Walton under Bory’s artillery chief, Col. Jones.  I have to think on that.

Image from Duke University





#85 – Maj. J. B. Walton

30 01 2008

Report of Maj. J. B. Walton, Battalion Washington Artillery

O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 2 [S# 2] — CHAPTER IX, pp 515-518

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION WASHINGTON ARTILLERY,

Near Stone Bridge, on Bull Run, Va., July 22, 1861

GENERAL: I have the honor to report on the morning of the 21st instant (Sunday) the battalion of Washington Artillery, consisting of  four companies, numbering two hundred and eighty-four officers and men and thirteen guns -six 6-pounders, smooth bore, four 12-pounder howitzers, and three rifled 6-pounders, all bronze—under my command, was assigned to duty as follows:

Four 12-pounder howitzers, under command of Lieut. T. L. Rosser, commanding, Lieut. C. C. Lewis, Lieut. C. H. Slocomb, and Lieut. H. A. Battles, with General Ewell’s Second Brigade, at Union Mills Ford.  Two 6-pounders, smooth bore, under command of Capt. M. B. Miller, Lieut. Joseph Norcom, with General Jones’ Third Brigade, at McLean’s Ford. One rifled 6-pounder and one smooth 6-pounder, under command of Lieut. J. J. Garnett, Lieut. L. A. Adam (reported sick after being engaged in the battle of the 18th instant, with General Longstreet’s Fourth Brigade, at Blackburn’s Ford. Five guns, three smooth 6-pounders, two rifled 6-pounders, under command of Lieut. C. W. Squires, Lieut. J. B. Richardson, and Lieut. J. B. Whittington, with Colonel Early’s Fifth Brigade, then bivouacked near McLean’s farm house.

At about 7 o’clock on the morning of the 21st an order was communicated to me to follow with the battery under Lieutenant Squires the brigade of General Jackson, then on the march towards Stone Bridge. Every preparation having been previously made, the order to mount was immediately given and the battery moved forward, arriving at Lewis’ farm house just in time to receive the first fire from the enemy’s guns, then in position near stone bridge. Here I was ordered to halt and await orders from General Bee.

Shortly after 8.30 o’clock a.m. I detached two rifled guns, under Lieutenant Richardson, and took position about one-half mile to the left of the Lewis farm house, where the enemy was found in large numbers. Fire was at once opened by the section under Lieutenant Richardson, and continued with good effect until his situation became so perilous that he was obliged to withdraw, firing retiring until his guns were out of range, when he limbered up and reported to me. In this engagement one of the enemy’s pieces was dismounted by a shot from the rifled gun directed by First Sergeant Edward Owen, First Company, and other serious work was accomplished.

Now, under direction of General Cocke, I took position in battery on the hill in front of Lewis’ farm house, my guns directed toward stone bridge, where it was reported the enemy was about to attack. Shortly before 10 o’clock orders were communicated to me to advance with my battery to a point, which was indicated, near the position lately occupied by the section under Lieutenant Richardson. Here we at once opened fire, soon obtaining the range with the rifled guns against artillery and the 6-pounders, with round-shot, spherical case, and canister against infantry, scattering by our well-directed fire death, destruction, and confusion in the ranks of both. As the enemy’s artillery would frequently get our range, we advanced by hand to the front until finally the battery was upon the crown of the hill, entirely exposed to the view of their artillery and infantry. At this moment their fire fell like hail around us, the artillery in front of our position evidently suffering greatly from the concentration of fire from my guns and those of the battery on my right, and notwithstanding we were at this time also subjected to a terrific fire of infantry on our left, my guns were as rapidly and beautifully served by the cannoneers, with as much composure and silence as they are when upon the ordinary daily drill.

The batteries of the enemy on our front having become silenced, and the fire of the infantry upon our left increasing, I considered it prudent to remove my battery from the then exposed position, being nearly out of ammunition (some of the guns having only a few rounds left in the boxes). The order to limber to the rear was consequently given, and my battery, followed by the battery on my right, was removed to its first position upon the elevated ground near Lewis’ farm house.

At about 1 o’clock, as nearly as I can now calculate, Lieutenant Squires was detailed with three 6-pounders, and took position near the road leading to the stone bridge from Lewis’ farm house and directed against the enemy’s artillery, which had now opened fire upon our position from the vicinity of stone bridge. This fire having been silenced by some guns of Colonel Pendleton and the guns of my battery under Lieutenant Squires, we discovered from the position on the hill the enemy in full retreat across the fields in range of my rifled guns. I opened fire upon their retreating columns, which was continued with admirable effect, scattering and causing them to spread over the fields in the greatest confusion, until I was ordered to discontinue by General Jackson, and save my ammunition for whatever occasion might now arise.  Subsequently I was permitted by General Johnston to open fire again, which was now, after having obtained the range, like target practice, so exactly did each shot do its work: the enemy, by thousands, in the greatest disorder, at a double-quick, received our fire and the fire from the Parrott guns of the battery alongside, dealing terrible destruction at every discharge.

This ended the battle of the 21st, the last gun having been fired from one of the rifles of my battery. The guns of this battery, under command of Captain Miller, with General Jones’ brigade, and Lieutenant Garnett, with General Longstreet’s brigade, were not engaged at their respective points, although under fire a portion of the day. The howitzer battery, under Lieutenant Commanding Rosser, with General Ewell’s brigade, was on the march from 2 o’clock p.m. in the direction of Fairfax Court. House, and, returning by way of Union Mills Ford, arrived with the reserve at my position unfortunately too late to take part in the engagement, notwithstanding the battery was moved at trot and the canonneers at a double-quick the entire distance from Union Mills Ford.

In this battle my loss has been one killed, Sergeant J. D. Reynolds, Fourth Company ; two wounded slightly, Corporal E. C. Payne, First Company, and Private George L. Crutcher, Fourth Company. There were three horses wounded, two belonging to the battery and one officer’s horse.

I cannot conclude this official report without the expression of my grateful thanks to the officers and men under my command for their gallant behavior during the entire day. They fought like veterans, and no man hesitated in the performance of any duty, or in taking any position to which it was indicated they were required. In a word, I desire to say these men are entirely worthy of the noble State that has sent them forth to battle for the independence of the Confederate States.

To Lieutenant Squires, commanding, I desire especially to direct your attention. A young officer, the second time under fire (having been in the engagement of the 18th), he acted his part in a manner worthy of a true soldier and a brave man. He is an example rarely to be met. Lieutenants Richardson and Whittington, each with his battery in the engagement of the 18th, were in this battle, and bravely did their duty. Lieut. Will Owen, adjutant, and Lieut. James Dearing, Virginia forces, attached to this battalion, accompanied me. To them I am indebted for valuable services upon the field. Frequently were they ordered to positions of great danger, and promptly and bravely did they each acquit themselves of any duty they were called upon to perform.

I could mention individual instances of bravery and daring on the part of non-commissioned officers and privates would not be invidious where all behaved so well.

In conclusion, general, I can only say I am gratified to know we have done our duty as we were pledged to do.

With great respect, I am, general, your obedient servant,

J. B. WALTON,

Major, Commanding

Brig. Gen. G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Commanding Division, C. S. Army





Dueling Blowhards

28 01 2008

 

 beauregard.jpg jeffdavis.jpg 

Hopefully by now you’ve had enough time to digest the OR of P. G. T. Beauregard – aka Bory, aka The Creole, aka The Little Napoleon – and the flurry of endorsements and such which it generated (here and here).  It’s a testament to the adaptability of the ecology of Virginia that two gasbags of such enormity, Bory and Davis, could coexist there without bringing on some sort of climatologic calamity.  Yikes!!!  Like the one he had with Joe Johnston, Davis’s contentious relationship with the Creole would have far reaching effects for the Confederacy.

Hopefully you caught Beauregard’s mention of Ayres’s (formerly Sherman’s) battery.  It seems he was one of the few to get it right.

Thanks for all the nice emails about my posts on historians and Civil War blogs.  I appreciate them all.





#84 (Part 2) – Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard

27 01 2008

 

Reports of Gen. G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, and Resulting Correspondence (Part 2)

O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 2 [S# 2] — CHAPTER IX, pp 504 – 515

[Indorsement]

The order issued by the War Department to General Johnston was not, as herein reported, to form a junction, “should the movement in his judgment be deemed advisable.” The following is an accurate copy of the order:

General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements exercise your discretion.

The words “if practicable” had reference to letters of General Johnston of 12th and 15th of July, which made it extremely doubtful if he had the power to make the movement, in view of the relative strength and position of Patterson’s forces as compared with his own.

The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but not accepted, and to have led to a decision of the War Department, cannot be found among its files, nor any reference to any decision made upon it, and it was not known that the Army had advanced beyond the line of Bull Run, the position previously selected by General Lee, and which was supposed to have continued to be the defensive line occupied by the main body of our forces. Inquiry has developed the fact that a message to be verbally delivered was sent by Hon. Mr. Chesnut. If the conjectures recited in the report were entertained, they rested on the accomplishment of one great condition, namely, that a junction of the forces of Generals Johnston and Holmes should be made with the army of General Beauregard, and should gain a victory. The junction was made, the victory was won, but the consequences that were predicted did not result. The reasons why no such consequences could result are given in the closing passages of the reports of both the commanding generals, and the responsibility cannot be transferred to the Government at Richmond, which certainly would have united in any feasible plan to accomplish such desirable results.

If the plan of campaign mentioned in the report had been presented in a written communication, and in sufficient detail to permit proper investigation, it must have been pronounced to be impossible at that time, and its proposal could only have been accounted for by the want of information of the forces and positions of the armies in the field. The facts that rendered it impossible are the following:

1. It was based, as related from memory by Colonel Chestnut, on the supposition of drawing a force of about twenty-five thousand men from the command of General Johnston. The letters of General Johnston show his effective force to have been only eleven thousand, with an enemy thirty thousand strong in his front ready to take possession of the valley of Virginia on his withdrawal.

2. It proposed to continue operations by effecting a junction of a part of the victorious forces with the army of General Garnett in Western Virginia. General Garnett’s forces amounted only to three or four thousand men, then known to be in rapid retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan, and the news that he was himself killed, and his army scattered, arrived within forty-eight hours of Colonel Chesnuts arrival in Richmond.

3. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to attack them in detail.

4. It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the battlefield would enable our forces to carry the fortifications on the Potomac, garrisoned, and within supporting distance of fresh troops; nor after the actual battle and victory did the generals on the field propose an advance on the capital, nor does it appear that they have since believed themselves in a condition to attempt such a movement.

It is proper also to observe that there is no communication on file in the War Department as recited at the close of the report, showing what were the causes which “prevented the advance of our forces and prolonged vigorous pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac.”

JEFFERSON DAVIS

—–

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS ARMY POTOMAC,

Centreville, Va., November 8, 1861

GENERAL: My attention having been called to the date of my report of the battle of Manassas, August 26, 1861, when it was only received at the War Department October 15, 1861, I have to request that the date of the letter accompanying the report, October –, 1861, should be affixed to it. The delay arose from the fact that it was placed in the hands of the copyist on the day of its date, but was left open to be amended and corrected as the details of the battle became better known and developed, by discussion on the subject and the reports of the enemy then being published, which enabled me to furnish, not only the report, but the history of that battle, accompanied by a full set of drawings, showing the position of the contending forces during four periods of that grand drama.

I am led to infer also that the strategic portion of the report is an obstacle to its publication. Should that be the case, I have to request that it may be separated into two parts, to obviate the difficulty referred to; but I do not wish it understood, however, that I ask the publication of any part of it, leaving that entirely to the judgment of the War Department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G.T. BEAUREGARD,

General, Commanding

General S. COOPER,

Adjutant-General, C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.

P. S.–What can be the matter with the mails? My letters are often from five to six days getting here from Richmond.

—–

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 16, 1861

Brigadier-General BEAUREGARD,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

SIR: In obedience to your order, I proceeded on Sunday last, 14th instant, to Richmond, with the purpose of laying before the President for his consideration your views and plans for the combined operation of the two armies under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston and yourself, respectively. I arrived in Richmond at 3.30 on the same day I left your quarters, and without delay reported to the President, who, although sick in bed, received me with great kindness and cordiality. After stating to him the object of my visit, he appointed an hour to meet him with General R. E. Lee, and Adjutant and Inspector General Cooper. At the appointed time the President, Generals Lee and Cooper, and Colonel Preston, of your staff, met me in private conference. Being requested by the President to lay before those present the subject-matter with which I was charged, I submitted on your part the following propositions:

That the Confederate armies were in front of the enemy with greatly inferior forces at all points; that it was desirable by uniting a portion of our forces to outnumber the enemy at some important point; that the point now occupied by you was at present in reference to the armies considered the most important. I stated also that the enemy were at present at or near Falls Church, with eight or ten thousand men, on the Alexandria, Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad, and also with some portion of his force at Springfield, on the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, with every indication of a purpose to advance on both lines, and that it was most probable the enemy would threaten our camp at Manassas with about ten thousand men, while the main body, twenty thousand or more, would advance towards Vienna, Frying Pan, and Pleasant Valley, to Hay Market,, on the Manassas Gap Railroad,  view to cut off our communication with General Johnston. To accomplish this, possession would be taken of passes of the Blue Ridge at Manassas, Ashby’s, and Snicker’s Gaps. He would then endeavor to cut off your communication with Richmond by the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, and force you either to fight in open field with greatly inferior numbers or to retire towards Fredericksburg by way of Brentsville, to join forces with General Holmes, or to withdraw from the intrenched camp and retire by the Alexandria and Orange Railroad before the enemy could reach it.

Under these circumstances I stated you would propose, and did propose, that General Johnston should, with the bulk of his forces, say twenty thousand, unite with you, leaving from three to five thousand men to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge and to hold Patterson in cheek. Then, with the combined forces of General Johnston and yourself, you would move rapidly forward on Fairfax Court-House, establish yourself between the two lines of the enemy, attack them separately with larger masses, and thus exterminate them or drive them into the Potomac. This being done, General Johnston, with ten thousand of your forces in addition to his own, and rallying as he went those left to guard the passes, would return at once with superior numbers, say thirty-five thousand, to attack and destroy Patterson at Winchester or wherever he might be. One week from the time of leaving Winchester would be sufficient to accomplish all this. You would then either occupy the enemy’s works in front of Washington if he should abandon them, or fall back on your present positions, according to circumstances. General Johnston, having disposed of Patterson, would detach a sufficient number from his force to re-enforce Garnett and make him superior to General McClellan. Having defeated McClellan,. General Garnett could then unite with Johnston, and the two cross the Potomac at the nearest point for Maryland, and, arousing the people as they proceeded, march to the rear of Washington, while you would attack it in front.

To these propositions respectful and earnest consideration was given by the President and the two generals I have mentioned. The scheme was considered brilliant and comprehensive, but to its adoption at this time two leading objections were urged by the President and by General Lee One was that General Johnston’s force was not now sufficiently strong to allow of the withdrawal of numbers sufficient to effect your object, and at the same time leave enough to keep Patterson in check and keep him from coming down upon your left. And the other and main objection was that the enemy was as yet too close to their cover to allow the reasonable expectation of the accomplishment of your object; that they would immediately fall back upon their intrenchments, or, being so close to their large reserves, would be quickly re-en-forced in numbers sufficient to regain the superiority of numbers, and thus defeat your purpose; that the combination might be made at a later period, when the objection would be removed by a sufficient increase of your armies and by the lengthening of the enemy’s lines and increase of distance from cover and reserves for quick re-enforcement.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES CHESNUT, JR.

—–

RICHMOND, VA., August 4, 1861

General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

MY DEAR SIR: Inclosed I transmit copies of a resolution of inquiry and the reply to it.(*) You will perceive that the answer was made in view of the telegram which I inclose to you, that being the only information then before me. Since that time it has been communicated to me that your letter to the Hon. Mr. Miles,(+) on the wants of your army and the consequences thereof, was read to the Congress, and hence the inquiry instituted. Permit me to request that you will return the telegram to me, which I inclosed to show you the form in which the matter came before me. Some excitement has been created by your letters. The quartermaster and the commissary generals both feel that they have been unjustly arraigned. As for myself, I can only say that I have endeavored to anticipate wants, and any failure which has occurred from imperfect knowledge might have been best avoided by timely requisitions and estimates. I think you are unjust to yourself in putting your failure to pursue the enemy to Washington to the account of short supplies of subsistence and transportation. Under the circumstances of our Army, and in the absence of the knowledge since acquired–if, indeed, the statements be true–it would have been extremely hazardous to have done more than was performed. You will not fail to remember that, so far from knowing that the enemy was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you in the night of the 21st to repel a supposed attack upon our right, and the next day’s operations did not fully reveal what has since been reported of the enemy’s panic. Enough was done for glory, and the measure of duty was full. Let us rather show the untaught that their desires are unreasonable than, by dwelling on possibilities, recently developed, give form and substance to the criticisms, always easy to those who judge after the event.

With sincere esteem, I am your friend,

JEFFERSON DAVIS

*Not found.

+Not found.

—–

RICHMOND, VA., October 30, 1861

General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

SIR: Yesterday my attention was called to various newspaper publications, purporting to have been sent from Manassas, and to be a synopsis of your report of the battle of July 21 last, and in which it is represented that you had been overruled by me in your plan for a battle with the enemy south of the Potomac, for the capture of Baltimore and Washington, and the liberation of Maryland. I inquired for your long-expected report, and it has to-day been submitted to my inspection. It appears, by official indorsement, to have been received by the Adjutant General on October 15, though it is dated August 26, 1861. With much surprise I found that the newspaper statements were sustained by the text of your report. I was surprised, because, if we did differ in opinion as to the measures and purposes of contemplated campaigns, such fact could have no appropriate place in the report of a battle.  Further, because it seemed to be an attempt to exalt yourself at my expense, and especially because no such plan as that described was submitted to me. It is true that some time before it was ordered you expressed a desire for the junction of General Johnston’s army with your own. The movement was postponed until the operations of the enemy rendered it necessary, and until it became thereby practicable to make it, with safety, to the valley of Virginia; hence-I believe was secured the success by which it was attended. If you have retained a copy of the plan of campaign which, you say, was submitted to me, through Colonel Chesnut, allow me to request that you will furnish me with a duplicate of it.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

JEFFERSON DAVIS

—–

RICHMOND, VA., October 30, 1861

Col. JAMES CHESNUT, Camden, S. C:

MY DEAR SIR: I beg that you will as promptly as possible send me a statement of a communication made to me by yourself on or about July 13 last, as aide of General Beauregard, in relation to any proposed plan of battle or campaign. I ask this because I have had my attention directed to a synopsis in the newspapers of General Beauregard’s report so entirely at variance with the facts as they occurred that I think it well to recur to your recollection of the message brought by you from the general.

I am, very truly, your friend,

JEFFERSON DAVIS

—–

CAMDEN, S.C., November 9, 1861

To the PRESIDENT:

DEAR SIR: I have this morning received your letter of the 15th [30] ultimo,(*) and, according to your request, reply at once, although you will not get [it] as promptly as I desire, as to-morrow, being Sunday, no mail leaves this place.

You ask me to recur to my recollection and send you a statement of a communication which, as aide to General Beauregard, I made to you on or about July 13, last, “in relation to any proposed plan of battle or campaign.”

On Saturday night or Sunday morning of July 14 last, about midnight I received a message from General Beauregard, requesting my attendance at his room. I immediately repaired thither, and learned from him that he had formed a plan of campaign which he desired to lay before the President, and requested me to undertake the duty.

About 6 o’clock of the same morning I left headquarters and arrived in Richmond in the afternoon of the same day, several hours beyond the usual time of arrival. I had two interviews with you that day, one in the afternoon and another in company with other persons during the evening. Remaining Monday for the completion of my mission, I returned to camp at Manassas on Tuesday following. Immediately after reaching headquarters of General Beauregard I made to him verbally a full report of all things touching the subject matter with which I had been charged.

On Thursday, July 18 last, while we were preparing for the field, the general in person directed me to make at once a written report of the same matter. This I did, and handed it to the assistant adjutant general, Colonel Jordan, who filed it for information of the general commanding, when I left the camp to join the general on the battle-field. I think the written report bears date of the verbal report, say July 15 last, and I am sure is accurate and full to the points in question, according to the freshness of my recollection at the time. I will ask you, however, to write to General Beauregard requesting a copy of the report, as I myself will do.

In the mean time and now I will state to you my recollection of the interview and of the contents of the report. I am sure the two will be found identical in substance, however they may vary in phraseology. I stated to General Beauregard that when I arrived in Richmond I repaired immediately to your apartment, where I learned you were ill in bed; but upon being notified of my presence you at once caused me to be invited into your chamber, where I was kindly and cordially received. I informed you of the object of my visit at which you expressed yourself pleased, and sent messages to Generals Cooper and Lee to meet us that evening at 7 o’clock, with maps, in your parlor. I requested you to allow Col. John S. Preston, who was then in Richmond, to be present at the interview, to which you consented.

At the time and place appointed yourself and Generals Cooper and Lee and Colonel Preston and myself assembled. You stated to the gentlemen present that I had come with a message from General Beauregard, which you then requested me to explain, whereupon I submitted on the part of General Beauregard the following propositions:

That we were standing in front of the enemy with inferior forces at all points; that it was desirable, by uniting a portion of our forces, to outnumber the enemy at some important point; that the most important point was the one at Manassas, and that the indication then was that the enemy would soon advance upon us by the Alexandria and by the Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad, having then his advanced force, 8,000 or 10,000 Strong, at or near Falls Church; that it was probable he would continue the movement towards Vienna, Frying Pan, and Pleasant Valley to Hay Market, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, with a view to cut off General Johnston from us by sending a few thousand men to take possession of the passes in the Blue Ridge, namely, Manassas Gap, Ashby’s Gap, and Turkersville [Snicker's] Gap, and then probably attempt to cut off our communication with Richmond by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and force us to fight him with great odds in an open country, or to retire towards Fredericksburg by way of Brentsville, to join our forces with those of General Holmes, or to withdraw from our intrenched camp at Manassas by the Orange [and Alexandria] Railroad before the enemy could reach it; that the enemy was also advancing part of his force on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad on our front, with a view probably of covering his movements on our left by threatening our center and right with a force of about 10.000 men.

In view of this condition of things General Beauregard, through me, at that time proposed that General Johnston should at once join him with the larger portion of his force, say 20,000, leaving from 3,000 to 5,000 to occupy and guard the gaps already mentioned and to hold General Patterson in check; then, with the combined forces of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, make a rapid march forward on Fairfax; establish themselves between the two lines of the enemy; attack them separately and successfully, and thus exterminate them. This being done, General Johnston would return and attack Patterson with a force of about 35,000 men, made up of about 10,000 of General Beauregard’s and 20,000 of his own, and gathering up on his return the 5,000 which were left to guard the passes. All this it was thought could be done in one week from the time that General Johnston should leave Winchester. In the mean time General Beauregard, with the 10,000, or about that, left with him, would either hold his position, or occupy the works of the enemy in front of Washington, if abandoned, according to circumstances. After General Johnston should take or defeat Patterson it was proposed that he should send from his command a force sufficient to General Garnett to outnumber and destroy General McClellan, Garnett in the mean time having received orders to fall back in the direction of Johnston’s column. McClellan being disposed of, General Garnett would unite his forces with General Johnston’s, and both cross the Potomac at the nearest point into Maryland, march on Washington, taking it in the rear, while General Beauregard attacked it in front, General Johnston in the mean time arousing the people of Maryland wherever he passed to the defense of their homes and independence.

After I had laid before you, these views, both yourself and General Lee spoke in terms of kindness and compliment to General Beauregard; thought the plan well conceived, and might be brilliant in its results if we should meet with no disaster in the details, and if the time for its execution had arrived. General Lee expressed the opinion, to which you assented, that the time for its execution had not yet arrived. With deference I asked General Lee for the reason upon which the opinion was founded. He proceeded to say the subject had been thought of generally. He thought the enemy was as yet too close to his cover; that if he found us with combined and superior forces before him he would not, or might not, give battle, but retire behind the protection of the guns of his intrenchments, and thus defeat the objects of our combination; that in such an event we would be put to a great disadvantage of achieving nothing and leaving the other points exposed, &c.; that in his opinion it would be better to draw the enemy farther from his intrenchments, and by lengthening to weaken his line, which would give us a better chance of success, &c.

Many other matters were spoken of at that interview as to the war generally, its policy the character of our forces, &c.; but as they did not pertain to the object of my mission, they were not mentioned in my report nor are repeated here.

I believe I have given you the sum and substance of what occurred at the interview referred to in relation to the matter in question, and what is contained in the report which I made in writing to General Beauregard. I do not at this time pretend to verbal accuracy, but feel satisfied of the correctness of the substance of the matter. I had at the time, and I have before me now, a memorandum of the points submitted by me on the part of General Beauregard.

I am sure a full and dispassionate investigation and consideration of this subject will leave little ground for dissatisfaction. The success of our cause depends not merely on the ability and fidelity, but to a great extent also on the harmony and hearty co-operation, of those who are chief and chosen instruments in the direction of our affairs. Any extended distrust in the crisis of our fate will bring dire calamities upon us. We must heed not the unwise babbling of some nor the deliberate malice of many. Yourself and your generals are alike elevated above the reach of unworthy considerations. Firm in the consciousness of right, devoting all your faculties to the triumph of a common and a noble cause, you and they can already afford to live in the clear light of a future judgment.

With great respect, your friend and obedient servant,

JAMES CHESNUT, JR.

*See also Davis to Chesnut, November 11, p. 513

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RICHMOND, VA., November 3, 1861

General J. E. JOHNSTON,

Commanding Department of the Potomac:

SIR: Reports have been and are being widely circulated to the effect that I prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle of Manassas, and had subsequently restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. Though such statements may have been made merely for my injury, and in that view might be postponed to a more convenient season, they have acquired importance from the fact that they have served to create distrust, to excite disappointment, and must embarrass the administration in its further efforts to re-enforce the armies of the Potomac, and, generally, to provide for the public defense. For these public considerations I call upon you, as the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by me on July 21 and 22, to say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active operations which it was feasible for the Army to undertake.(*)

Very respectfully, yours &c.,

Jefferson Davis

*Answer, if any, not found.

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RICHMOND, VA.. November 4, 1861

Generals COOPER and LEE, C. S. Army:

GENTLEMEN: The injurious effect produced by state, ants, widely published, to show that the Army or the Potomac had been needlessly doomed to inactivity by my rejection of plans for vigorous movements against the enemy which were presented to me by General Beauregard, induces me to ask you to state what was the communication made by that officer through the Hon. Mr. Chesnut, on the subject of his position at Manassas in July last, and what were the propositions and requests then conveyed to me. You are invited to refer to the introduction of General Beauregard’s report of the battle of Manassas, that you may see how far the statement made therein agrees with the communication made to me by the Hon. Mr. Chesnut in the interview at which you were present.

I have requested General Beauregard to furnish me with a duplicate of the plan of battle and campaign, which he says in his report was submitted to me, but have not received an answer.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

JEFFERSON DAVIS

—–

RICHMOND, VA. November 9, 1861

To his Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,

President of Confederate States:

SIR: In reply to your letter of the 4th instant, I have the honor to state that I was present at an interview in the parlor of the Spottswood Hotel, on the occasion referred to in General Beauregard’s introductory remarks in his report of the battle of Manassas, wherein he states that he dispatched, on July 13, one of his staff, Col. James Chesnut, of South Carolina, to submit to the consideration of the President a plan of operations, &c.

My impression in respect to that interview is that General Beauregard, being fully satisfied that an early attack would be made on his position by the enemy, greatly superior in force, and feeling the necessity for additional aid to enable him to give battle on more equal terms, had sent Colonel Chesnut to urge upon the President an increase from General Johnston’s command, then in the valley of the Shenandoah. I am also under the impression that it was represented on the part of General Beauregard that, if compelled to abandon his position by superior numbers, he would retire by Fredericksburg, or in the direction of the Rappahannock. Beyond these representations or suggestions I am not sensible that any plan of operations was submitted, whether written or oral; nor can I call to mind that any written communication from General Beauregard was made to the President on the occasion of the interview. In respect to receiving aid from General Johnston, it will be recollected that that officer had in his front a large force of the enemy, at least double his own numbers, and it would have been fatal to our cause in the valley to have sent away at that time any considerable portion of his command for the object contemplated by General Beauregard. Nor was it possible for him to do so, with any reasonable hope of success, until the tardiness and inactivity of the enemy in his front rendered such movement practicable, when it was finally accomplished under your telegraphic instructions of July 17, which resulted in the success of our arms at the battle of Manassas on the 21st.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

S. COOPER,

General, C. S Army

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RICHMOND, VA., November 11, 1861

Col. JAMES CHESNUT:

MY DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 2d instant, in reply to my inquiry of the 30th ultimo.(*) My memory is confirmed as to the fact that you delivered to me orally a message from General Beauregard, but left with me no plan of battle or of campaign; and I regret, as our conversation was to be reported and to be filed with the papers of General Beauregard, that the propositions were not reduced to writing and submitted for a written reply, or at least that I was not permitted to see the report of the interview before it became a public document. I well remember that you came to explain the hazard of General Beauregard’s position, and to ask for re-enforcements, suggesting that General Johnston should make a junction with him; but do not remember that any proposition was made to select Fairfax Court-House as a battle-field, and cannot realize how I should have objected to the choice of that field, as I did not then know how bad a selection it would have been. The rest seems to have been merely hypothetical propositions, and such as would only have impressed themselves on my memory by their errors, both as to numbers of available troops and topography of the country. The general’s report does not give those details, but presents a summary of things which no one desired more than myself, with a conclusion that the plan for their achievement was not accepted, &c Thus has apparent confirmation been given to the slander that I would not permit the Army to advance to the capture of Washington and the liberation of Maryland, attributing to me political views which I think you must know were not entertained by me. The importance of this is not any effect it may have on me individually, but is the injury inflicted on the public interest by the belief created that the Army has been doomed to inactivity, to avoid the exasperation of the enemy.

That I have not heeded “the unwise babbling of some nor the deliberate malice of many,” is to be found in the fact that they were never noticed by me until a respectable foundation appeared for them. My confidence and friendship for General Beauregard have been unmistakably manifested, and none can regret more than myself the error he has committed in bringing extraneous matter into his report of a battle, without any perceivable motive for so doing which is consistent with the good opinion I entertained of him. To a request for a duplicate of the plan of battle and campaign, which he had reported was submitted to me through you, he replies by assuring me that the plan, as stated in his report, is the one you were sent to submit-that he has a written statement of the result of your conference with me, which has been sent to New Orleans, and of which he promises to furnish a copy.

Your letter shows that you bore merely a message from General Beauregard, and his official announcement of a plan of operations submitted but not accepted is poorly sustained by reference to a conversation with me by a third person, even though it was reduced to writing after having been orally communicated to him. When the newspapers published a synopsis of General Beauregard’s report, in which reference is made to the plan said to have been submitted to me by him, I could not believe he was responsible for the statement until I saw his report.

I accept your friendly advice in the spirit which suggests it, and can assure you that our cause is to me so far above any personal considerations, that I can find no difficulty in fully co-operating with any one who can and will promote its success.

JEFFERSON DAVIS

*Colonel Chesnut refers to this letter as of October 15.  See his letter of November 2, p.509.

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RICHMOND, November 12, 1861

General G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Comdg. District of Potomac, Centreville, Va.:

GENERAL: I have received your letter of the 8th instant,(*) and in compliance with your request have caused to be affixed to your report of the battle of Manassas the date of your letter of the 14th October, which accompanied it, although this was unnecessary, inasmuch as the letter had already been filed with the report itself.

In respect to the strategic portion of the report as an obstacle to its publication, I would remark that it is a rule of the Department to furnish copies of reports of battles only to Congress, by whose authority alone they are printed. Under this rule they are withheld from publication by the Department in the daily papers. Some few of these reports of battles have found their way into the papers, but the newspapers obtained their copies before the reports reached this office.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. COOPER,

Adjt. and Insp. Gen.

P. S.–I am unable to account for the irregularity of the mails between this city and Centreville, and this reminds me that I duly received your note of the 23d October, in which you asked for information in respect to aides-de-camp and other matters, and to which I promptly replied as fully as I had the means of doing, offering at the same time to supply you with anything in addition that you might require. I was surprised to learn from Colonel Deas a few days ago that you had never received my answer.

S. C.

*Page 505.

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COOSAWHATCHIE, S.C., November 24, 1861

His Excellency THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES:

My absence on an examination of the coast of South Carolina and Georgia has prevented until now my reply to your note of the 4th instant, asking what communication was made by General Beauregard to you through the honorable Mr. Chesnut on the subject of his position at Manassas in July last, and what were the propositions and requests conveyed by him.

I have not seen the report of General Beauregard of the battle of Manassas, and am unable to refer to his introductory statement to which you call my attention. I cannot, therefore, say how far it agrees with the communication of Mr. Chesnut, I recollect, however, that at the interview at which I was present Mr. Chesnut urged, on the part of General Beauregard, the importance of re-enforcing the Army of the Potomac to enable it to oppose the Federal forces accumulating in its front. As a means of accomplishing this end he suggested that a portion of the Army in the Shenandoah Valley, under General Johnston, be ordered to join it. With the aid thus afforded General Beauregard thought he could successfully resist an attack of the enemy. Should he succeed in repulsing him, he could in turn re-enforce General Johnston. Should General Johnston succeed in driving back General Patterson, then in his front, he could re-enforce the Army in Northwestern Virginia. The advantages of the union of the armies on the Potomac had been more than once the subject of consideration by you, and I do not recollect that at the interview in question they were less apparent. The difficulty of timing the march of the troops so as to benefit one army without jeopardizing the object of the other was therefore mainly considered, and you decided that the movements of the enemy in and about Alexandria were not sufficiently demonstrative to warrant the withdrawing of any of the forces from the Shenandoah Valley. A few days afterwards, how-ever–I think three or four–the reports from General Beauregard showed so clearly the enemy’s purpose, that you ordered General Johnston, with his effective force, to march at once to the support of General Beauregard, and directed General Holmes, with such troops as could be spared from the defense of the approaches to Fredericksburg, to move upon Manassas.

The successful combination of the armies was made, and the glorious victory of July 21 followed.

I have the honor, &c.,

R. E. LEE





#84 (Part 1) – Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard

26 01 2008

 Reports of Gen. G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, and Resulting Correspondence (Part 1)

O.R.– SERIES I–VOLUME 2 [S# 2] — CHAPTER IX, pp 484 – 504

HDQRS. FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Fairfax Court-House, October 14, 1861

SIR: I have the honor to transmit by my aide, Lieut. S. W. Ferguson, the report of the battle of Manassas, with the accompanying papers and drawings(*), as well as the flags and colors captured from the enemy on that occasion. Occupations of the gravest character have prevented their earlier transmission. I send as a guard of said colors two of the soldiers who participated in their capture.

I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General, Commanding

Gen. SAMUEL COOPER,

Adjutant General C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.

*Drawings not found

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HDQRS. FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Manassas, August 26 [October 14], 1861

GENERAL: Before entering upon a narration of the general military operations in the presence of the enemy on the 21st of July, I propose, I hope not unseasonably, first to recite certain events which belong to the strategy of the campaign, and consequently form an essential part of the history of the battle.

Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy, with a decidedly superior force, both as to numbers and war equipage, to attack or turn my position in this quarter, was immediately impending, I dispatched on the 13th of July one of my staff, Col. James Chesnut, of South Carolina, to submit for the consideration of the President a plan of operations substantially as follows:

I proposed that General Johnston should unite as soon as possible the bulk of the Army of the Shenandoah with that of the Potomac, then under my command, leaving only sufficient forces to garrison his strong works at Winchester, and to guard the fine defensive passes of the Blue Ridge, and thus hold General Patterson in check. At the same time Brigadier-General Holmes was to march hither with all of his command not essential for the defense of the position of Aquia Creek. These junctions having been effected at Manassas, an immediate impetuous attack of our combined armies upon General McDowell was to follow as soon as he approached my advanced positions at and around Fairfax Court-House, with the inevitable result, as I submitted, of his complete defeat and the destruction or capture of his army. This accomplished, the Army of the Shenandoah, under General Johnston, increased with a part of my forces, and rejoined as he returned by the detachments left to hold the mountain passes, was to march back rapidly into the valley, fall upon and crush Patterson with a superior force wheresoever he might be found. This I confidently estimated could be achieved within fifteen days after General Johnston should march from Winchester for Manassas. Meanwhile I was to occupy the enemy’s works on this side of the Potomac if, as I anticipated, he had been so routed as to enable me to enter them with him; or if not, to retire again for a time within the lines of Bull Run with my main force. Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston would re-enforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him superior to his opponent, General McClellan, and able to defeat that officer. This done, General Garnett was to form an immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to cross the Potomac into Maryland with his whole force, arouse the people as he advanced to the recovery of their political rights and the defense of their homes and families from an offensive invader, and then march to the investment of Washington in the rear, whilst I resumed the offensive in front. This plan of operations, you are aware, was not accepted at the time, from considerations which appeared so weighty as to more than counterbalance its proposed advantages.

Informed of these views, and of the decision of the War Department, I then made my preparations for the stoutest practicable defense of the line of Bull Run, the enemy having now developed his purposes by the advance on and occupation of Fairfax Court-House, from which my advanced brigade had been withdrawn.

The War Department having been informed by me by telegraph on the 17th July of the movement of General McDowell, General Johnston was immediately ordered to form a junction of his army corps with mine, should the movement in his judgment be deemed advisable. General Holmes was also directed to push forward with two regiments, a battery, and one company of cavalry.

In view of these propositions, approaching re-enforcements modifying my plan of operations so far as to determine on attacking the enemy at Centreville as soon as I should hear of the near approach of the two re-enforcing columns, I sent one of my aides, Colonel Chisolm, of South Carolina, to meet and communicate my plans to General Johnston, and my wish that one portion of his forces should march by the way of Aldie, and take the enemy on his right flank and in reverse at Centreville. Difficulties, however, of an insuperable character, in connection with means of transportation and the marching condition of his troops, made this impracticable, and it was determined our forces should be united within the lines of Bull Run, and thence advance to the attack of the enemy.

General Johnston arrived here about noon on the 20th July, and being my senior in rank he necessarily assumed command of all the forces of the Confederate States then concentrating at this point. Made acquainted with my plan of operations and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gave them his entire approval, and generously directed their execution under my command.

In consequence of the untoward detention, however, of some five thousand of General Johnston’s army corps, resulting from the inadequate and imperfect means of transportation for so many troops at the disposition of the Manassas Gap Railroad, it became necessary, on the morning of the 21st, before daylight, to modify the plan accepted to suit the contingency of an immediate attack on our lines by the main force of the enemy, then plainly at hand.

The enemy’s forces, reported by their best-informed journals to be fifty-five thousand strong, I had learned from reliable sources on the night of the 20th were being concentrated in and around Centreville and along the Warrenton turnpike road to Bull Run, near which our respective pickets were in immediate proximity. This fact, with the conviction that after his signal discomfiture on the 18th of July before Blackburn’s Fords–the center of my lines–he would not renew the attack in that quarter, induced me at once to look for an attempt on my left flank, resting on the stone bridge, which was but weakly guarded by men, as well as but slightly provided with artificial defensive appliances and artillery.

In view of these palpable military conditions, by 4.30 a.m. on the 21st of July I had prepared and dispatched orders directing the whole of the Confederate forces within the lines of Bull Run, including the brigades and regiments of General Johnston, which had arrived at that time, to be held in readiness to march at a moment’s notice. At that hour the following was the disposition of our forces: Ewell’s brigade, constituted as on the 18th of July, remained in position at Union Mills Ford, its left extending along Bull Run in the direction of McLean’s Ford, and supported by Holmes’ brigade, Second Tennessee and First Arkansas Regiments, a short distance to the rear–that is, at and near Camp Wigfall. D. R. Jones’ brigade, from Ewell’s left, in front of McLean’s Ford and along the stream to Longstreet’s position. It was unchanged in organization, and was supported by Early’s brigade, also unchanged, placed behind a thicket of young pines a short distance in the rear of McLean’s Ford. Longstreet’s brigade held its former ground at Blackburn’s Ford, from Jones’ left to Bonham’s right, at Mitchell’s Ford, and was supported by Jackson’s brigade, consisting of Cols. James F. Preston’s Fourth, Harper’s Fifth, Allen’s Second, the Twenty-seventh, Lieutenant-Colonel Echols, and the Thirty-third, Cummings’ Virginia Regiments, two thousand six hundred and eleven strong, which were posted behind the skirting of pines to the rear of Blackburn’s and Mitchell’s Fords, and in rear of this support was also Barksdale’s Thirteenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, which had lately arrived from Lynchburg. Along the edge of a pine thicket, in rear of and equidistant from McLean’s and Blackburn’s Fords, ready to support either position, I had also placed all of Bee’s and Bartow’s brigades that had arrived, namely: Two companies of the Eleventh Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell; the Second Mississippi, Colonel Falkner, and Fourth Alabama, with Seventh and Eighth Georgia Regiments, Colonel Gartrell and Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner–in all two thousand seven hundred and thirty-two bayonets. Bonham’s brigade, as before, held Mitchell’s Ford, its right near Longstreet’s left, its left extending in the direction of Cocke’s right. It was organized as at the end of the 18th of July, with Jackson’s brigade, as before said, as a support.

Cocke’s brigade, increased by seven companies of the Eighth, Hunton’s, three companies of the Forty-ninth, Smith’s, Virginia Regiments, two companies of cavalry, and a battery, under Rogers, of four 6-pounders, occupied the line in front and rear of Bull Run, extending from the direction of Bonham’s left, and guarding Island, Ball’s, and Lewis’ Fords, to the right of Evans’ demi-brigade, near the stone bridge, also under General Cooke’s command. The latter held the stone bridge, and its left covered a farm ford about one mile above the bridge.

Stuart’s Cavalry, some three hundred men of the Army of the Shenandoah, guarded the level ground extending in rear from Bonham’s left to Cocke’s right.

Two companies of Radford’s cavalry were held in reserve a short distance in rear of Mitchell’s Ford, his left extending in the direction of Stuart’s right.

Colonel Pendleton’s reserve battery of eight pieces was temporarily placed in rear of Bonham’s extreme left.

Major Walton’s reserve battery of five guns was in position on McLean’s farm in a piece of woods in rear of Bee’s right.

Hampton’s Legion, of six companies of infantry, 600 strong, having arrived that morning by the cars from Richmond, was subsequently, as soon as it arrived, ordered forward to a position in the immediate vicinity of the Lewis house as a support for any troops engaged in that quarter.

The effective force of all arms of the Army of the Potomac on that eventful morning, including the garrison at Camp Pickens, did not exceed 21,833 and 29 guns. The Army of the Shenandoah, ready for action on the field, may be set at 6,000 men and 20 guns. (That is, when the battle began. Smith’s brigade and Fisher’s North Carolina came up later, and made total of Army of the Shenandoah engaged, of all arms, 8,334. Hill’s Virginia Regiment, 550, also arrived, but was posted as reserve to right flank.) The brigade of General Holmes mustered about 1,265 bayonets, 6 guns, and a company of cavalry about 90 strong.

Informed at 5.30 a.m. by Colonel Evans that the enemy had deployed some twelve hundred men (these were what Colonel Evans saw of General Schenck’s brigade of General Tyler’s division and two other heavy brigades—in all over nine thousand men and thirteen pieces of artillery, Carlisle’s and Ayres’ batteries; that is, nine hundred men and two 6-pounders, confronted by nine thousand men and thirteen pieces of artillery, mostly rifled) with several pieces of artillery in his immediate front, I at once ordered him, as also General Cooke, if attacked, to maintain their position to the last extremity.

In my opinion the most effective method of relieving that flank was by a rapid, determined attack with my right wing and center on the enemy’s flank and rear at Centreville, with due precautions against the advance of his reserves from the direction of Washington. By such a movement I confidently expected to achieve a complete victory for my country by 12 m.

These new dispositions were submitted to General Johnston, who fully approved them, and the orders for their immediate execution were at once issued.

Brigadier-General Ewell was directed to begin the movement, to be followed and supported successively by Generals D. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham, respectively, supported by their several appointed reserves. The cavalry, under Stuart and Radford, were to be held in hand, subject to future orders and ready for employment, as might be required by the exigencies of the battle.

About 8.30 a.m. General Johnston and myself transferred our headquarters to a central position, about half a mile in rear of Mitchell’s Ford, whence we might watch the course of events. Previously, as early as 5.30, the Federalists in front of Evans’ position (stone bridge) had opened with a large 30-pounder Parrott rifled gun, and thirty minutes later with a moderate, apparently tentative, fire from a battery of rifled pieces, directed first in front of Evans’, and then in the direction of Cocke’s position, but without drawing a return fire and discovery of our positions, chiefly because in that quarter we had nothing but eight 6 pounder pieces, which could not reach the distant enemy.

As the Federalists had advanced with an extended line of skirmishers in front of Evans, that officer promptly threw forward the two flank companies of the Fourth South Carolina Regiment and one company of Wheat’s Louisiana Battalion, deployed as skirmishers to cover his small front. An occasional scattering fire resulted, and thus the two armies in that quarter remained for more than an hour, while the main body of the enemy was marching his devious way through the Big Forest to take our forces in flank and rear.

By 8.30 a.m. Colonel Evans, having become satisfied of the counterfeit character of the movement on his front, and persuaded of an attempt to turn his left flank, decided to change his position to meet the enemy, and for this purpose immediately put in motion to his left and rear six companies of Sloan’s Fourth South Carolina Regiment, Wheat’s Louisiana Battalion’s five companies, and two 6-pounders of Latham’s battery, leaving four companies of Sloan’s regiment under cover as the sole immediate defense of the stone bridge, but giving information to General Cocke of his change of position and the red, sons that impelled it.

Following a road leading by the old Pittsylvania (Carter) mansion, Colonel Evans formed in line of battle some four hundred yards in rear, as he advanced, of that house, his guns to the front and in position, properly supported, to its immediate right. Finding, however, that the enemy did not appear on that road, which was a branch of one leading by Sudley Springs Ford to Brentsville and Dumfries, he turned abruptly to the left, and marching across the fields for three-quarters of a mile, about 9.30 a.m. took a position in line of battle, his left, Sloan’s companies, resting on the main Brentsville road in a shallow ravine, the Louisiana Battalion to the right, in advance some two hundred yards, a rectangular copse of wood separating them, one piece of his artillery planted on an eminence some seven hundred yards to the rear of Wheat’s battalion, and the other on a ridge near and in rear of Sloan’s position, commanding a reach of the road just in front of the line of battle. In this order he awaited the coming of the masses of the enemy, now drawing near.

In the mean time, about 7 o’clock a.m., Jackson’s brigade, with Imboden’s and five pieces of Walton’s battery, had been sent to take up a position along Bull Run, to guard the interval between Cooke’s right and Bonham’s left, with orders to support either in case of need, the character and topographical features of the ground having been shown to General Jackson by Capt. D. B. Harris, of the engineers, of this army corps. So much of Bee’s and Bartow’s brigades, now united, as had arrived, some 2,800 muskets, had also been sent forward to the support of the position of the stone bridge.

The enemy, beginning his detour from the turnpike at a point nearly half-way between stone bridge and Centreville, had pursued a tortuous, narrow trace of a rarely-used road through a dense wood the greater part of his way until near the Sudley road. A division under Colonel Hunter, of the Federal Regular Army, of two strong brigades, was in the advance, followed immediately by another division, under Colonel Heintzelman, of three brigades and seven companies of Regular Cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of artillery, eighteen of which were rifled guns. This column, as it crossed Bull Run, numbered over sixteen thousand men of all arms by their own accounts.

Burnside’s brigade–which here, as at Fairfax Court-House, led the advance–at about 9.45 a.m. debouched from a wood in sight of Evans’ position, some five hundred yards distant from Wheat’s battalion. He immediately threw forward his skirmishers in force, and they became engaged with Wheat’s command, and the 6-pounder gun under Lieutenant Leftwitch. The Federalists at once advanced–as they report officially–the Second Rhode Island Regiment Volunteers, with its vaunted battery of six 13-pounder rifled guns. Sloan’s companies were then brought into action, having been pushed forward through the woods. The enemy, soon galled and staggered by the fire and pressed by the determined valor with which Wheat handled his battalion until he was desperately wounded, hastened up three other regiments of the brigade and two Dahlgren howitzers, making in all quite three thousand five hundred bayonets and eight pieces of artillery, opposed to less than eight hundred men and two 6-pounder guns. Despite this odds, this intrepid command, of but eleven weak companies, maintained its front to the enemy for quite an hour, and until General Bee came to their aid with his command. The heroic Bee, with a soldier’s eye and recognition of the situation, had previously disposed his command with skill, Imboden’s battery having been admirably placed between the two brigades, under shelter, behind the undulations of a hill about one hundred and fifty yards north of the now famous Henry house, and very near where he subsequently fell mortally wounded, to the great misfortune of his country, but after deeds of deliberate and ever-memorable courage. Meanwhile the enemy had pushed forward a battalion of eight companies of regular infantry, and one of their best batteries of six pieces (four rifled), supported by four companies of marines, to increase the desperate odds against which Evans and his men had maintained their stand with an almost matchless tenacity. General Bee, now finding Evans sorely pressed under the crushing weight of the masses of the enemy, at the call of Colonel Evans threw forward his whole force to his aid across a small stream (Young’s Branch and Valley), and engaged the Federalists with impetuosity, Imboden’s battery at the time playing from his well-chosen position with brilliant effect with spherical case, the enemy having first opened on him from a rifle battery (probably Griffin’s) with elongated cylindrical shells, which flew a few feet over the heads of our men and exploded in the crest of the hill immediately in rear.

As Bee advanced under a severe fire he placed the Seventh and Eighth Georgia Regiments under the chivalrous Bartow, at about 11 a.m. in a wood of second-growth pines, to the right and front of and nearly perpendicular to Evans  line of battle; the Fourth Alabama to the left of them, along a fence, connecting the position of the Georgia regiments with the rectangular copse in which Sloan’s South Carolina companies were engaged? and into which he also threw the Second Mississippi. A fierce and destructive conflict now ensued. The fire was withering on both sides, while the enemy swept our short thin lines with their numerous artillery, which, according to their official reports, at this time consisted of at least ten rifled guns and four howitzers. For an hour did these stout-hearted men of the blended commands of Bee, Evans, and Barrow breast an unintermitting battle-storm, animated surely by something more than the ordinary courage of even the bravest men under fire. It must have been indeed the inspiration of the cause and consciousness of the great stake at issue which thus nerved and animated one and all to stand unawed and unshrinking in such extremity.

Two Federal brigades of Heintzelman’s division were now brought into action, led by Ricketts” superb light battery of six 10-pounder rifled guns, which, posted on an eminence to the right of the Sudley road, opened fire on Imboden’s battery–about this time increased by two rifled pieces of the Washington Artillery under Lieutenant Richardson, and already the mark of two batteries, which divided their fire with Imboden and two guns under Lieutenants Davidson and Leftwitch, of Latham’s battery, posted as before mentioned. At this time confronting the enemy we had still but Evans’ eleven companies and two guns, Bee’s and Bartow’s four regiments, the two companies Eleventh Mississippi under Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell, and the six pieces under Imboden and Richardson. The enemy had two divisions of four strong brigades, including seventeen companies of regular infantry, cavalry, and artillery, four companies of marines, and twenty pieces of artillery. (See official reports of Colonels Heintzelman, Porter, &c.) Against this odds, scarcely credible, our advance position was still for a while maintained, and the enemy’s ranks constantly broken and shattered under the scorching fire of our men; but fresh regiments of the Federalists came upon the field. Sherman’s and Keyes’ brigades of Tyler’s division, as is stated in their reports, numbering over six thousand bayonets, which had found a passage across the run about eight hundred yards above the stone bridge, threatened our right.

Heavy losses bad now been sustained on our side both in numbers and in the personal worth of the slain. The Eighth Georgia Regiment had suffered heavily, being exposed, as it took and maintained its position, to a fire from the enemy, already posted within a hundred yards of their front and right, sheltered by fences and other cover. It was at this time that Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner was severely wounded, as also several other valuable officers. The adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Branch, was killed, and the horse of the regretted Barrow was shot under him. The Fourth Alabama also suffered severely from the deadly fire of the thousands of muskets which they so dauntlessly confronted under the immediate leadership of Bee himself. Its brave colonel (E. J. Jones) was dangerously wounded, and many gallant officers fell, slain or hors de combat.

Now, however, with the surging mass of over fourteen thousand Federal infantry pressing on their front and under the incessant fire of at least twenty pieces of artillery, with the fresh brigades of Sherman and Keyes approaching, the latter already in musket range, our lines gave back, but under orders from General Bee. The enemy, maintaining their fire, pressed their swelling masses onward as our shattered battalions retired. The slaughter for the moment was deplorable, and has filled many a Southern home with life-long sorrow. Under this inexorable stress the retreat continued, until arrested by the energy and resolution of General Bee, supported by Barrow and Evans, just in rear of the Robinson house, and Hampton’s Legion, which had been already advanced and was in position near it. Imboden’s battery, which had been handled with marked skill, but whose men were almost exhausted, and the two pieces of Walton’s battery, under Lieutenant Richardson, being threatened by the enemy’s infantry on the left and front, were also obliged to fall back. Imboden, leaving a disabled piece on the ground, retired until he met Jackson’s brigade, while Richardson joined the main body of his battery near the Lewis house.

As our infantry retired from the extreme front the two 6-pounders of Latham’s battery before mentioned fell back with excellent judgment to suitable positions in the rear, where an effective fire was maintained upon the still advancing lines of the Federalists with damaging effect until their ammunition was nearly exhausted, when they too were withdrawn in the near presence of the enemy and rejoined their captain.

From the point, previously indicated, where General Johnston and myself had established our headquarters, we heard the continuous roll of musketry and the sustained din of the artillery, which announced the serious outburst of the battle on our left flank, and we anxiously but confidently awaited similar sounds of conflict from our front at Centreville, resulting from the prescribed attack in that quarter by our right wing.

At 10:30 a.m., however, this expectation was dissipated, from Brigadier-General Ewell informing me, to my profound disappointment, that my orders for his advance had miscarried, but that in consequence of a communication from Gen. D. R. Jones he had just thrown his brigade across the stream at Union Mills. But in my judgment it was now too late for the effective execution of the contemplated movement, which must have required quite three hours for the troops to get into position for the attack. Therefore it became immediately necessary to depend on new combinations and other dispositions suited to the now pressing exigency. The movement of the right and center, already begun by Jones and Longstreet, was at once countermanded with the sanction of General Johnston, and we arranged to meet the enemy on the field upon which he had chosen to give us battle.

Under these circumstances our reserves not already in movement were immediately ordered up to support our left flank, namely, Holmes’ two regiments and battery of artillery, under Capt. Lindsey Walker, of six guns, and Early’s brigade. Two regiments from Bonham’s brigade, with Kemper’s four 6-pounders, were also called for and, with the sanction of General Johnston, Generals Ewell, Jones (D. R.), Longstreet, and Bonham were directed to make a demonstration to their several fronts, to retain and engross the enemy’s reserves and any forces on their flank and at and around Centreville. Previously our respective chiefs of staff, Major Rhett and Colonel Jordan, had been left at my headquarters to hasten up and give directions to any troops that might arrive at Manassas.

These orders having been duly dispatched by staff officers, at 11.30 a.m. General Johnston and myself set out for the immediate field of action, which we reached in the rear of the Robinson and Widow Henry’s houses at about 12 m., and just as the commands of Bee, Bar-tow, and Evans had taken shelter in a wooded ravine behind the former, stoutly held at the time by Hampton with his Legion, which had made stand there after having previously been as far forward as the turnpike, where Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, an officer of brilliant promise, was killed, and other severe losses were sustained.

Before our arrival upon the scene General Jackson had moved forward with his brigade of five Virginia regiments from his position in reserve, and had judiciously taken post below the brim of the plateau, nearly east of the Henry house, and to the left of the ravine and woods occupied by the mingled remnants of Bee’s, Bartow’s, and Evans’ commands, with Imboden’s battery and two of Stanard’s pieces placed so as to play upon the on-coming enemy, supported in the immediate rear by Col. J. F. Preston’s and Lieutenant-Colonel Echols’ regiments, on the right by Harper’s, and on the left by Allen’s and Cummings’ regiments.

As soon as General Johnston and myself reached the field we were occupied with the reorganization of the heroic troops, whose previous stand, with scarce a parallel, has nothing more valiant in all the pages of history, and whose losses fitly tell why at length their ranks had lost their cohesion.

It was now that General Johnston impressively and gallantly charged to the front, with the colors of the Fourth Alabama Regiment by his side, all the field officers of the regiment having been previously disabled. Shortly afterwards I placed S. R. Gist, adjutant and inspector general of South Carolina, a volunteer aide of General Bee, in command of this regiment, and who led it again to the front as became its previous behavior, and remained with it for the rest of the day.

As soon as we had thus rallied and disposed our forces, I urged General Johnston to leave the immediate conduct of the field to me, while he, repairing to Portici, the Lewis house, should urge re-enforcement–forward. At first he was unwilling, but reminded that one of us must do so, and that properly it was his place, he reluctantly, but fortunately, complied; fortunately, because from that position, by his energy and sagacity, his keen perception and anticipation of my needs, he so directed the reserves as to insure the success of the day.

As General Johnston departed for Portici, Colonel Bartow reported to me with the remains of the Seventh Georgia Volunteers, Gartrell’s, which I ordered him to post on the left of Jackson’s line in the edge of the belt of pines bordering the southeastern rim of the plateau, on which the battle was now to rage so long and so fiercely.

Col. William Smith’s battalion of the Forty-ninth Virginia Volunteers, having also come up by my orders, I placed it on the left of Gartrell’s, as my extreme left at the time. Repairing then to the right, I placed Hampton’s Legion, which have suffered greatly, on that flank somewhat to the rear of Harper’s regiment, and also the seven companies of the Eighth (Hunton’s) Virginia Regiment, which, detached from Cocke’s brigade by my orders and those of General Johnston, had opportunely reached the ground. These, with Harper’s regiment, constituted a reserve to protect our right flank from an advance of the enemy from the quarter of the stone bridge, and served as a support for the line of battle, which was formed on the right by Bee’s and Evans’ commands, in the center by four regiments of Jackson’s brigade, with Imboden’s four 6-pounders, Walton’s five guns (two rifled), two guns (one piece rifled) of Stanard’s, and two 6-pounders of Rogers’ batteries, the latter under Lieutenant Heaton, and on the left by Gartrell’s reduced ranks and Colonel Smith’s battalion, subsequently re-enforced, Falkner’s Second Mississippi Regiment, and by another regiment of the Army of the Shenandoah, just arrived upon the field–the Sixth (Fisher’s) North Carolina. Confronting the enemy at this time my forces numbered at most not more than sixty-five hundred infantry and artillerists, with but thirteen pieces of artillery and two companies (Carter’s and Hoge’s) of Stuart’s Cavalry.

The enemy’s force now bearing hotly and confidently down on our position, regiment after regiment of the best-equipped men that ever took the field according to their own official history of the day, was formed of Colonels Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s divisions, Colonels Sherman’s and Keyes’ brigades of Tyler’s division, and of the formidable batteries of Ricketts, Griffin, and Arnold (regulars), and Second Rhode Island and two Dahlgren howitzers–a force of over twenty thousand infantry, seven companies of regular cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of improved artillery. At the same time perilous heavy reserves of infantry and artillery hung in the distance around the stone bridge, Mitchell’s, Blackburn’s, and Union Mills Fords, visibly ready to fall upon us at any moment, and I was also assured of the existence of other heavy corps at and around Centreville and elsewhere within convenient supporting distances.

Fully conscious of this portentous disparity of force, as I posted the lines for the encounter I sought to infuse into the hearts of my officers and men the confidence and determined spirit of resistance to this wicked invasion of the homes of a free people which I felt. I informed them that re-enforcements would rapidly come to their support, and that we must at all hazards hold our posts until re-enforced. I reminded them that we fought for our homes, our firesides, and for the independence of our country. I urged them to the resolution of victory or death on that field. These sentiments were loudly, eagerly cheered wheresoever proclaimed, and I then felt reassured of the unconquerable spirit of that army, which would enable us to wrench victory from the host then threatening us with destruction.

Oh, my country! I would readily have sacrificed my life and those of all the brave men around me to save your honor and to maintain your independence from the degrading yoke which those ruthless invaders had come to impose and render perpetual, and the day’s issue has assured me that such emotions must also have animated all under my command.

In the mean time the enemy had seized upon the plateau on which Robinson’s and the Henry houses are situated–the position first occupied in the morning by General Bee before advancing to the support of Evans. Ricketts’ battery of six rifled guns, the pride of the Federalists, the object of their unstinted expenditure in outfit, and the equally powerful regular light battery of Griffin, were brought forward and placed in immediate action, after having, conjointly with the batteries already mentioned, played from former positions with destructive effect upon our forward battalions.

The topographical features of the plateau, now become the stage of the contending armies, must be described in outline. A glance at the map will show that it is inclosed on three sides by small water-courses, which empty into Bull Run within a few yards of each other a half a mile to the south of the stone bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite one hundred feet above the level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three sides to the level of the inclosing streams in gentle slopes, but which are furrowed by ravines of irregular direction and length, and studded with clumps and patches of young pines and oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is oblique to the course of Bull Run in that quarter and to the Brentsville and turnpike roads, which intersect each other at right angles. Immediately surrounding the two houses before mentioned are small open fields of irregular outline, not exceeding one hundred and fifty acres in extent. The houses, occupied at the time, the one by the Widow Henry and the other by the free negro Robinson, are small wooden buildings, the latter densely embowered in trees and environed by a double row of fences on two sides. Around the eastern and southern brow of the plateau an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth pines gave excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of it with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining the fields, a broad belt of oaks extends directly across the crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which during the battle regiments of both armies met and contended for the mastery. From the open ground of this plateau the view embraces a wide expanse of woods and gently undulating open country of broad grass and grain fields in all directions, including the scene of Evans’ and Bee’s recent encounter with the enemy, some twelve hundred yards to the northward.

In reply to the play of the enemy’s batteries our own artillery had not been either idle or unskillful. The ground occupied by our guns, on a level with that held by the batteries of the enemy, was an open space of limited extent, behind a low undulation just at the eastern verge of the plateau, some live or six hundred yards from the Henry house. Here, as before said, thirteen pieces, mostly 6-pounders, were, maintained in action; the several batteries of Imboden, Stanard, Pendleton (Rockbridge Artillery), and Alburtis, of the Army of the Shenandoah, and five guns of Walton’s and Heaton’s section of Rogers’ battery of the Army of the Potomac, alternating to some extent with each other, and taking part as needed, all from the outset displaying that marvelous capacity of our people as artillerists which has made them, it would appear, at once the terror and the admiration of the enemy. As was soon apparent, the Federalists had suffered severely from our artillery and from the fire of our musketry on the right, and especially from the left flank, placed under cover, within whose galling range they had been advanced; and we are told in their official reports how regiment after regiment thrown forward to dislodge us was broken, never to recover its entire organization on that field.

In the mean time, also, two companies of Stuart’s Cavalry ((Carter’s and Hoge’s) made a dashing charge down the Brentsville and Sudley road upon the Fire Zouaves, then the enemy’s right; on the plateau, which added to their disorder wrought by our musketry on that flank. But still the press of the enemy was heavy in that quarter of the field as fresh troops were thrown forward there to outflank us, and some three guns of a battery in an attempt to obtain a position, apparently to enfilade our batteries, were thrown so close to the Thirty-third Regiment, Jackson’s brigade, that that regiment, springing forward, seized them, but with severe loss, and was subsequently driven back by an overpowering force of Federal musketry.

Now, full 2 o’clock p.m., I gave the order for the right of my line, except my reserves, to advance to recover the plateau. It was done with uncommon resolution and vigor, and at the same time Jackson’s brigade pierced the enemy’s center with the determination of veterans and the spirit of men who fight for a sacred cause, but it suffered seriously. With equal spirit the other parts of the line made the onset, and the Federal lines were broken and swept back at all points from the open ground of the plateau. Rallying soon, however, as they were strongly re-enforced by fresh regiments, the Federalists returned, and by weight of numbers pressed our lines back, recovered their ground and guns, and renewed the offensive.

By this time, between half past two and 3 o’clock p.m., our re-enforcements pushed forward, and, directed by General Johnston to the required quarter, were at hand just as I had ordered forward to a second effort for the recovery of the disputed plateau the whole line, including my reserve, which at this crisis of the battle I felt called upon to lead in person. This attack was general, and was shared in by every regiment then in the field, including the Sixth (Fisher’s) Worth Carolina Regiment, which had just come up and taken position on the immediate left of the Forty-ninth Virginia Regiment. The whole open ground was again swept clear of the enemy, and the plateau around the Henry and Robinson houses remained finally in our possession with the greater part of the Ricketts and Griffin batteries, and a flag of the First Michigan Regiment, captured by the Twenty-seventh Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Echols, of Jackson’s brigade.

This part of the day was rich with deeds of individual coolness and dauntless conduct, as well as well-directed embodied resolution and bravery, but fraught with the loss to the service of the country of lives of inestimable preciousness at this juncture. The brave Bee was mortally wounded at the head of the Fourth Alabama and some Mississippians. In the open field near the Henry house, and a few yards distant, the promising life of Bartow, while leading the Seventh Georgia Regiment, was quenched in blood. Col. F. J. Thomas, acting chief of ordnance, of General Johnston’s staff, after gallant conduct and most efficient service, was also slain. Colonel Fisher, Sixth North Carolina, likewise fell, after soldierly behavior at the head of his regiment with ranks greatly thinned.

Withers’ Eighteenth Regiment, of Cocke’s brigade, had come up in time to follow this charge, and, in conjunction with Hampton’s Legion, captured several rifled pieces, which may have fallen previously in possession of some of our troops, but if so, had been recovered by the enemy. These pieces were immediately turned and effectively served on distant masses of the enemy by the hands of some of our officers.

While the enemy had thus been driven back on our right entirely across the turnpike and beyond Young’s Branch on our left, the woods yet swarmed with them when our re-enforcements opportunely arrived in quick succession and took position in that portion of the field. Kershaw’s Second and Cash’s Eighth South Carolina Regiments, which had arrived soon after Withers, were led through the oaks just east of the Sudley-Brentsville road, brushing some of the enemy before them, and taking an advantageous position along and west of that road, opened with much skill and effect on bodies of the enemy that had been rallied under cover of a strong Federal brigade posted on a plateau in the southwest angle formed by intersection of the turnpike with the Sudley-Brentsville road. Among the troops thus engaged were the Federal regular infantry.

At the same time Kemper’s battery, passing northward by the Sudley-Brentsville road, took position on the open space, under orders of Colonel Kershaw, near where an enemy’s battery had been captured, and was opened with effective results upon the Federal right, then the mark also of Kershaw’s and Cash’s regiments. Preston’s Twenty-eighth Regiment, of Cocke’s brigade, had by that time entered the same body of oaks, and encountered some Michigan troops, capturing their brigade commander, Colonel Willcox.

Another important accession to our forces had also occurred about the same time, 3 o’clock p.m. Brig. Gen. E. K. Smith, with some seventeen hundred infantry, of Elzey’s brigade, of the Army of the Shenandoah, and Beckham’s battery came upon the field from Camp Pickens, Manassas, where they had arrived by railroad at noon. Directed in person by General Johnston to the left, then so much endangered, on reaching a position in rear of the oak woods, south of the Henry house, and immediately east of the Sudley road, General Smith was disabled by a severe wound, and his valuable services were lost at that critical juncture; but the command devolved upon a meritorious officer of experience, Colonel Elzey, who led his infantry at once somewhat farther to the left, in the direction of the Chinn house, across the road, through the oaks skirting the west side of the road, and around which he sent the battery, under Lieutenant Beckham. This officer took up a most favorable position near that house, whence, with a clear view of the Federal right and center, filling the open fields to the west of the Brentsville-Sudley road and gently sloping southward, he opened fire with his battery upon them with deadly and damaging effect.

Colonel Early, who by some mischance did not receive orders until 2 o’clock which had been sent him at noon, came on the ground immediately after Elzey, with Kemper’s Seventh Virginia, Hays’ Seventh Louisiana, and Barksdale’s Thirteenth Mississippi Regiments. This brigade, by the personal direction of General Johnston, was marched by the Holkham house across the fields to the left, entirely around the woods through which Elzey had passed, and under a severe fire, into a position in line of battle near Chinn’s house, outflanking the enemy’s right.

At this time, about 3.30 p, m., the enemy, driven back on their left and center and brushed from the woods bordering the Sudley road, south and west of the Henry house, had formed a line of battle of truly formidable proportions, of crescent outline, reaching on their left from vicinity of Pittsylvania (the old Carter mansion), by Mathews’ and in rear of Dogan’s, across the turnpike near to Chinn’s house. The woods and fields were filled with their masses of infantry a and their carefully-preserved cavalry. It was a truly magnificent, though redoubtable, spectacle as they threw forward in flue style on the broad, gentle slopes of the ridge occupied by their main lines a cloud of skirmishers, preparatory for another attack.

But as Early formed his line, and Beckham’s pieces played upon the right of the enemy, Elzey’s brigade, Gibbons’ Tenth Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Steuart’s First Maryland, and Vaughn’s Third Tennessee Regiments, Cash’s Eighth and Kershaw’s Second South Carolina, Withers, Eighteenth and Preston’s Twenty-eighth Virginia advanced in an irregular line, almost simultaneously, with great spirit from their several positions upon the front and flanks of the enemy in their quarter of the field. At the same time, too, Early resolutely assailed their right flank and rear. Under this combined attack the enemy was soon forced first over the narrow plateau in the southern angle made by the two roads so often mentioned into a patch of woods on its western slope, thence back over Young’s Branch and the turnpike into the fields of the Dogan farm and rearward, in extreme disorder in all available directions towards Bull Run. The rout had now become general and complete.

About the time that Elzey and Early were entering into action a column of the enemy (Keyes’ brigade, of Tyler’s division) made its way across the turnpike between Bull Run and the Robinson house, under cover of a wood and brow of the ridges, apparently to turn my right, but was easily repulsed by a few shots from Latham’s battery, now united and placed in position by Capt. D. B. Harris, of the Virginia engineers, whose services during the day became his character as an able, cool, an(. skillful officer, and from Alburtis’ battery, opportunely ordered by General Jackson to a position to the right of Latham, on a hill commanding the line of approach of the enemy, and supported by portions of regiments collected together by the staff officers of General Johnston and myself.

Early’s brigade, meanwhile, joined by the Nineteenth Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Strange, of Cockers brigade, pursued the now panic-stricken fugitive enemy. Stuart, with his cavalry and Beckham had also taken up the pursuit along the road by which the enemy had come upon the field that morning, but soon, cumbered by prisoners who thronged his way, the former was unable to attack the mass of the fast-fleeing, frantic Federalists. Withers’, R. T. Preston’s, Cash’s, and Kershaw’s regiments, Hampton’s Legion, and Kemper’s battery also pursued along the Warrenton road by the stone bridge, the enemy having opportunely opened a way for them through the heavy abatis which my troops had made on the west side of the bridge several days before; but this pursuit was soon recalled in consequence of a false report which unfortunately reached us that the enemy’s reserves, known to be fresh and of considerable strength, were threatening the position of Union Mills Ford.

Colonel Radford, with six companies Virginia Cavalry, was also ordered by General Johnston to cross Bull Run and attack the enemy from the direction of Lewis’ house. Conducted by one of my aides, Colonel Chisolm, by the Lewis Ford to the immediate vicinity of the suspension bridge, he charged a battery with great gallantry, took Colonel Corcoran, of the Sixty-ninth Regiment New York Volunteers, a prisoner, and captured the Federal colors of that regiment, as well as a number of the enemy. He lost, however, a promising officer of his regiment, Capt. Winston Radford.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mumford also led some companies of cavalry in hot pursuit, and rendered material service in the capture of prisoners and of cannon, horses, ammunition, &c., abandoned by the enemy in their flight. Captain Lay’s company of the Powhatan Troops and Utterback’s Rangers, Virginia Volunteers, attached to my person, did material service under Captain Lay in rallying troops broken for the time by the onset of the enemy’s masses.

During the period of the momentous events, fraught with the weal of our country, which were passing on the blood-stained plateau along the Sudley and Warrenton roads, other portions of the line of Bull Run had not been void of action of moment and of influence on the general result.

While Colonel Evans and his sturdy band were holding at bay the Federal advance beyond the turnpike the enemy made repeated demonstrations with artillery and infantry upon the line of Cooke’s brigade, with the serious intention of forcing the position, as General Schenck admits in his report. They were driven back with severe loss by Latham’s (a section) and Rogers’ four 6-pounders, and were so impressed with the strength of that line as to be held in check and inactive even after it had been stripped of all its troops but one company of the Nineteenth Virginia Regiment, under Captain Duke, a meritorious officer; and it is worthy of notice that in this encounter of our 6-pounder guns, handled by our volunteer artillerists, they had worsted such a notorious adversary as the Ayres (formerly Sherman’s) battery, which quit the contest under the illusion that it had weightier metal than its own to contend with.

The center brigades, Bonham’s and Longstreet’s, of the line of Bull Run, if not closely engaged, were, nevertheless, exposed for much of the day to an annoying, almost incessant fire of artillery of long range; but, by a steady, veteran-like maintenance of their positions, they held virtually paralyzed all day two strong brigades of the enemy with their batteries (four) of rifled guns.

As before said, two regiments of Bonham’s brigade–Second and Eighth South Carolina Volunteers-and Kemper’s battery took a distinguished part in the battle. The remainder–Third (Williams’), Seventh (Bacon’s) South Carolina Volunteers, Eleventh (Kirkland’s) North Carolina Regiment, six companies of the Eighth Louisiana Volunteers, Shields’ battery, and one Section of Walton’s battery, under Lieutenant Garnett–whether in holding their post or taking up the pursuit, officers and men discharged their duty with credit and promise.

Longstreet’s brigade, pursuant to orders prescribing his part of the operations of the center and right wing, was thrown across Bull Run early in the morning, and under a severe fire of artillery was skillfully disposed for the assault of the enemy’s batteries in that quarter, but was withdrawn subsequently, in consequence of the change of plan already mentioned and explained. The troops of this brigade were–First (Major Skinner), Eleventh (Garland’s), Twenty-fourth (Lieutenant-Colonel Hairston), Seventeenth (Corse’s) Virginia Regiments; Fifth North Carolina (Lieutenant-Colonel Jones), and Whitehead’s company Virginia Cavalry. Throughout the day these troops evinced the most soldierly spirit.

After the rout, having been ordered by General Johnston in the direction of Centreville in pursuit, these brigades advanced nearly to that place, when, night and darkness intervening, General Bonham thought it proper to direct his own brigade and that of General Longstreet back to Bull Run.

General D. R. Jones early in the day crossing Bull Run with his brigade, pursuant to orders indicating his part in the projected attack by our right wing and center on the enemy at Centreville, took up a position on the Union Hills and Centreville road more than a mile in advance of the run. Ordered back, in consequence of the miscarriage of the orders to General Ewell, the retrograde movement was necessarily made under a sharp fire of artillery.

At noon this brigade, in obedience to new instructions, was again thrown across Bull Run to make demonstration. Unsupported by other troops, the advance was gallantly made until within musket range of the enemy’s force–Colonel Davies’ brigade, in position near Rocky Run–and under the concentrated fire of their artillery. In this affair the Fifth, (Jenkins’) South Carolina and Captain Fontaine’s company of the Eighteenth Mississippi Regiment are mentioned by General Jones as having shown conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and discipline under a combined fire of infantry and artillery. Not only did the return fire of the brigade drive to cover the enemy’s infantry, but the movement unquestionably spread through the enemy’s ranks a sense of insecurity and danger from an attack by that route on their rear at Centreville, which served to augment the extraordinary panic which we know disbanded the entire Federal Army for the time. This is evident from the fact that Colonel Davies, the immediate adversary’s commander, in his official report, was induced to magnify one small company of our cavalry which accompanied the brigade into a force of 2,000 men, and Colonel Miles, the commander of the Federal reserves at Centreville, says the movement caused painful apprehensions for the left flank of their army.

General Ewell, occupying for the time the right of the lines of Bull Run, at Union Mills Ford, after the miscarriage of my orders for his advance upon Centreville, in the afternoon was ordered by General Johnston to bring up his brigade into battle, then raging on the left flank. Promptly executed as this movement was, the brigade, after a severe march, reached the field too late to share the glories as they had the labors of the day.  As the important position at the Union Mills had been left with but a slender guard, General Ewell was at once ordered to retrace his steps and resume his position,. to prevent the possibility of its seizure by any force of the enemy in that quarter. Brigadier-General Holmes, left with his brigade as a support to the same position in the original plan of battle, had also been called to the left, whither he marched with the utmost speed, but not in time to join actively in the battle. Walker’s rifled guns of the brigade, however, came up in time to be fired with precision and decided execution at the retreating enemy, and Scott’s cavalry, joining in the pursuit, assisted in the capture of prisoners and war munitions.

This victory, the details of which I have thus sought to chronicle as fully as were fitting an official report, it remains to record was dearly won by the death of many officers and men of inestimable value, belonging to all grades of our society. In the death of General Barnard E. Bee the Confederacy has sustained an irreparable loss, for, with great personal bravery and coolness, he possessed the qualities of an accomplished soldier and an able, reliable commander. Colonels Bartow and Fisher and Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, of Hampton’s Legion, in the fearless command of their men, gave earnest of great usefulness to the service had they been spared to complete a career so brilliantly begun. Besides the field officers already mentioned as having been wounded while in the gallant discharge of their duties, many others also received severe wounds, after equally honorable and distinguished conduct, whether in leading their men forward or in rallying them when overpowered or temporarily shattered by the largely superior force to which we were generally opposed.

The subordinate grades were likewise abundantly conspicuous for zeal and capacity for the leadership of men in arms. To mention all who, fighting well, paid the lavish forfeit of their lives, or at least crippled, mutilated bodies, on the field of Manassas, cannot well be done within the compass of this paper; but a grateful country and mourning friends will not suffer their names and services to be forgotten and pass away unhonored.

Nor are those officers and men who were so fortunate as to escape the thick-flying deadly missiles of the enemy less worthy of praise for their endurance, firmness, and valor, than their brothers in arms whose lives were closed or bodies maimed on that memorable day. To mention all who exhibited ability and brilliant courage were impossible in this report; nor do the reports of brigade and other subordinate commanders supply full lists of all actually deserving of distinction. I can only mention those whose conduct came immediately under my notice or the consequence of whose actions happened to be signally important. It is fit that I should in this way commend to notice the dauntless conduct and imperturbable coolness of Colonel Evans, and well indeed was he supported by Colonel Sloan and the officers of the Fourth South Carolina Regiment, as also Major Wheat, than whom no one displayed more brilliant courage until carried from the field shot through the lungs, though happily not mortally stricken. But in the desperate, unequal conflict to which these brave gentlemen were for a time necessarily exposed, the behavior of officers and men generally was worthy of the highest admiration, and assuredly hereafter all there present may proudly say, We were of that band who fought the first hour of the battle of Manassas. Equal honors and credit must also be awarded in the pages of history to the gallant officers and men who, under Bee and Bartow, subsequently marching to their side, saved them from destruction, and relieved them from the brunt of the enemy’s attack.

The conduct of General Jackson also requires mention as eminently that of an able, fearless soldier and sagacious commander, one fit to lead his efficient brigade. His prompt, timely arrival before the plateau of the Henry house, and his judicious disposition of his troops, contributed much to the success of the day. Although painfully wounded in the hand, he remained on the field to the end of the battle, rendering invaluable assistance.

Col. William Smith was as efficient as self-possessed and brave. The influence of his example and his words of encouragement were not confined to his immediate command, the good conduct of which is especially noticeable, inasmuch as it had been embodied but a day or two before the battle.

Colonels Harper, Hunton, and Hampton, commanding regiments of the reserve, attracted my notice by their soldierly ability, as with their gallant commands they restored the fortunes of the day at a time when the enemy by a last desperate onset with heavy odds had driven our forces from the fiercely-contested ground around the Henry and Robinson houses. Veterans could not have behaved better than these well-led regiments.

High praise must also be given to Colonels Cocke, Early, and Elzey, brigade commanders; also to Colonel Kershaw, commanding for the time the Second and Eighth South Carolina Regiments. Under the instructions of General Johnston these officers reached the field at an opportune, critical moment, and disposed, handled, and fought their respective commands with sagacity, decision, and successful results, which have been described in detail.

Col. J. E. B. Stuart likewise deserves mention for his enterprise and ability as a cavalry commander. Through his judicious reconnaissance of the country on our left flank he acquired information, both of topographical features and the positions of the enemy, of the utmost importance in the subsequent and closing movements of the day on that flank, and his services in the pursuit were highly effective.

Capt. E. P. Alexander, C. S. Engineers, gave me seasonable and material assistance early in the day with his system of signals. Almost the first shot fired by the enemy passed through the tent of his party at the stone bridge, where they subsequently firmly maintained their position in the discharge of their duty–the transmission of messages of the enemy’s movements–for several hours under fire. Later, Captain Alexander acted as my aide-de-camp in the transmission of orders and in observation of the enemy.

I was most efficiently served throughout the day by my volunteer aides, Colonels Preston, Manning, Chesnut, Miles, Rice, Hayward, and Chisolm, to whom I tender my thanks for their unflagging, intelligent, and fearless discharge of the laborious, responsible duties Intrusted to them. To Lieut. S. W. Ferguson, aide-de-camp, and Colonel Hayward, who were habitually at my side from 12 noon until the close of the battle, my special acknowledgments are due. The horse of the former was killed under him by the same shell that wounded that of the latter. Both were eminently useful to me, and were distinguished for coolness and courage until the enemy gave way and fled in wild disorder in every direction–a scene the President of the Confederacy had the high satisfaction of witnessing, as he arrived upon the field at that exultant moment.

I also received from the time I reached the front such signal service from H. E. Peyton, at the time a private in the Loudoun Cavalry, that I have called him to my personal staff. Similar services were also rendered me repeatedly during the battle by T. J. Randolph, a volunteer acting aide-de-camp to Colonel Cocke. Capt. Clifton H. Smith, of the general staff, was also present on the field, and rendered efficient service in the transmission of orders.

It must be permitted me here to record my profound sense of my obligations to General Johnston for his generous permission to carry out my plans with such modifications as circumstances had required. From his services on the field as we entered it together, already mentioned, and his subsequent watchful management of the re-enforcements as they reached the vicinity of the field, our countrymen may draw the most auspicious auguries.

To Col. Thomas Jordan, my efficient and zealous assistant adjutant-general, much credit is due for his able assistance in the organization of the forces under my command and for the intelligence and promptness with which he has discharged all the laborious and important duties of his office.

Valuable assistance was given to me by Major Cabell, chief officer of the quartermaster’s department, in the sphere of his duties-duties environed by far more than the ordinary difficulties and embarrassments attending the operations of a long organized regular establishment.

Col. R. B. Lee, chief of subsistence department, had but just entered upon his duties, but his experience and long and varied services in his department made him as efficient as possible.

Capt. W. H. Fowle, whom Colonel Lee had relieved, had previously exerted himself to the utmost to carry out orders from these headquarters to render his department equal to the demands of the service. That it was not entirely so it is due to justice to say was certainly not his fault.

Deprived by the sudden severe illness of the medical director, Surg. Thomas H. Williams, his duties were discharged by Surg. R. L. Brodie to my entire satisfaction; and it is proper to say that the entire medical corps of the Army at present, embracing gentlemen of distinction in the profession, who had quit lucrative private practice, by their services in the field and subsequently did high honor to their profession.

The vital duties of the ordnance department were effectively discharged under the administration of my chief of artillery and ordnance, Col. S. Jones.

At one time, when reports of evil omen and disaster reached Camp Pickens with such circumstantiality as to give reasonable grounds of anxiety, its commander, Colonel Terrett, the commander of the intrenched batteries, Captain Sterrett, of the C. S. Navy, and their officers, made the most efficient possible preparations for the desperate defense of that position in extremity; and in this connection I regret my inability to mention the names of those patriotic gentlemen of Virginia by the gratuitous labor of whose slaves the intrenched camp at Manassas had been mainly constructed, relieving the troops from that laborious service, and giving opportunity for their military instruction.

Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Williamson, the engineer of these works, assisted by Capt. D. B. Harris, discharged his duties with untiring energy and devotion as well as satisfactory skill.

Capt. W. H. Stevens, engineer C. S. Army, served with the advanced forces at Fairfax Court-House for some time before the battle. He laid out the works there in admirable accordance with the purposes for which they were designed, and yet so as to admit of ultimate extension and adaptation to more serious uses as means and part of a system of real defense when determined upon. He has shown himself to be an officer of energy and ability.

Maj. Thomas G. Rhett, after having discharged for several months the laborious duties of adjutant-general to the commanding officer of Camp Pickens, was detached to join the Army of the Shenandoah just on the eve of the advance of the enemy, but volunteering his services, was ordered to assist on the staff of General Bonham, joining that officer at Centreville on the night of the 17th, before the battle of Bull Run, where he rendered valuable services, until the arrival of General Johnston, on the 20th of July, when he was called to the place of chief of staff of that officer. It is also proper to acknowledge the signal services rendered by Cols. B. F. Terry and T. Lubbock, of Texas, who had attached themselves to the staff of General Longstreet. These gentlemen made daring and valuable reconnaissances of the enemy’s positions, assisted by Captains Goree and Chichester; they also carried orders to the field, and on the following day accompanied Captain White-, head’s troop to take possession of Fairfax Court-House. Colonel Terry, with his unerring rifle, severed the halliard, and thus lowered the Federal flag found still floating from the cupola of the court-house there. He also secured a large Federal garrison flag, designed, it is said, to be unfurled over our intrenchments at Manassas.

In connection with the unfortunate casualty of the day, that is the miscarriage of the orders sent by courier to Generals Holmes and Ewell to attack the enemy in flank and reverse at Centreville, through which the triumph of our arms was prevented from being still more decisive, I regard it in place to say a divisional organization, with officers in command of divisions, with appropriate rank, as in European services, would greatly reduce the risk of such mishaps, and would advantageously simplify the communications of a general in command of a field with his troops.

While glorious for our people, and of crushing effect upon the morale of our hitherto confident and overweening adversary, as were the events of the battle of Manassas, the field was only won by stout fighting, and, as before reported, with much loss, as is precisely exhibited in the papers herewith, marked F, G, and H,(@) and being lists of the killed and wounded. The killed outright numbered 369, the wounded 1,483, making an aggregate of 1,852.

The actual loss of the enemy will never be known; it may now only be conjectured. Their abandoned dead, as they were buried by our people where they fell, unfortunately were not enumerated, but many parts of the field were thick with their corpses as but few battle-fields have ever been. The official reports of the enemy are studiously silent on this point, but still afford us data for an approximate estimate. Left almost in the dark in respect to the losses of Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s divisions, first, longest, and most hotly engaged, we are informed that Sherman’s brigade, Tyler’s division, suffered in killed, wounded, and missing 609; that is, about eighteen per cent. of the brigade. A regiment of Franklin’s brigade (Gorman’s) lost twenty-one per cent., Griffin’s (battery) loss was thirty per cent., and that of Keyes’ brigade, which was so handled by its commander as to be exposed to only occasional volleys from our troops, was at least ten per cent. To these facts add the repeated references in the reports of the more reticent commanders to the “murderous” fire to which they were habitually exposed, the “pistol-range” volleys, and galling musketry of which they speak as scourging their ranks, and we are warranted in placing the entire loss of the Federalists at over forty-five hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners. To this may be legitimately added as a casualty of the battle the thousands of fugitives from the field, who have never rejoined their regiments, and who are as much lost the enemy’s service as if slain or disabled by wounds. These may not be included under the head of missing, because in every instance of such report we took as many prisoners of those brigades or regiments as are reported missing.

A list appended exhibits some 1,460 of their wounded and others who fell into our hands and were sent to Richmond.(*) Some were sent to other points, so that the number of prisoners, including wounded who did not die, may be set down as not less than 1,600. Besides these a considerable number who could not be removed from the field died at several farm-houses and field hospitals within ten days following the battle.

To serve the future historian of this war I will note the fact that among the captured Federalists are officers and men of forty-seven regiments of volunteers, besides from some nine different regiments of regular troops, detachments of which were engaged. From their official reports we learn of a regiment of volunteers engaged, six regiments of Miles’ division, and the five regiments of Runyon’s brigade, from which we have neither sound nor wounded prisoners. Making all allowances for mistakes, we are warranted in saying that the Federal army consisted of at least fifty-five regiments of volunteers, eight companies of regular infantry, four of marines, nine of regular cavalry, and twelve batteries of forty-nine guns. These regiments at one time, as will appear from a published list appended, marked K, numbered in the aggregate 54,140, and average 964 each. From an order of the enemy’s commander, however, date, July 13, we learn that one hundred men front each regiment were directed to remain in charge of their respective camps. Some allowance must further be made for the sick and details, which would reduce the average to eight hundred men. Adding the regular cavalry, infantry, and artillery present, an estimate of their force may be made.(+)

A paper appended, marked L, exhibits in part the ordnance and supplies captured, including some twenty-eight field pieces of the best character of arm, with over one hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun, thirty-seven caissons, six forges, four battery wagons, sixty-four artillery horses completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 4,500 sets of accouterments, over 500 muskets, some nine regimental and garrison flags, with a large number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blankets, a large store of axes and intrenching tools, wagons, ambulances, horses, camp and garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some subsistence.

Added to these results may rightly be noticed here that by this battle an invading army, superbly equipped, within twenty miles of their base of operations, has been converted into one virtually besieged and exclusively occupied for months in the construction of a stupendous series of fortifications for the protection of its own capital.

I beg to call attention to the reports of the several subordinate commanders for reference to the signal parts played by individuals of their respective commands. Contradictory statements found in these reports should not excite surprise, when we remember how difficult if not impossible it is to reconcile the narrations of bystanders or participants in even the most inconsiderable affair, much less the shifting, thrilling scenes of a battlefield.

Accompanying are maps showing the positions of the armies on the morning of the 21st July and of three several stages of the battle; also of the line of Bull Run north of Blackburn’s Ford. These maps, from actual surveys made by Capt. D. B. Harris, assisted by Mr. John Grant, were drawn by the latter with a rare accuracy worthy of high commendation.(#)

In conclusion, it is proper and doubtless expected that through this report my countrymen should be made acquainted with some of the sufficient causes that prevented the advance of our forces and prolonged vigorous pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac. The War Department has been fully advised long since of all of those causes, some of which only are proper to be here communicated. An army which had fought as ours on that day, against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water and without food except a hastily-snatched scanty meal at dawn, was not in condition for the toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle.

On the following day an unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain intervened to obstruct our advance with reasonable prospect of fruitful results. Added to this, the want of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General, Commanding

General S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va

*Summarized in No.121, post.

@Namely: 3 colonels, 1 major, 13 captains, 36 lieutenants, 2 quartermasters, 5 surgeons, 7 assistant surgeons, 2 chaplains, 15 citizens, and 1,376 enlisted men.

+Report No. 120, post.

#Not found





Reviews Out the Wazoo

25 01 2008

 

I finished up my three book reviews in brief for the May issue of America’s Civil War earlier this week.  I’ll also write a full review of a Civil War DVD for the same issue this weekend.  And yesterday I received a book for review on this blog.

bloody-shirt-2.jpgThe Bloody Shirt: Terror after Appomattox, by Stephen Budiansky, was sent to me by Lindsay Prevette, a publicist at Viking/Penguin, who contacted me through the comments section of one of my posts.  I’m very upfront with folks who ask if I’ll review their book for the blog (keeping in mind this is only the third time this has happened).  I can’t guarantee how soon I’ll get to it, nor can I guarantee my review will be a positive one.  I think so far all the book reviews I’ve written here (solicited or otherwise) have been balanced.

The Bloody Shirt is another entry in the flavor of the month among academic Civil War historians – reconstruction – though its author is a journalist.  I’ll write a little review in brief next week, and will hopefully be able to blow through the book pretty quickly once I’ve finished the incredibly, unbelievably long biography of Sullivan Ballou I’m reading now.  Then I’ll write a full review.

I was pleasantly surprised when I opened Budiansky’s book to the illustrations (the first thing I do when I pick up a new book, even before the bibliography) and saw a nice portrait of Adelbert Ames, member of the USMA class of 1861 and winner of the Medal of Honor for his actions at First Bull Run.  Ames was a reconstruction mucky-muck and Republican governor of Mississippi, in addition to being the great-grandfather of George Plimpton.  There is also a portrait of James Longstreet, brigade commander at Bull Run who played a prominent and, to some, unpopular role in putting down post-war violence in New Orleans.

To top it all off yesterday I was presented with a great opportunity to combine book reviews with battlefield stomping.  I’m pretty stoked about this one.

Now all I need is for the big guy to add about 12 hours to each day.





Civil War Blogs – What I Look For

24 01 2008

While we’re on the subject of my rules, I think it’s time to let my readers know what I look for in a Civil War blog.  Let me preface this by saying a blog can be, and should be, whatever the blogger wants it to be.  It can be focused, or it can be a stream of consciousness.  It can strictly manage the comments of readers, even to the extent of not allowing reader comments, or it can let readers post whatever they want to the comments sections.  It can discuss any and all topics, or it can ban some.  There are no rules for blogging.  That’s the beauty.

What gets me to revisit a blog?  A few things:  I want the blogger to be true to how he or she has characterized the blog.  That’s not to say we can’t change what our blog is about over time as our blog develops (notice I gave myself some wiggle room, and some limitations, in my About over to the right).  Just don’t tell me that your blog is about one thing, then consistently post about something else over and over and over.  I’m not talking about folks discussing their personal lives or boosting their favorite football or baseball teams on their site, within reason.  Just be honest with your readers about what your blog is about, for cryin’ out loud!  Bait & switch: not for me.

I also look for a blog with a sense of humor, and yes, a positive outlook.  I don’t pursue this line of study to raise my blood pressure.  My cardiologist thinks this rule is a good one.  The angry, brooding genius who sees clearly all that is wrong with the stupid little people who don’t agree with him won’t mind if this stupid little person doesn’t give him hits.  Angry: not for me.

I don’t read a blog to find out what the blogger thinks about what other bloggers are writing (more specific, more personal than what I’m doing in this post).  I sometimes point readers to other blog articles that I find interesting, and may also expand the discussion of the topic here.  I may even publicly disagree.  But I try not to get personal in what I write or to theorize on and question the blogger’s integrity or motivation.  I leave that to his readers.  Harping on other bloggers: not for me.

If I want to read opinions on modern (post, say, 1876, though there are some exceptions) politics or religion, I’m not going to seek such out on a blog that advertises itself as being focused on some aspect of the American Civil War.  The same goes for getting tips on rewiring my house.  Modern politics & religion on a CW blog: not for me.

Bloggers who violate my rules for consistent viewing – I can’t say that I never revisit a blog that commits the transgressions listed above – are not doing anything wrong.  They’re not doing anything they shouldn’t be doing.  And they’re not bad people because of how they run their blog.  Their stuff is just not what I’m looking for.  That’s all. 

I try to follow my own rules.  Be sure to call me on it when I don’t.





A Rose by Any Other Name

23 01 2008

I have in my life taken aspirin when I’ve had a headache.  I have installed new copper plumbing throughout a two story house.  I have offered opinions on the legality of certain actions when asked.  However, I’m not a doctor.  I’m not a plumber.  And I’m not a lawyer.

You may have noticed that on this blog I’ve referred to individuals as historians.  I’ve referred to some as “historians”.  I’ve referred to others as herodotus.jpgwriters, and to others as chroniclers.  There’s a reason for that.  I have a rule.  It’s my rule, and not necessarily yours.  But since you’re reading my blog, you should know what my rules are.

In order for someone to be referred to as a (yes, for the 100 millionth time, it’s “a”, check your style manual!) historian by me, they must have earned an advanced degree – at least a master’s degree – in history.  That’s pretty simple.  There are no exceptions.  None.  Nada.

Whether or not I refer to someone as a historian has nothing to do with the quality or quantity of his or her work in the field of history.  It’s simply recognition of their membership in the profession: a profession that, like others, has requirements for membership (educational requirements, peer review requirements, ethical requirements).  It’s out of respect for the profession and for those individuals who have satisfied the minimum requirements for membership – requirements that I, at this late stage, will never satisfy – that I don’t throw the word historian around loosely.  There are good and bad doctors, plumbers, lawyers, and historians out there, but that does not change the fact that they are who and what they are.  And I yam what I yam, whatever that is.

Don’t get upset if I don’t refer to you or to someone you admire as a historian when you or they don’t meet my requirements.  If it makes you feel any better, the guy in the picture doesn’t meet them either.  But feel free to let me know when I make a mistake. 

I got the picture of Herodotus from this site - no, I can’t read a word of it.

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New Blog Alert

22 01 2008

 

Friend Chris Army has a new blog up.  I think it’s called Angel’s Share, but what you’ll see on the marquee is Musings of a bourbon sipping ACW Student, which fits him quite well if you replace sipping with swilling.  You’ll find it here, and in my blogroll to the right.

I think this is going to be a good one.  I’ve known Chris for awhile; he’s one of those Gettysburgaholics, but not a Frassanidiot to the extent of some of his compadres.  He’s published an article in Blue & Gray magazine on the most interesting day of the battle, July 1st.  Chris has a methodical, logical approach to his research, and never allows where he suspects something may lead actually do the leading.

By his latest post, it looks like Chris is trying to figure out what his blog, and blogs in general, should be.  All I can tell you is it should be what you want it to be, and it may take a little while for you to figure out what that is.  But you’re the only one who can do that.  Good luck Chris and good blogging!








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